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This thesis is a critical examination of Fukuyama's "end of history" version of
liberalism, in which he announces the triumphant emergence of liberal democracy
as _a universal_ fQrm _of_gg_'.'~rn_9J'~Ge~The __t!lesis seeks to investigate Francis
Fukuyama's notion of liberal democracy and his arguments for it, in order to
assess the normative impact of market driven political and economic outcomes on
the human context or life satisfaction, especially recognition. This is contrasted
with Amartya Sen's notion of well-being in order to show that Fukuyama does not
pay attention to some of the basic moral demands of human life.
The thesis is comprised of an introduction and six chapters. The contents of
these chapters can be presented briefly as follows:
• The first chapter looks at how Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant use the
theory of social contract to explain the genesis and justification of the state.
Featuring prominently in all their versions of social contract are the values of
freedom, equality, and independence of the individual, the process of
consensus, the primacy of self-preservation and the necessity of the state.
Together these laid the basis for a philosophically reasoned and
progressive theory of politics. This chapter also looks at the theory of
laissez-faire, which paved the way for a free market economy. This doctrine
was developed in the thought of Adam Smith, Ricardo, Mill and Bentham.
For Fukuyama these thinkers inaugurated a tradition of political thought that
ultimately led to liberalism and democracy.
• The second chapter discusses the teleological view of history underlying the
philosophical theories of history advanced by Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Each
of these thinkers assumes that history is moving towards an end point or
goal. It is from these philosophers that Fukuyama appropriates the idea of
universality to envisage the universality of liberal democracy.
• The third chapter analyzes Fukuyama's "end of history" claim and his
arguments for it. When communism finally collapsed, liberal democracy was
the only remaining option, he claims. Drawing on Kant's idea of universal
history, Hegel's notion of a universal and homogeneous state and Marx's
materialist interpretation of history, Fukuyama envisages a global order that
will be ushered in by the universal and homogeneous liberal state which is
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the ultimate goal of liberal democracy. It is the duty of the liberal state to
ensure equal and mutual recognition and affirmation of its citizens' freedom.
• The fourth chapter stages a debate between Fukuyama and Sen in which
the question of life satisfaction and its achievability is addressed. Fukuyama
claims that human-beings desire recegnition, and can best satisfy this
desire through liberal democracy. Sen for his part claims that people need
well-being, and can only achieve it through democracy, which he views as a
universal value. The discussion shows that although Fukuyama and Sen
may share similar political values they differ ideologically and in historical
vision.
• The fifth chapter deals with the critical evaluation of liberal democracy.
Several issues present major problems for liberal democracy. These issues
are liberal individualism as the central focus of liberalism and liberal
democracy; the global trend against gender bias; the political and cultural
homogenization of the world; the problem of parallel histories versus a
single inclusive history; desire-satisfaction versus need-satisfaction, and the
cultural preconditions of liberal democracy.
• The sixth chapter recapitulates the preceding chapters and spells out the
conclusion reached in the course of the thesis.
The findings on the notion of the "end of history" show that Fukuyama wishes the
equal and mutual recognition of the freedom and dignity of all individuals as well as
the affirmation of their individual rights. This concern for the individual is laudable.
However, excessive individualism threatens the fabric of every society, and
Fukuyama realizes that this threat is especially strong in liberal democracy. His
suggested solution is to cultivate social capital in the form of trust. This thesis
concludes that Fukuyama's medicine is no match for the disease; the whole thrust
of the intellectual tradition leading to liberal democracy - and of much else in
Western culture since Hobbes - is in the direction of excessive individualism and
the withering of community. Moreover, where Fukuyama sees isothymia - the
desire for equal recognition, the psychological truth is probably that people desire
to be recognized as superior - mega/othymia, again making individualism
intrinsically more threatening to a sense of community than Fukuyama seems to
realize.
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Fukuyama suggests that an international consensus in favour of liberal
democracy is emerging. But it appears that such a consensus is unlikely to arise -
nation-states fear disenfranchisement and assimilation and thus insist on their
sovereignty, effectively blocking any shift from the nation-state to a homogeneous
and universal liberal state. It is difficult to generate the consensus needed to
receive it as a universal system, because not all people subscribe to its cultural
preconditions. The satisfaction of human desire of any kind cannot be
universalized since human existence is centrally characterized by diversity of
context, culture, and perception. Any attempt to impose cultural or ideological
homogeneity requires conquest - cultural or military imperialism.
The triumphant emergence of liberal democracy cannot be the ultimate end
of the whole of human history. If this were the case, it would no longer be worth
trying to increase human knowledge, since knowledge always points to an open
future in terms of how it will be used for further advancement.
Due to its internal contradictions, such as the tension between excessive
individualism and community, liberal democracy has unintended negative
consequences. Liberal democracy is not yet the final ideology leading to human
satisfaction at a global level for this generation and generations to come as long as
human thought evolves. This will remain the case as long as Fukuyama's
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The subject of tne -present research is reflected in the title of this thesis: Ideology,
Virtue, and Well-being: A Critical Examination of Francis Fukuyama's Notion of
Liberal Democracy. In terms of scope, this thesis does not intend to
comprehensively cover all that has been written on the subject of ideology and its
influence on life satisfaction. Rather, it will study one ideology - Fukuyama's
version of liberalism at the end of history - to see how it promises satisfaction
through the distribution of recognition to all citizens of society.
The main aim of this thesis is to investigate Francis Fukuyama's notion of
liberal democracy and his arguments for it, and then contrast his ideas with those
expressed by Amartya Sen. Fukuyama believes that liberalism produces
satisfaction by offering all citizens mutual and equal recognition. This thesis
especially focuses on a moral question about Fukuyama's liberal society and
economy: does Fukuyama's liberalism in fact overcome the problem of unequal
recognition? Does it distribute recognition equitably, and thus achieve justice?
Although I acknowledge that liberalism has contributed much to political and
economic development, I shall contend that the triumph of liberalism1 does not
mean that there will be no other ideologies - either by revival or invention - in
contest with it. I shall also maintain that the triumph of liberalism does not seem to
resolve the ethical problem of inequality in the distribution of socio-political and
economic goods in the era of Fukuyama's "end of history" - it neither encourages
the equal distribution of wealth nor shows any concern with such equality. I shall
also argue that either Fukuyama's end of history project lacks a theory of ethics or,
1Fukuyama repeatedly refers to the expression two terms, namely "liberal democracy" and "neo-
liberalism." According to Heywood (1997:43) neo-Iiberalism is an updated version of classical
political economy that was developed in the writings of free-market economists such as Fredrick
Hayek and Milton Friedman, and philosophers such as Robert Nozick. Its central pillars are the
market and the individual, including his/her liberty (Heywood, 1997:47). The individual's liberty is
expressed in negative terms - thus non-interference by the state or the absence of external
constraints upon the individual. In economic liberalism, this position is based on a deep faith in the
mechanism of the free market and the belief that the economy works best when left alone by the
government. Although the expression liberal democracy and neo-liberalism will sometimes be used
i~ this thesis, whenever and wherever the term 'liberalism' is used, it will refer to the merger of
liberal democracy and neo-liberalism.
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if it has one, that it is too superficial to cater for the inherent social problems of
liberal societies.
The justification for my choice of topic for this thesis lies in the following:
questions of morality and/or economic justice in globalisation are fundamental in
many disciplines today, including philosophy. And yet a debate between
Fukuyama and Sen has yet to take place in the field of philosophy. This debate
crucially concerns how the rival notions "recognition" and "well-being" fare when it
comes to offering life satisfaction, and whether justice in the distribution of life
satisfaction can be better achieved by focusing on "recognition" a /a Fukuyama or
by focusing on "well-being" a la Sen. This thesis intends to contribute to this
debate, which cuts to the core of issues concerning ideology, markets, economic
justice and 'the human context.' Thus it will critically examine liberal democracy as
expounded by Fukuyama in order to assess the normative impact of market driven
political and economic outcomes on the human context of life satisfaction.
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
Background to Statement of the Problem
In many parts of the world, particularly in Europe before and during the
Enlightenment, history has been understood in terms of the idea of progress
towards some ideal end point. Thus understanding changes as progress becomes
a fundamental norm for the development of societies. In many societies, especially
Western societies, liberal ideas and institutions have been the vehicle of this 'belief
in progress' or 'ideology of progress.' Liberalism embraced and promoted the
following fundamental indicators of the ideology of progress: (1) "the absence of
social controls over individual behaviour;" (2) "increased human power to control
the environment in ways that provide conditions of greater ease, comfort and
security for human life;" and (3) "a marketplace offering an ever increasing
superabundance for the gratification of every human desire" (Fowler, 1995:104). In
human societies where these liberal ideas of progress or change have flourished,
this has mostly happened after traditional forms and values were weakened or
corrupted, either as a result of natural waning, or as a result of deliberate
destruction.
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It was in the 1yth century during the English revolution that the idea of
liberalism clearly emerged in tandem with the dissolution of the feudal system and
the emergence of a modern capitalist society. These liberal ideas spread to many
places in the wake of the French and American revolutions (Eccleshall, 1984:28;
Dahrendorf, 1987:173; Heywood,1-99+A~). - Consequently, the liberal wave
entered into an inseparable merger with market capitalism and became a theory
and practice that extolled the virtues of laissez-faire capitalism. This merger
between liberalism and market capitalism was highly influential in the 18th and
(especially) 19th century (Dahrendorf, 1987:173; Cl. also Heywood, 1997:41).
Liberalism has shown that it has consequences for socio-ethical, economic
and political thought. Firstly, in its socio-ethical aspect, liberalism calls for the
dissolution of cultural variations and for the reconstruction or even invention of new
moral values and inter-human relations. Secondly, in its economic aspect, it gives
a forum for 'equal access and participation,' but of divergent and competing
interests governed by market forces (Dahrendorf, 1987:173). Thirdly, in its political
aspect, it was instrumental in the promotion of the idea of democracy (Dahrendorf,
1987:173). Although the idea of democracy emerged in ancient Greece more than
two millennia ago, Plato dismissed it as the most undisciplined form of
governance. Despite its bad press from Plato, democracy later went on to become
a historically highly influential idea.
In the later stages of its development, liberalism advanced and evolved into
an ideology and a movement that assumed an influential role in attempting to
understand, evaluate, and influence change in political and economic
development, urbanization, scientific progress and cultural secularisation
(Sheehan, 1982:1). When it assumed this role, liberalism developed its own set of
ideas and set of institutions founded on the twin principle of the freedom and
equality of individuals. These were necessary to counter existing rival ideologies,
such as hereditary monarchism, fascism, and communism. At the natural death
and/or deliberate overthrow of these rival ideologies, liberalism - then liberal
democracy (in synergy with market economy) survived. And it is this lone
triumphant survival of liberalism that Francis Fukuyama records as "the end of
history," beginning with his article "The End of History," that first appeared in the
National Interest in 1989. The theory expressed in the article was later expanded
14
into a book, The End of History and the Last Man (1992) (hereafter The End of
History), which is central to this thesis.
According to Fukuyama (1992), after the fall of communism the only
working ideology for governance and economic development was liberalism. Using
the Hegelian-Marxianconceptof history-as instrument to interpret the triumphant
inevitability of liberalism over other ideologies, Fukuyama concludes that the fall of
communism as an ideology means the gradual and ultimately triumphant
emergence of liberal democracy. In The End of History Fukuyama reiterates the
two basic arguments he presented in the article, "The End of History". Firstly, he
argues that there is "a remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal
democracy as a system of government" that has "emerged throughout the world
over" as the triumphant ideology that has vanquished its rivals: "hereditary
monarchy, fascism, and most recently communism" (Fukuyama, 1992:xi).
Secondly, Fukuyama (1992:xi) argues that "liberal democracy may constitute the
'end point of mankind's ideological evolution' and the 'final form of human
government' and as such constitute the 'end of history,'" satisfying the immemorial
human desire for recognition.
Fukuyama traces the conceptual development of liberalism and the factors
that supported its successful emergence as an 'ultimately triumphant' system of
governance and economic development. In The End of History (1992), Fukuyama
shows that in contemporary life and in theory there is an inseparable convergence
of liberal democracy as a form of justice and neo-liberalism as an economic
system striving for free markets. He claims that this convergence satisfies both
"rational desire" through the accumulation and distribution of wealth, and the
thymotic desire, which expresses itself in the "struggle for recognition." This
convergence has transformed inter-human relations fundamentally. Fukuyama's
view is that the twin conditions of liberal democracy and neo-liberal economics
have supported each other, occasioned each other, produced each other, and
finally, linked together in a form of life that is fully satisfying to human beings
(insofar as it is operative), and hence, fully supportive of equality as a qualitative
aspect of human dignity. Behind this view of Fukuyama is a universalistic vision of
what the equality of humanity entails, along with a rosy picture of the benign nature
of neo-liberal economics. Fukuyama is convinced that the Western liberal idea
(based on the twin principles of liberty and equality in political and economic life)
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has triumphed over contending ideologies (e.g. fascism, and communism). The
resulting universal consensus concerning the legitimacy of political and economic
liberalism heralds the economic homogenization of the world. For Fukuyama
global neo-liberalism promises us prosperity and peace, as well as a global
economic and politicalentity:--It will usher in a fair-distribution of economic goods
and allow the satisfaction of the human desire for recognition.
Fukuyama portrays the liberal project with modified libertarian motivation
and tendencies - through neo-liberalism - as aiming to establish one and the
same economic system across all human communities, regardless of any
differences in culture or values they may exhibit. It displays its ethical
shortcomings especially in the question of economic equality. It subscribes to the
market ideal that is regarded by libertarians as the ideal form of economic
integration and fair distribution for all people at all times, regardless of the values
they endorse.
In his work Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (1995),
Fukuyama focuses upon the economic performance of various cultural groupings
after the "end of history." He argues that the difference in economic success of
different cultures is partly a function of the shared moral horizons that bind people
within a community into networks of trust, which constitute social capital. By social
capital Fukuyama (1995:26) means the "capability that arises from the prevalence
of trust in a society or in certain parts of it." It is from the stores of social capital that
capitalism and liberal democracy draw their effective functioning (Warren,
1999:319). In Trust Fukuyama addresses inter-human relationships within the
bounds of his "end of history" project. His view of human relations turns out to be
market-oriented. This is because in the market money co-ordinates relationships
between the market participants (Offe, 1999:42), and without money these
relationships do not exist. Fukuyama believes that liberal democracy is conducive
to interpersonal trust. Inglehart (1999:88) opposes this belief, arguing that
"democratic institutions do not necessarily produce interpersonal trust." Inglehart is
correct because political institutions are not the only sphere controlling society.
There are other spheres of society at work such as family, business, the judiciary,
religion, etc. In The Great Disruption (1999) Fukuyama argues that a new social
order after the "end of history" is under construction that will see human beings,
driven by new developments in the biological sciences, construct new moral values
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and reason their way through to a new and spontaneous social arrangement under
one ideology - liberal democracy. This means the destruction of existing forms of
interpersonal trust and the creation of new moral values. The spontaneous
reception (which Fukuyama interprets as the triumph) of liberal democracy,
according to Fukuyama(1999),has also opened the door to-new forms of trust in
inter-human relations, as well as between the state and its citizens, a change that
will impel humanity to invent new ethical concepts.
Like Fukuyama, Amartya Sen2 (1999:3-5) holds that the idea of democracy has
become a universal value and commitment. This claim to universality faces
challenges from various ideological persuasions, both political and economic. Talking
about the functions of democracy, Sen (1999:8-11) points out three important values
promoted by democracy, namely,
(1) intrinsic value - the importance of politico-economic "participation and freedom in
human life";
(2) instrumental value - people's expression and support of their political will in
"keeping governments responsible and accountable"; and
(3) constructive value - the "role of democracy in the formation of values and in the
understanding of needs, rights, and duties."
Many neo-liberal scholars contend that the market economy is successful in terms of
the democratic virtues listed above. According to Sen (1985: 1) "it is natural to feel that
an institution that is so crucial to our well-being must be valuable" - hence "the
market's moral standing 'has to be' high." The market is a crucial institution to our
well-being and we are dependent on it, yet this fact, Sen (1985: 1) argues, "does not
tell us much about the value of the market as an institution." The question is: how
does one judge the value and moral standing of the market economy? For Sen
(1985: 17), the assessment of the moral standing of the market mechanism is related
to its results, thus it is derivative and contingent. The outcomes of the market
economy raise questions about distributive justice, related to a normative analysis of
the problem of inequality based on interpersonal comparisons of human wellbeing.
In his extensive exploration of the question: "Equality of what?" Sen (1992: 12-
30) critically re-examines the issue of inequality by investigating the existence of
2 Amartya K. Sen is an economist born in 1933 in India. He attended Presidency College, Calcutta
where he obtained a B.A. degree in economics from Calcutta University. In 1955 he moved to
Britain to study at Trinity College, Cambridge University. where he got a BA in economics, an MA
and a PhD. He has written many books and articles. Two of his most relevant books to this thesis
are Inequality Re-examined (1992) and Development as Freedom (1999).
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interpersonal differences. For Sen what is fundamental in the first place is the
substantive freedom to pursue well-being (See Chapter 5 of this thesis). According to
Sen, Rawls overlooks the interpersonal differences in human existence when he
holds that the distribution of primary goods should be equal among all the members of
-the commanity-;-regardlessof their individual-differences. Instead, Sen introduces the
capability equality approach. He (Sen, 1987; 1992) defines a capability as the ability
to achieve a certain "functioning", for example, literacy is a capability, and reading is a
functioning. Consequently, Sen defines human well-being in terms of the functionings
a person achieves. In contrast with Rawls' egalitarian conception of strict equality -
the notion that primary goods should be distributed equally, Sen (1992:39-87)
advocates for the unequal distribution of primary goods in pursuit of a different form
equality: the equality of the "capabilities" of different persons to strive and achieve
valuable functionings, and more generally their equality in their effective freedom to
pursue their well-being. DeMartino (2000: 108) comments that Sen's "principle of
capabilities equality promotes extensive ... social experimentation" that involves "no
necessary presumptions about the existence of one ideal set of institutional
arrangements (such as neo-liberalism)." The principle encourages the vigilant
interrogation of the exact performance of any existing economic system, with the
intention of pressing for reform where there is failure to meet the demands of the
principle of capability equality (DeMartino, 2000: 108). The principle of capability
equality rejects the idea of the "end of history" that anticipates the coming of some
final state of an organizational entity. It is an open-ended view of society that leaves
room for societies to enhance the capabilities of their citizens.
The Problem
Liberalism can contribute to the development of many aspects of the conditions of
human existence, but its inherent concept of "absolute" freedom seen in a free
market economy, as well as its policy of competition, have profound effects upon
the social, environmental and temporal conditions of humankind. Furthermore,
many critics claim, liberalism exacerbates such problems as poverty,
environmental destruction, anti-democratic tendencies and even the inadequate
functioning of financial markets. On the basis of this understanding of the
phenomenon of economic liberalism, the problem to be addressed in this research
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can be stated in the following terms. The hisforico-philosophical roots of economic
liberalism expounded by Fukuyama show that its political and economic
tendencies have moral shortcomings regarding issues of justice in the distribution
of economic and political recognition. Human dignity remains unprotected and
does-not flourish: Howcan-these- cf)flcepis-beamendedor replaced by better
ones, while respecting the fact that global markets are here to stay, whether we
like it or not.
In addressing the problem of the best approach to justice for market-
oriented societies, with regard to well-being, I have carefully considered the views
of both Sen and Fukuyama, and conclude that Sen offers a better theory of justice
within market-oriented societies with regard to human well-being. Hence I end up
siding with Sen's views on this matter.
Some of the broad questions of my thesis are: Is liberal democracy the best
alternative to ensure political and economic justice? Is Sen's theory of economic
justice adequate as an alternative to Fukuyama? Does Sen's view take adequate
cognisance of the broad problem of human dignity in the context of globalisation?
To address these broad questions, the following more specific questions will need
to be addressed:
(1) What are the philosophical ideas underlying the purported rise and 'triumph' of
liberal democracy expressed in Fukuyama?
(2) Shall we enter the "end of history" with all the problems of unequal recognition?
(3) Can human satisfaction be systematized or universalized through one system
of thought from one cultural perspective - Western liberal democracy?
In a nutshell, this thesis critically examines two major theorists of modern political
and economic thought - both concerned with issues of justice, but in disagreement
with each other. In this thesis I will construe Sen's acute questioning of laissez-
faire economics as in effect a critique of Fukuyama. I will seek to understand and
discover the normative and descriptive adequacy of what is nevertheless of value
in Fukuyama's claim of universal and mutual recognition. And finally I will examine
Sen's concept of well-being.
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DIVISION OF CHAPTERS
The thesis comprises of the following chapters:
Intro-duction
The introduction discusses the status of the subject matter (the scope, the focus,
starting point and justification), the statement of the problem, and the whole set up
of chapters.
Chapter 1: Philosophical Antecedents of Fukuyama - Part I: Liberal Notions
of Morality and Political Economy
The aim of this chapter is to explore the philosophical ideas and assumptions that
underlie Fukuyama's views on liberalism, especially the politico-economic aspect.
This background is important for understanding Fukuyama's philosophy of the 'end
of history' which he derives from Hegel-as-interpreted-by-Kojeve.
Chapter 2: Philosophical Antecedents of Fukuyama - Part 11: Philosophy of
History
Chapter 2 traces some further philosophical antecedents of Fukuyama - this time
regarding the theory of history. Kant's, Hegel's and Marx's ideas on history and
related themes are discussed, especially the idea of the end of history.
Chapter 3: The "End of History": An Analysis of Fukuyama's Argument for
the Triumph of Liberal Democracy
The identified corpus of Fukuyama's writings is critically analyzed and evaluated in
order to give a clear account of his views on "the end of history" as the triumph of
liberal democracy.
Chapter 4: Recognition or Well-being?: Sen versus Fukuyama on Life
Satisfaction in a Liberal Society
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Fukuyama claims that life satisfaction is realized in the fulfilment of the desire for
mutual recognition that is brought to a homogenized 'world society' through liberal
democracy. The work of Amartya Sen gives an opposing view that attempts to
show the- moral "limits "of the- ethics· of" liberal-aernocracy in relation to life
satisfaction. Sen's view relies on his concept of the primacy of the freedom to
pursue well-being, which takes the notion of basic needs as its point of departure.
Chapter 5: Critical Evaluation of the Fukuyama versus Sen Debate
In the fifth chapter I critically evaluate the arguments presented by the two thinkers
in relation to central issues such as individualism, difference or inequality,
recognition, desire and need satisfaction.
Chapter 6: Recapitulation and Conclusion
This chapter presents my final conclusions.
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CHAPTER 1
PHILOSOPHICAL ANTECEDENTS OF FUKUYAMA - PART I:
LIBERAL CONCEPTIONS OF MORALITY AND
POLITICAL ECONOMY
-Seek-ye first the Kingdom of pure practical reason and its justice, and your end (the b!~ssing of
perpetual peace) will come to you of itself. Thus it is, for example, a principle of moral politics that a
people is to unite itself into a state in accordance with freedom and equality as the sole concepts of
right, and this principle is not based upon prudence but upon duty.
- Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace.
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The long period between Socrates and Adam Smith saw the emergence of a
variety of philosophical reflections concerning systems of governance, virtue and
life satisfaction. Politics and economics are of particular philosophical interest as
they raise moral questions concerning the justification of the formation of the state
as well as obligations to the state, social welfare, distributive justice, freedom, and
recognition. Above all, they raise questions about the equitable well-being of all
individuals. These questions have led thinkers to dialectically and critically reflect
on their contemporary situations by revisiting and reinterpreting ideas that
dominated and shaped life in previous epochs of human history. Such dialectic
reflection recurs in Fukuyama's interpretation of the fall of communism and the rise
of liberal democracy as the end of history. Fukuyama (1992:288) believes that this
dialectic reflection is important because
we need a trans-historical standard against which to measure democratic society,
some concept of "man as man" that would allow us to see its potential defects. It
was for that reason that we turned to the "first men" of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau,
and Hegel.
Fukuyama not only turned to Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Hegel, but also to
Kant, Marx and, surprisingly, Nietzsche - whom many scholars regard as an
enemy of democracy. I will not deal with Nietzsche in this study as one of
Fukuyama's antecedents. So the next two chapters attempt to critically outline
ideas that contributed to the shaping of Fukuyama's notion of liberal democracy as
expressed in his idea of the end of history.
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In this chapter, I will give a survey of the major liberal notions regarding
humankind's desirable political arrangements, as well as the conception of
economic needs during and after the European Enlightenment period. Politically,
Fukuyama appropriates social contract theories (centring on ideas such as self-
preservation, recognition;~freedom; and-equality) because they uphold the liberal
ideas of consensus and toleration - recognizing the interest of the individual. As
for economics: he endorses a laissez-faire theory. These theories serve as the
central pillars supporting Fukuyama's claim of the end of history.
In the first part of this chapter attention will be paid to the social contract
theories of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In the
second part of the chapter I will concentrate on the theory of laissez-faire whose
proponents are Adam Smith, Ricardo, Bentham, and Mill. I will also pay attention
to libertarianism.
1.2 THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL CONTRACT
It is not clear whether the idea of contract co-emerged with the ideas of
sovereignty and natura/law or if they were subsequent to each other. Be this as it
may, the three are politically and economically coherent or relational and
contribute to the idea of what a just distribution of human satisfaction would be. In
Bodin's (1962: 102ff) sixteenth century philosophy that prefigured Hobbes, the state
is defined as the embodiment of the presence of the sovereign. The sovereign's
presence within the state is viewed as the source of law, although this same law
does not bind the sovereign. This makes sovereignty indivisible, and inalienable,
from the state. Families (natural associations) and their property are not, however,
at the sovereign's unlimited disposal. According to Quinton (1994:313) this makes
Bodin's doctrine of the sovereign less absolute. In a much more comprehensive
way than Bodin, Hobbes used the ideas of contract and natural law to defend
absolute sovereignty; however he was limited by the logical necessity of his
contractarian form of unrestricted absolutism.
Contractarianism3 was discussed and defended in Thomas Hobbes's
Leviathan, John Locke's Second Treatise of Government, and Jean-Jacques
3 The term contractarianism refers to a family of moral and political theories that make use of the
idea of a social contract (Burch, 1995:159). This idea views political relations as originating in
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Rousseau's Social Contract. It gained acceptance among the utilitarians and
libertarians. However, it was strongly criticised by David Hume in his essay, "Of the
original contract," and by Hegel in his Philosophy of Right. The social contract was,
however, considered in all these cases to be preferable to the ideology of
hereditary-mon8reMial-rule-;--AeeorEiiA§- to-- Flew- (-1979: 32B);the notion of social
contract refers to
an agreement between individuals, or between individuals and a governing power,
in which some personal liberties are freely surrendered in return for the advantages
of having a well-organized society, or good government.
Hampton (1995:745) also defines social contract as "an agreement either between
the people and their ruler, or among the people in the community." The idea of a
social contract has been used in diverse arguments to either explain, or justify,
both "the origin of the state, or of human society, or of particular social
arrangements" (Flew, 1979:328; et. also Hampton, 1995:745). Central to
philosophers such as Plato (to a certain extent), Hobbes, Locke, and Kant, who all
use the social contract theory, is the argument that human beings at first lived in a
pre-political 'state of nature' before they were constituted as a political community
(Rousseau's social contract theory does not fit this pattern). This 'state of nature' is
so unbearable that they would soon enter into an agreement, either with one
another, or with a prospective ruler, to install a political entity that each believed
would secure his or her lot (Hampton, 1995:745).
There are many versions of the social contract, but I shall concentrate on
the political and moral versions. Within these political and moral versions, Freeman
(1998:659) usefully distinguishes two main social contact views, namely, interest-
based contract views that stem from Hobbes; and democratic contract views which
are derived from the natural rights theories of Locke who argued against royal
absolutism, and after Locke, from Rousseau and Kant.
According to Freeman (1998:659), the common aim of interest-based
contract theories is to account for justice as it relates to what best promotes each
individual's enlightened interests. Interest-based contract theories are
characterised by Freeman (1998:659) as follows:
contract or agreement (Freeman, 1998:657). Proponents include Hobbes, Locke, Hume,
Rousseau, and Kant.
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(1) basic, self-regarding and individual-focused desires and interests that are fixed
by their nature but definable without moral notions;
(2) agreements based on rational compromise where each party is prepared to
accept limitations on the pursuit of their interest on the condition that others are
----willing to do so;--- . -- ...- -.-
(3) agreement that all members must be made better than they would without it;
(4) agreements that are historical in the sense that parties know their particular
desires and circumstances.
Unlike interest-based contracts, democratic contracts centre on the primary
democratic ideals of freedom and equality. The social contract theories of Locke,
Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls are all examples of democratic contracts. According to
Freeman (1998:659), the basic idea embodied in democratic contract views is that
if free individuals all reach consensus on something, from a suitable position of
equality,
the standards they would endorse embody requirements of democratic justice
applicable to all the parties as far as they aim to co-operate on terms of equal
freedom and mutual respect and recognition.
These are central ideas that come out of the idea of social contract underpinning
Fukuyama's "end of history" project. They form the basis of his argument for, and
promise of, economic prosperity under liberalism. The intention of this section is to
selectively trace the theory of social contract and its implications for Fukuyama's
liberal ideas.
1.2.1 Hobbes: Absolute Sovereignty of the Leviathan State
Fukuyama (1992:144-145; 1995:284; 1999:165) regards Hobbes, Locke and
Rousseau as the original sources of liberalism in Western political thought.
Hobbes, according to Fukuyama, stands at the head of this liberal philosophical
tradition. Many political philosophers object to this idea. Levine (2002:46) argues
that Hobbes was plainly not a liberal, because in Hobbes, there is "a tenet of his
theory of the sovereignty that the sovereign's power is necessarily unrestricted,
that a sovereign can rightfully do anything." If Hobbes were a liberal, argues Levine
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(2002:46), then he would have shown that there is "a principled limitation on the
use of coercive force; restrictions on what sovereigns might rightfully do." Levine
(2002:46) depicts Hobbes as "a forerunner of liberal political thought." This is
simply because Hobbes introduces a shift from inherited monarchical rule to a
consensuahnstallation ofa sovereign by a group of-people.
Hobbes's philosophical enterprise emerges from the ethical and political
culture of Renaissance humanism and moves towards the dawn of the
Enlightenment. A closer look at Hobbes's moral and political philosophl shows
that it converges on the idea of the supremacy of the individual, although he tries
to propagate the idea of absolute sovereignty as the only stable alternative to
anarchy.
The fundamental problem that Hobbes tries to address is that of creating a
political order that would transform the tendencies of individual human passions,
which Levine (2002:24) calls "the natural condition of mankind." Accordingly
citizens of the state of nature would attempt to solve the problem by seeking ways
that would leave each one of them in a mutually advantageous position. In order to
do this they had to construct a sovereign power that would enforce their agreement
to surrender some of their rights in return for a more peaceful condition.
In his introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, Sorell (1996:6-
7) shows that Hobbes allocates to moral philosophy the investigation of human
passions and patterns of behaviour, and to political philosophy the theory of the
institution of sovereignty as a response to the question of rulership and source of
law. Although they are allocated different tasks, the two fields of thought both
invariably converge on the individual. It is at this convergence of Hobbes's moral
and political thought that we encounter liberal ideas such as equal rights, liberty,
justice, and the justification of the state on the basis of consensus and toleration.
These ideas have an inseparable relationship to the idea of self-preservation.
4 Hobbes defines Ethics or Moral philosophy as the science or knowledge of "consequences from
the passions .of men", and "wh~t i~ Good and Evil, in the conversation, and Society of mankind.
Good and EVil a~e names that signify our appetites, and aversions" (in the Leviathan, 1966c:72-73,
146):, o.r that. whl~h h~s to do with "the passions, manners [mores] and the aims or purposes of
men (m Anti-White, (In Tuck (1996:179». In distinction to Ethics, Hobbes (in Anti-White, (in Tuck
(~996:179».d.efines ~Oli~ics (or Civil Philosophy) as that subject that "concerns human society and
discusses cIvil laws, Justice and all other virtues."
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1.2.1.1 The Idea of Self-preservation
Hobbes (1966c: 110-123) presents the state of nature as a condition in which free
and equal individuals find themselves in contact with each other in the absence of
a superior authority (a state or civil society) that can lay down and enforce rules of
order to control their behaviour toward each other. In the state of nature there is
thus no governance by law, and no recognition of authority. Consequently
individuals are a threat to each other and fall into the condition which Hobbes
(1966c:115) calls "a war of all against aiL" The war of all against all is a result of a
conflict of interests, each individual's rational pursuit of his intent, the urge to get
anything in any way, including killing, so as to satisfy his desires. A central desire
is that of self-preservation. This desire is supplemented by the desire for glory
based on "competition of riches, honour, command, or other power," this desire
"inclineth to contention, enmity, and war: because the way of one competitor, to
the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repel the other" (Hobbes,
1966c:86). It is a condition based on self-interest, and its consequences are that
human life becomes "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" (Hobbes, 1966c:113).
Self-interest provides the sole motivation for doing anything to fulfil one's desires,
especially the desire for the achievement and promotion of self-preservation. Out
of this condition Hobbes derives his principles of right and justice.
In attempting to propose an idea of good reasoning, Hobbes sets out from a
comprehensive system of materialistic metaphysics5 in which all that exists is
matter in motion6 . This materialistic picture of humankind lays the foundation for
5 The most important and basic assumption of Hobbes's materialist metaphysics is that all that
exists are bodies (matter) and all that is knowable is solely of bodies (matter). It follows that the
concern of philosophy is to inquire into the causes and characteristics of these bodies (physical,
human, and the body politic) (Hobbes, 1966a:2-12). All these bodies share a common
characteristic, that of materia prima (Le. first matter) (Hobbes, 1966a:117-118). Hobbes
(1966a:119) defines materia prima, as "body in general, that is, body considered universally, not as
having neither form nor any accident, but in which no form nor any other accident but quantity are
at all considered, that is, they are not drawn into argumentation".
6 Equally important to the above mentioned assumption is the notion of motion (Hobbes,
1966a:113-116). Hobbes (1966a:204) defines motion as the continual privation (or relinquishing) of
one place and acquiring of another. There are two types of motion. On the one hand, there is vital
motion which refers to the process of birth, continues through life and includes such motions as the
course of blood, pulse, nutrition, breathing, excretion, "to which motions there needs no help of
imagination" (Hobbes, 1966a:38). On the other hand, there is voluntary motion (or animal motion)
which refers to going, speaking, the deliberate movement of our limbs. There are first of all
movements in our minds, "... because going, speaking, and the like voluntary motions, depend
~Iways up?n a preced~nt.thought of whither, which way, and what; it is evident, that the imagination
IS the first Internal beginning [that is: cause - RW] of all voluntary motion" (Hobbes, 1966a:39).
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his notion of self-preservation. It is from his materialist psychology that Hobbes
(Leviathan, Chapter 6 and De Homine, Chapter 11) explains the origin and nature
of various passions and emotions, including the supreme desire, or passion for
self-preservation. The desire for self-preservation is very important to Hobbes's
-accountofhuman-warfare--in -the state of nature, andte his justification for absolute
sovereignty (Hampton, 1986:14). Fukuyama (1992:156) even describes it as "the
fundamental moral fact" for Hobbes - the concepts of justice and right are founded
on the pursuit of the desire to preserve one's physical existence.
In trying to further establish the importance of the idea of self-preservation,
one should ask whether self-preservation can be understood as intrinsic, or as only
interactive and socially developed. In his book, The Elements of Law Natural and
Politic, Hobbes (1928:71) argues that it is natural for human beings "to avoid that
which is hurtful" and, most of all, "the terrible enemy of nature, death", that causes
"both the loss of all power and also the greatest of all bodily pains in the losing..."
In this argument, Hobbes emphasises the primacy of the desire for self-
preservation over death, but in the De Homine, he (Hobbes, 1968:48-49)
acknowledges that
though death is the greatest of all evils (especially when accompanied by torture),
the pains of life can be so great that, unless their quick end is foreseen, they lead
men to number death among the goods.
What comes out of Hobbes' argument is that the desire for self-preservation is
clearly presented as being intrinsic on the grounds that we are naturally averse to
anything that hinders our internal vital motions, especially death, which causes the
complete cessation of vital motions. The choice for death is only made in a
situation where life involves enormous pain.
A close look at the idea of self-preservation also shows that it has two
aspects: the first has to do with the means to achieve one's preservation of
physical existence - laws of nature (or natural law) (this will be discussed below
under point 1.2.1.2). The second aspect has to do with valuation and moral laws.
Concerning the first aspect, in Leviathan, Hobbes (1966c:116) describes the law of
nature as
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a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do
that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the
same; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved.
Furthermore, Hobbes (1966c: 117) explains that this precept or general rule of
reason implies
that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it;
and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and
advantages of war.
In the De Corpore Politico, Hobbes (1966d:86-87) talks of the laws of nature as
founded on reason. He (Hobbes, 1966d:86) argues that since no person is mighty
enough to assure himself or herself prolonged self-preservation as long as he or
she remains in the state of hostility and war, reason must dictate that every person
in the state of nature seeks peace for his or her own good. Hobbes (1966d:87)
here describes reason as the law of nature itself (Chapter 11: 1), and as a precept of
natural law (Chapter 11:2). These seemingly conflicting descriptions of the laws of
nature raised a lot of questions among commentators regarding what Hobbes
means, but not one of them seems to capture Hobbes' fundamental idea on this
issue. It may be possible that Hobbes meant to say that reason carries with it two
sides: one side makes reason function as the foundation - or law - of nature; the
other side sees its function as a general rule of natural law that governs human
behaviour.
Hampton (1986:89) points out that in Leviathan the laws of nature are
characterised by Hobbes as theorems "designed to specify actions· that will be
means to one's self-preservation." But Tuck (1996:189) argues that Hobbes
presents the laws of nature "as an implication of the principle of self-
preservation... " One needs to ask what exactly these laws of nature entail. From
scattered references one can assemble Hobbes' exposition of the laws of nature.
Laws of nature include such things as seeking peace, defending ourselves, justice,
equity, liberty, fidelity to covenants, modesty, mercy and gratitude (Hobbes, 1966c:
113-147). Thus the laws of nature appear to mean all activities that cause and
govern our natural behaviour through the instrument of reason as we strive to
preserve our physical existence.
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The second aspect of the notion of self-preservation deals with valuations
and moral laws. Hobbes' moral philosophy is sometimes viewed as both
subjectivist in valuations and objectivist in moral laws.
(1) Concerning--valuations, Hobbes (1966cA1 )-defines -that- which is "Good" as
whatsoever is the object of someone's desire, and that which is evil as the
object of someone's hate and aversion. One can point out that underneath the
Hobbesian ethic is the polarity of the greatest good, self-preservation (Hobbes,
1968:48), versus the greatest evil, death (Hobbes, 1928:71). That which is
good cannot be defined as simply good, but it should be said to be relative to
person, place, and time (Hobbes, 1928:47), leading Hampton (1986:29) to
conclude that Hobbes' ethic "espouses a thoroughgoing ethical subjectivism."
(2) Concerning moral laws, Jessop (1960:25) argues against those who label
Hobbes' ethic as wholly political and relativist. According to Jessop this label is
not strictly correct because Hobbes holds
that the moral laws are so contrary to our passions that we cannot bring ourselves
to follow them except under fear of an external coercive power, and when we are
sure that our neighbours are under the same reliable control. ... that the moral laws
are objective, perpetually valid, and divine in origin, but can only become operative
or effective in a State.
In other words, Jessop is arguing that moral laws can only be objective when they
function under the sovereignty which Hobbes terms a reasoned institution. On the
same note, but from a different angle, Sorell (1996:7) comments that
moral laws can be objective in the sense of commanding universal assent and
leading to a condition (peace) that everyone will find SUbjectively preferable to its
absence (war), without there being an independently existing rightness that they
conform to.
Although it appears that way, it is not possible to say that this is Hobbes' idea
concerning the moral laws. Social or civil life, for Hobbes, rotated around the
sovereign whose authority permeated every aspect of life. The realisation of a
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social contract by the installation of the sovereignty made any moral laws agreed
upon, binding.
1.2.1.2 The Social Contract
Hobbes's argument in Leviathan is that there should be a reasoned and
consensual institution of an absolute sovereignty (which Locke, in contrasting and
unfavourable terms, equates with tyranny) rather than an inherited one, as was the
tradition in the monarchical era. He attempts to show that bad reasoning plunged
European societies into political chaos during the seventeenth century (Hampton,
1986:1). Hobbes's philosophy is obviously a response to events in his own
country. England, in the first half of the sixteenth century experienced "the irascible
despotism of Henry VIII" followed by "ecclesiastical oppression" (Quinton,
1994:314). Peters (1967:40) describes the political and moral situation of England
during this time as verging on anarchy. In the seventeenth century, especially the
years leading to the English Civil War, Quinton (1994:316) says, "resistance to
royal encroachments - denial of customary rights, ruling without parliament - led to
the bandying about of a phrase with a very important future: the 'life, liberty, and
property'" of an individual.
In a bid to show that European 'bad reasoning' could be corrected, Hobbes
addresses the question of the emergence of human civil society and the reasoned
institution of the sovereign. His answer is presented in a hypothetical portrait of the
state of nature.
The concept of human beings as individualistic and materialistic, with equal
rights-liberties to do anything they desire and judge as good, leads Hobbes to
conclude that by nature all human beings are equal in terms of physiological
construction, strength and mental ability. Any qualitative or significant differences
in ability are of no consequence. Stumpf (1982:223) argues that Hobbes' equality
refers to the capability of hurting one's neighbour and seizing what one deems
important for one's own survival. Be this as it may, Hobbes' assumption of human
equality, as individuals with natural rights governed by the dictate of reason
(natural law) for the sake of survival, makes his social contract theory more
plausible. Hobbes' intention with the social contract theory is to rationalise political
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obligation and to substitute an intelligible bargain for mystifying appeals to tradition
and divine right (Peters, 1967:42).
It is the desire for self-preservation, based on the law of nature, expressed
in the fear of death, that drives each man to seek peace and hope for economic
prosp-erity-(Hobbes~--1966-c:116=1-17). Altheugh the-natural- situation of man looks
hopeless, Hobbes (1966c: 117) argues that the fundamental law of nature compels
man to seek peace and follow it, and also to defend himself if he is to preserve his
existence. This adds some spark of hope. The road to peace lies in the way that
these equal and free individuals mutually lay down their natural rights and
renounce, or transfer, them to sign a contract with the commonwealth or sovereign
who will be given absolute sovereign powers to arbitrate on all matters of life
(Hobbes, 1966c: 116-159); that is, to usher in justice? The sovereign does not exist
until there is a contract, for it is through a covenant or contract that mutual and
voluntary renunciation of natural rights is brought into effect.
According to Hobbes (1966c: 158) the social contract presumes that each
free individual says to every other free man,
I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man or this assembly of
men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him and authorize all his
actions in like manner.
Under such a presumption the social contract does not end in the mutual
transferring of rights based on rational action under the impetus of fear, but rather,
it brings many of those free and equal individuals into one people and marks the
generation or the establishment of "that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak
more reverently, of that mortal good to which we owe under the immortal God our,
peace and defence" (Hobbes, 1966c:158). Hobbes (1966c: 158) defines this
Leviathan or the commonwealth as,
one person of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another,
have made themselves every one author to the end he may use the strength and
means of them all as he shall think expedient for their peace and common defence.
7 Hobb~s (1 ~66c:187) distinguishes between justice of manners and justice of actions. When the
former IS attnbuted to man it means conformity or inconformity of manners to reason.
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This person shall be called the sovereign because of the sovereign powers
bestowed upon him, but the rest shall be subjects (Hobbes, 1966c:158).
People can break the covenants they have mutually made with each other
to transfer their rights to the Leviathan on the occasion of their interest to do so
(Hobbes, 1966c:121-127). However, to ensure sustenance of these breakable
covenants Hobbes (1966c: 154;162) adds that "covenants without the sword, are
words, and of no strength to secure a man at aiL" That means someone with
absolute authority was supposed to be bestowed with powers to see to it that law
and order are maintained.
1.2.1.3 The Sovereign
Hobbes employed the ideas of natural law and social contract to defend the idea of
a monarchial sovereignty who has absolute power, and uses it as the determinant
of justice, morality and even legality. Without this sovereignty the governing norms
of the community would not carry much weight. Hobbes is a radical contractarian
who spells out and defends a radical view of individualism - human beings are
individuals first, and social creatures on a contractual basis, second. Gray (1986:7)
correctly points out that Hobbes voiced "an intransigent individualism" whose
"consummate modernity marks a decisive break with the social philosophy
bequeathed by Plato and Aristotle to medieval Christian thought." This is because
Hobbes' (1966c:185-196) individualism is so radical that even the family and social
ties are not natural to individuals, but only artificially forged and coerced contracts
between a so-called inferior (e.g. child, wife, servant or slave) and a so-called
superior (e.g. parent, husband, master). This is why, as already indicated above,
the state of nature is a condition where equal and free individuals are at war with
each other. It may be said that the Hobbesian moral and political view of human
society is that men are predominantly animated by a self-interested desire for
power and self-preservation. In their natural condition, where there is no sovereign
power to constrain them, this leads to dire results. However, because each one of
them wants to survive, these free and equal individuals decide on a contract.
The outcome of the contract is the emergence of the sovereign who fulfils
the requirements of preserving order. The sovereign has all the power to protect
the subjects and the subjects are obliged to obey the sovereign. The whole
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purpose of the obligation to obedience by the subjects is to receive protection from
the sovereign. Although Hobbes (1966c:202-203;289) gives the subjects some
liberties, which he defines as "those things the subjects may justly refuse to do
even though commanded by the sovereign", the powers of the sovereign are still
. -imposing-and-no subject is allowed tobreach-thecovenant.~
To recapitulate, it may be said that the liberty and equality of individuals
under an absolute sovereign is central to Hobbes' moral and political philosophy.
The development of the ideology of absolute monarchial sovereigntism is based on
the assumption that an individual's desire for self-preservation (under the natural
right to life), without a sovereign authority to facilitate it, can only result in a
situation of war of all against all. He uses the hypothetical portrait of the state of
nature as a philosophical justification for the existence of a reasoned monarchial
sovereignty, rather than an inherited monarchy (which he rejected).
The concept of a social contract derives the basis of political allegiance and
moral compromise from a desire for self-preservation at all costs. Hence, the
surrender of liberty and rights to the tyrannical LEVIATHAN in return for security.
Furthermore, in his moral and political philosophy, Hobbes devotes the theory of
social contract to the idea that morality is a human invention, or a human-made
institution, at a given time and place, which is justified only to the extent that it
effectively furthers an individual's interests in a mutually agreed situation. Bound
by his radical individualism, Hobbes explains the existence of morality in any
society by appealing to the convention that only relates to the desires of an
individual. At the same time, Hobbes argues that whether morality can be justified
in any human society depends upon how well its moral conventions serve
individuals' desires or preferences.
As for the subsequent development of liberalism: Hobbes' ideas of
individualism, self-preservation, liberty, equality, justice, and the rule of law were
received, modified and critically evaluated in a whole tradition of liberal writing,
culminating in Fukuyama. The radical modernity of Hobbesian uncompromising
individualism presents the idea of the fundamental and inalienable right of self-
preservation, which Fukuyama views as the source for a social contract. From this,
natural laws, based on consensus and toleration are derived, in which justice and
morality are rooted, and from which all other rights and obligations are derived.
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1.2.2 Locke: Majoritarian Democracy
The political philosophy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries supplied an
ideological foundation for the age of absolutism, an age where absolute power was
~centred on- kings and rulers-. The political -problem of-internal order was largely
presented in the language of national sovereignty (Lest, 1988:753). The eighteenth
century, on the other hand, emerged as the age of democratic revolutions. Political
problems were those of freedom, and the revolt against injustice. Political theories
accordingly came to focus on the freedom and equality of citizens (cf. Locke,
Rousseau, Kant, etc). These political theories were expressed in the idiom of
natural and inalienable rights (Lest, 1988:753). That is to say, the conception of
political power in the eighteenth century was that it could never be exercised apart
from its ultimate goal - the common good. Men entered into a social contract in
order to preserve their lives, liberty, and property in a justified way. Locke explains
this idea in his Second Treatise of Government.
Locke's philosophy gave theoretical expression to the principles underlying
the English revolution and his justification inspired the political thought of the
French Enlightenment, as well as providing the intellectual foundation for the
American Constitution. Liberalism in these societies was understood in Lockean
liberal terms (Fukuyama, 1992:145). Locke's liberal philosophy is built on a
theological-philosophical basis. Hence his basic thesis: that all human beings are
born with the natural right to equal freedom, and a natural duty to God to preserve
themselves and the rest of humankind. He believes that the knowledge of natural
rights is written in the hearts of all people. He argues that any person in his right
mind, and using common sense, can figure out that people have natural rights and
what these rights entail (Anderson, 1992:xii).
Emerging from Locke's moral and political philosophy are two major ideas
that are of importance to this chapter: (1) the idea of the social contract and (2) the
idea of property rights. The former entails Locke's idea of natural law, natural right, .




Locke takes the idea of a social contract from Hobbes but adds to it the
fundamental right to property. Fukuyama (1992:366) correctly points out that the
tockean- right--to-property-is-derived from- the rightteself-preservation. Thus if a
person has the right to life, he or she also has the right to the means of life (land,
food, etc). In connection to this, Locke grasped the moral idea that the goal of
economic and political power is to achieve the common good - based on fair
distribution, so that each person can preserve him/herself as demanded by the
fundamental law (which I will discuss below). This common good is achievable
within the context of an agreed normative situation. This situation starts from
realising the existence of natural law, and the natural rights endowed by God (as
already indicated above that Locke's ideas are based on a theologico-
philosophical basis), to every individual in the state of nature.
(a) State of Nature.
In Hobbes, the state of nature was portrayed negatively - a war of all against all.
Locke, on the other hand, (1924:118-124[11:4-19])8 presents it positively, as a place
of limen (sic) living together according to reason, without a common superior on
earth with authority to judge between them." According to Locke, this should be
seen as being "properly in the state of nature." Furthermore, Locke (1924:119[11:6])
argues that in the state of nature there is a possibility of knowing the moral law. If
these laws are enacted through reason, they teach all humankind that no one
ought to harm another's life, health, liberty, or property. The state of nature
provides a moral code for political and economic life. This is typical of the Lockean
empiricist approach to the process of knowledge acquisition. Locke's state of
nature is thus social in character, it is a place of learning by interaction and
reasoning, whereas in Hobbes the state of nature is characterised by absolute
anarchy.
8 The square brackets contain the following: the Roman numeral stands for Book 11 and the
number following to it stands for the paragraph. '
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Of great importance to the Lockean state of nature are the ideas of natural
law, natural rights and natural duty (or obligation). These ideas will be discussed
below.
(i)-Natural Law. Lecke'sview of-Auman beings- follows that of Aristotle. It pictures
human beings as essentially social and rational. They are rational in that they can,
at least, acknowledge the existence and the role of the law of nature in their social
interaction. For Locke (1924:118-124[11:7-10]) the law of nature is the law of reason
that prescribes how human conduct in the state of nature ought to occur
universally (because it is applicable to all of humankind in all places and at all
times). According to Locke (1924: 119[11:6 - 7]) if consulted, the law of nature
restrains people from violating each others' rights, or, enjoins them not to interfere
with each other's "life, ... liberty, health, or possessions."
In his analytic commentary, L10yd Thomas (1995: 15-17) shows that there is
a distinction between laws of nature and the fundamental law of nature. While the
fundamental law of nature demands all humanity to be preserved (the right to life)
(Locke, 1924:125-126 [11:16;134]), the laws of nature create access to the means
of self-preservation. Thus according to L10yd Thomas (1995: 16-17) Locke's
conception of the teleological character and the necessity of the laws of nature are
rationally justified on the basis of the fundamental law of nature. All in all, what
Locke is saying is that in the state of nature there is some form of control if people
choose to reason together.
(ii) Natural Right. Locke's fundamental law of nature entails the natural right of all
men to equal freedom by virtue of which no one may legitimately exercise political
jurisdiction over another without their consent and a natural duty to God to
preserve themselves and the rest of humanity. L10yd Thomas (1995: 18-19)
describes Lockean natural rights as simply "rights conferred upon persons by laws
of nature" but not by the fundamental law of nature itself. Collinson (1987:64)
points out that in the Two Treatises of Civil Government, Locke argues against the
divine right of kings. He maintains that all individuals are perfectly free and equal in
the state of nature and possess certain rights - i.e. natural rights. It follows that
even if a civil government is formed, natural rights are the area of human conduct
that is immune from government interference. In discussing the major types of
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natural rights Locke (1924:120-124; 129-141 [11:7-15; 14-51]) emphasises the right
to ownership of property over other major types of rights (the right to life (or the
right to self-preservation), the right to punish transgressions, the right to seek
reparation).
(iii) Natural Duty (or Obligation). The concept of obligation comes with the
relational concept of law. In this case, it is natural law that compels people to
conform to the duty of maintaining harmony in a pre-political society. This makes it
each individual's responsibility to enact the law of nature that binds them to
preserve peace and refrain from harming one another.
The law of nature serves as a moral code of the state of nature - a
normative law that concerns how people ought to act. Whenever enacted through
reason by each individual, it dictates how people ought to behave in order not to
infringe on each other's natural rights.
The Lockean state of nature is portrayed as a condition in which none of the
institutions of the state exist, but individual members are free, equal and
independent (Locke, 1924:118-119[4-7]). By freedom (or liberty in the state of
nature), Locke (1924:125-128[11:17;22]) means being free from any constraint but
the moral law of nature. Under a government, it means freedom from the arbitrary
will of another man and from any human rule but the standing rule common to
every individual of that society (Locke, 1924:127-128[11:21-22]). An individual's
freedom is inseparable from his right of self-preservation which is, according to
Locke (1924:125-126[11:125-126]), "the foundation of all the rest". Should any
individual or institution desire or attempt to get another person under his or its
absolute power, this creates a state of war against the other, and the would-be
deprived person has the right to resist or rebel.
Locke (1924: 125[11: 17]) argues that he has reason to conclude that a person
"who would get me into his power without my consent ... must necessarily be
supposed ... to take away everything else". This is because everything that is
involved in the formation of the commonwealth involves each and every
individual's freedom, independence, and rights as well as private property.
Therefore an individual's freedom and rights should not be compromised, or
tampered with, by anybody or by any institution.
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(b) Formation of the Body Politic and the Institution of Government
There is no doubt that there are some deficiencies or inconveniences in the state
of nature (Locke, 1924:180[124-127]). Wolterstorff (1995:440) points to some of
-the-deficiencies in- the state--ofnature-that-the-gov6rnment is· expected to correct,
such as "the bad human tendency to transgress on other persons' properties, and
the equally bad tendency to punish such transgressions more severely than the
law of nature permits". In the event of some individuals failing to maintain peace
and harmony in the state of nature, a civil government is formed. Locke (1924: 164-
165[11:95-99]) argues that all men in the state of nature are free, equal,
independent and guided by the law of nature to consent to a contract with one
another to institute a government; to eliminate deficiencies and then to obey that
government, provided it does what they have contracted with one another. This
body politic will uphold natural law and the natural rights to life, liberty and
property, of the contractees. L10yd Thomas (1995:22) holds that
Locke's reason for postulating the executive power of the law of nature is linked to
his main strategy for showing how political authority can be legitimate ... therefore
that there should be a single, common, known interpretation of the law of nature by
reference to which disputes can be settled, and that there should be standard
punishments for the violation of those common rules, impartially administered and
enforced.
Hence Locke's (1924: 118 [11:3]) definition of political power,
political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws with penalties of death, and
consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, and
of employing the force of the commonwealth from foreign injury, and all this only for
the public good.
Locke (1924: 124[11: 15]) maintains that all men are in a state of nature and remain
so until, by their own consent, they make themselves members of some politic
society so that they may achieve a public good. The Lockean proposal for the
formation of a political community that will see the installation of an executive
power (or authority) begins with a number of individuals uniting into one society,
each of them transferring his "executive power of natural law" to the public, and
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"there, and there only is a political, or civil society" formed (Locke, 1924:160[11:85]).
Thus each individual consents with others to make one body politic under one
government, and puts himself under the obligation to every one of that society to
submit to the determination of the majority" (Locke, 1924: 164-165[95-98]). That is
to say, the Lockean idea of the emergence of a human politiGCiI community or civil
society is based on the theory of consent. Through his theory of consent, Locke
presents one of the fundamental principles of the liberal tradition: that there can be
no subjection to any power without consent (either expressed or tacit).
L10yd Thomas (1995:25) describes Locke's idea of the formation of a
political community as being a two-staged process, whereby a political (executive)
power is established. In the first stage of the process, free and equal individuals
make compacts (or contracts) with one another as an expression of their wish to
quit the state of nature. Each person agrees to surrender the control of his
executive power of the law of nature into the hands of the body politic (Locke,
1924: 124; 164; 204-205[11: 14, 95, 171]). It follows that the formed political
community leads to the second stage of the process - that of instituting a
government. It is the political community - under strict majority approval - that
forms a government by placing, in the words of L10yd Thomas (1995:31), "their
pooled executive power of the law of nature in the hand of the government on
trusf' that it will attain the intended end - safety and security (or preservation)
(Locke, 1924: 164-5; 192[11:95-98; 149]). If the formed government neglects, acts
contrary to, or opposes the intended end or if it fails to achieve it, Locke
(1924:192[11:149]) states that
the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and the power devolve into the hands of
those that gave it, who may place it anew where they shall think best for their
safety and security.
The formation of a government means entrusting the rights of judging and
executing the demands of the law to an individual or the group of individuals
(Hampsher-Monk, 1992:98) through a process that is underpinned by the
principles of majoritarian democracy9. Hampsher-Monk (1992:98) comments that
9 Locke has in many places and in many ways been misinterpreted as stipulating majoritarian
democracy as the only legitimate form of government (Hampsher-Monk, 1992:98). Hampsher-Monk
(1992:98) correctly argues that Locke does not talk of the constitutional form of government that
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"government is thus a trust, not a simple contract"10 and the political society which
is formed as a result of a contract is therefore the body that does the entrusting.
In connection with the idea of trust, Locke develops a theory of justifiable
rebellion against the state if it acts contrary to the trust reposed in it by the political
. cummunity~~Lockeadvance'sanumber ohdeas'as~'general grounds for justifying a
rebellion should the government happen to act other than expected. Firstly, if a
government fails to enforce the fundamental law of nature, it provides a fertile
ground for a rebellion against it and/or its dissolution. The government is entrusted
with executive power by the majoritarian approval of the politic society to enforce
the law of nature (Locke, 1924:181-182; 184[11:131;135)). During its life, it may
happen that the government fails to enforce the fundamental law of nature, not as
a result of perpetually ineffectual attempts to do so, but "as a matter of perverse
intention" (Locke, 1924:227[11:219]; L10yd Thomas, 1995:62). When it becomes
evident that the government is failing to execute the administration of justice for the
securing of people's rights, or anything assigned to it, it is natural that people will
withdraw their trust in it. Consequently, it should be dissolved so that the people
can be "at liberty to erect a new legislative" that will provide for their safety and
common (or public) good (Locke, 1924:228[11:220)).
Secondly, rebellion or dissolution is justified if a government fails to further
the common good, as it is obliged to function in securing people's property against
the greedy and the self-interested, against partiality in judgment and negligence,
and against destructive execution of justice (Locke, 1924:180[11:124-126)). In its
function of opposing the above mentioned deficiencies of the state of nature the,
government is expected never to act to "extend further than the common good"
(that of effective enforcement of everyone's rights by preserving their property
(Locke, 1924:180-1, 188,204 [11:124, 131, 139, 171)). Thus, according to Locke
(1924: 184-5 [11: 135)), the sole purpose of the government is to protect people's
material possessions, including life. Any end other than preservation calls for its
dissolution.
Thirdly, Locke (1924:228[11:221]) suggests that a government can be
dissolved when it acts contrary to
should take place but of the process of how people's freedoms should be regulated in the formation
of a government.
10 The idea of trust will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis in the context of
Fukuyama's idea of 'trust'.
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the trust reposed in them when they endeavour to invade the property of the
subject, and to make themselves, or any part of the community master or arbitrary
disposers of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of the people.
It has already been indicated in some of the above sections that it is the rational
majority of the society that gives the government the executive power of the law of
nature on the basis of trust. If the government acts contrary to this trust or "the
attitudinal consent of the majority", as L10yd Thomas (1995:64) puts it, it loses its
justification and legitimacy.
Fourthly, if a government fails to function within the limitations of its powers.
Locke (1924: 184-5[11: 135]) maintains that
nobody can transfer to another more power than he has in himself, and nobody
has an absolute arbitrary power over himself.... A man cannot subject himself to
the arbitrary power of another ... but so much as the law of nature gave him for the
preservation of himself and the rest of mankind, this is all he doth, or can give up to
the commonwealth, and by it to the legislative power, so that the legislative can
have no more than this. Their power in the utmost bounds of it is limited to the
public good of the society.
What bears emphasizing here is that the degree of power the government claims
over the majority of the individual members of the body politic is crucial to its
legitimacy. The government cannot be arbitrary since under the law of nature the
rights of individual members of the society are not autocratic and are given under
consent based on majoritarian decision. Hampsher-Monk (1992: 103) explains that
if
the powers surrendered by the citizens are limited by the constraints on their own
original rights, ... so must be the powers of the government if it is to remain
legitimate.
At the core of these four conditions is the idea that, for the government to retain its
legitimacy for continual governance, it must always act in such a way that it does
not lose the consent of the people. For it is the people who put the government in
power, and it is the people that will take it out of power
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(e) Theory of Consent
Simmons (1998) suggests that by "consent" Locke seems to refer to "a blanket
-- term- -coverin9- -all-k-ifld-s--of- delibeFate-, --vQluntary- -alienations of rights and/or
undertakings of obligations." Simmons (1998) chooses to use the term "alienation"
to explain either the transferring or renouncement of rights - thus "the right simply
stops to be possessed by the renouncing party without transferring to another". As
already shown above, the Lockean account shows that there are two kinds of
consent, namely, express and tacit. The former refers to "consent given by positive
action of some direct and explicit sort whose sole conventional point is to give
consent, such as an oral or written promise" (Simmons, 1998). It requires
something like a public oath of allegiance (Locke, 1924:164[11:95]). By contrast, the
latter is "consent given without 'expressions' of it; that is, consent given without
verbal or otherwise direct and explicit positive acts" (Simmons, 1998). It requires
merely having "any possession or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of any
government ... whether his possession be of land to him and his heirs forever, or a
lodging only for a week" (Locke, 1924: 177[11: 119]). Locke (1924: 177[11: 119]) further
suggests that tacit consent is simply given by "travelling freely on the highway" or
by just "being within the territories of that government." By introducing the above
mentioned distinction of the two stages of his notion of consent, Locke becomes
rather unclear and windy in his explanation, especially when discussing tacit
consent. This has attracted much critical scrutiny of his theory of consent, which
accordingly, as Jones (2002:50) puts it, is "regarded by political theorists and
historians of political thought alike as problematic and unconvincing."
1.2.2.2 Property rights
To Hobbes' idea of self-preservation, Locke added the idea of property rights. By
the term "property" Locke refers to a man's life and liberty as well as his or her
possessions. Locke (1924: 130[11:26]) develops the idea of self-ownership where he
maintains that "every man has a 'property' in his own 'person"'. Barry (1986:102)
comments that Locke's conception of the natural right to property was derived from
this idea of self-ownership.
43
Starting from a theological premise, Locke (1924: 129[11:25]) claims that God
granted the world from which we should draw our sustenance in common to Adam
and Noah. It is on this common grant that an individual can discharge his
obligation through labour to preserve himself and the rest of creation under the
fundamental law of nature. For an individual to declare any part of God's common
----- --~--~.- ----- ---- - ----"-- -
grant his own private property, he is required to meet certain conditions. Locke
(1924: 130-3[11:26-34]) lays down three basic conditions that control the human
acquisition of property:
(a) Labour. The labour that a person puts on the materials necessarily introduces
and demarcates (or distinguishes) private possession from the common grant.
Sometimes this is discussed under "the 'value-added' argument" and
sometimes under the "the 'labour-mixing' argument" (L1oyd Thomas, 1995:97-
114). With regards to the former argument, under the right of enclosure and
appropriation, through mixing labour with material, an individual acquires either
a piece of land or anything not owned by anybody and adds value to it - hence
it becomes his/her private property. With regards to the latter, labour-mixing
implies exclusion of others from making use of the value added capital
resource (Hampsher-Monk, 1992:91).
(b) Leaving sufficient for others. Since private property is derived from the common
grant, and it is a divine mandate (or duty) to preserve both others and us, one
must be prepared to appropriate only what is enough for personal use and
leave the rest in common for others. Locke does not provide an answer to a
question such as, "If the remaining land is not sufficient or/and is not good
enough for usage, does it mean that "the proviso of the law of nature for
legitimate appropriation of property" is offended?" (Hampsher-Monk, 1992:91).
This question points to the issue of the shortage of land, probably due to the
method of appropriation. If land is finite and the human population keeps on
growing, 'enough' will soon not be left over for others.
(c) Non-spoilage. Non-spoilage refers to idea that as people enclose and
appropriate property, especially land, they must acquire what they can use from
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the common grant (without consent from other commoners) without spoiling or
wasteful use (Hampsher-Monk, 1992:89).
These conditions provoke a number of questions regarding Locke's theory of
property -rights. One-of the most important--questions has to do with employed
labour. Hampsher-Monk (1992:89) points out that Locke is silent on an important
area regarding the right to property. This lacuna can be expressed as follows
"although labour is what individuates and so establishes a private right, Locke
does not assume that the right will in all circumstances accrue to the labourer".
Locke (1924: 130-131 [27-30]) does, however, assume that both employed labour
and the employees' labour create property rights for the employer. He argues:
Thus, the grass my horse has bit, the turfs my servant has cut, and the ore I have
digged in any place, where I have a right to them in common with others, become
my property without the assignation or consent of anybody. The labour that was
mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my property
in them.
Since property acquisition is a state of nature event that is prior to the institution of
government, one is compelled to ask 'Does the body politic and/or the state have a
general jurisdiction over private properties within its territories?' Earlier on, under
point (c), I discussed the relationship between property and the theory of consent.
This discussion indicates that there is some form of legal authority over the citizen
and his property since it is ownership of property that keeps him part of the
territory. However Locke's concept of property is not clear because one's servant's
labour does not make that with which he has mixed his labour the master's
property. Perhaps Locke does not think that servants are fully human.
Hampsher-Monk (1992:82) makes an illuminating comparative evaluation of
Hobbes's and Locke's state of nature theories:
Hobbes's fundamental postulate was an unlimited right of nature claimed by each
individual on his own behalf, the state of nature is one of strife, whereas Locke's
fundamental postulate is a natural duty of preservation which we owe to God as a
result of his having created us. This duty does not lead to strife (if it is followed)
because it requires not only our own preservation but that of all men, since even
though we are all special to ourselves, we are all equal before God_
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What appears here is the difference between Hobbesian radical individualism and
Lockean systematic individualism. Although the two views share the idea of social
contract, Lockean individualism has a social bearing built on radical Protestant
-the-01ogical-doctrines-,- fleshed -out in-political-terms;--to-exJ,:llain the responsibility of
all men before God. Locke is here trying 'to ground a principle of political equality'
that accommodates community life. Hence his view of life in the state of nature is
positive, whereas the Hobbesian view is expressed in negative terms - that of
anarchy.
Locke's picture of the state of nature may have been positive, but his
doctrine of rights bound to the state of nature is problematic, since it is difficult to
have full knowledge of how rights existed before the institution of a civil society and
a government system that grants and enforces them. A close examination of the
whole idea shows that the Lockean idea of rights does not have a descriptive
meaning, but implies a prescriptive claim that men ought to have these rights. Be
that as it may, the Lockean doctrine of rights found favour in many constitutional
institutions. The Lockean version of the social contract differed from that of
Hobbes, in that it was predominantly democratic in character. Furthermore,
according to Locke's version of the social contract ownership of land in the state of
nature antedates the formation of the body politic, without there having been any
territorial jurisdiction over owners and their possessions.
When the citizens come to form the body politic, they bring all that they
possess to the political society for safety and security. But they do not surrender
their rights, with the exception of the right to personally judge and punish offenders
against the natural law. Therefore, it may be concluded that central to the Lockean
version of the social contract is the theory of consent between individuals in the
formation of a political society, and between the political body and the state. This
theory of consent is seen as a way to safeguard freedoms and rights.
1.2.3 Rousseau's Social Contract
Rousseau's more radical political ideas were developed upon a Lockean
foundation. For complex and subtle reasons, he rejected the Hobbesian picture of
the state of nature which led to the creation of the Sovereign. The Hobbesian
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sovereign government is not part of the social contract: "he thus avoids the
necessity of submitting it to any obligation whatsoever, and leaves it absolute and
irresponsible" (Cole, 1913:xx). That is to say, the absolute sovereign reports to no
one and remains open to criticism as a politically and morally pathological
--coh-ditlon.-However; Rousseau received irom-Hobbes the idea that in the process
leading to the formation of a social contract "the individual should be prepared to
submit totally to the supreme· authority of a collective entity," which Rousseau
recasts in "the form of a community rather than Hobbes's unitary state" (Jones,
2002:25) where the absolute monarch is in charge of everything.
Cole (1913:xx) may be correct in pointing out that Locke's version of the
social contract was largely aimed at justifying the English revolution of 1688. This
is because Locke does not make the government depend simply on its institution,
but always "on the consent of the governed, and regards all rulers as liable to be
displaced if they govern tyrannically" (Cole, 1913:xx). Rousseau disagrees with his
predecessors and advocates a different pathway. What is Rousseau's version of
the social contract?
1.2.3.1 The Individual in the Pre-political Sphere
In The Social Contract (or Principles of Political Right) (1762) (henceforth, The
Social Contract), Rousseau develops a theory of sovereignty and investigates its
implications. In the opening statement of the first chapter of The Social Contract,
Rousseau (1913:3) makes a declaration on human freedom cum or amid
enslavement:
Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains. One thinks himself the master of
others, and still remains a greater slave than they. How did this change come
about? ... What can make it legitimate?
This statement indicates that Rousseau is centrally preoccupied with the theme of
freedom and concurrently with fears of dependency. Hampsher-Monk (1992:173)
identifies two types of restraints on freedom, namely,
(a) conventional restraints - where an individual mayor can do anything he or she
chooses, but there is always a threat or a physical limit to prevent one from
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exercising ones freedom. Thus there is always some kind of restriction to any
intention to exercise hislher freedom;
(b) non-conventional restraints - where an individual's own will might not be free,
either in the sense of being driven by conflicting and irreconcilable desires, or
through being totally enervated by some debilitating belief or doctrine, or again by
being directed at something that is in principle unattainable (Hampsher-Monk,
1992:173).
The first type of restraint shows us that the world of reality has bounds that cannot
be expanded - meaning that where there are such bounds we have to learn to
pursue the attainable and reject the unattainable. The second dimension shows us
that the world of imagination is boundless, but it can be restricted either through
belief or some other kind of coercion. That is to say, to be free is either to reject the
unattainable or to realise necessity. In this case, the necessity is for an individual
to reject being perpetually chained, and to strive for a common goal where he is
forced to be free.
Connected to the idea of freedom (or natural liberty) is the idea of natural
equality. Natural liberty forms one of the basic assumptions on which Rousseau's
theory of social contract is premised. Based on the assumption of natural equality,
many proponents of social contract have used the contract to create the idea of the
possibility of virtual enslavement in the state of nature in order to solve the paradox
of liberty and social subordination when they are brought into a civil society. These
proponents claim that each individual has his freedom entitled to him, but that he
surrenders it in the event of the formation of the political community. Rousseau,
however, has a different explanation of how an individual loses his liberty and
equality to his neighbour, or the body politic.
Within the realm of natural equality, Rousseau raises the question of
inequality between individuals before the social contract. In The Discourse on the
Origin of Inequality Among Men (1755) Rousseau (1913:160) asks "what is the
origin of inequality among men, and is it authorized by natural law?" He
distinguishes two kinds of inequality, viz: natural (or physical) inequality, and moral
(or political) inequality (Rousseau, 1913:160). In other words, the natural condition
of man comprises two distinct aspects - the physical and the moral aspects.
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Rousseau (1913: 199) argues that the loss of independence - dependency - is the
fundamental source of inequality. He elaborates the argument in the following way:
So long as men ... undertook only what a single person could accomplish, and
-~confiAed themselves-tosuch-arts -as -did-noLl"equire the joint labour oLseveral.
hands, they lived free, healthy, honest, and happy lives, so long as their nature
allowed, and as they continued to enjoy the pleasures of mutual and independent
intercourse. But from the moment one man began to stand in need of the help of
another; from the moment it appeared advantageous to anyone man to have
enough provisions for two, equality disappeared, property was introduced, work
became indispensable, and vast forests became smiling fields, which man had to
water with the sweat of his brow, and where slavery and misery were seen to
germinate and grow up with the crops (Rousseau, 1913:199).
Furthermore, Rousseau (1911 :49) claims that "dependence on things" does not
infringe upon one's freedom, and does not produce vices, as does dependence on
men. It is the latter form of dependence that leads to the problem of inequality.
This follows from Rousseau's (1913:214-215;221) survey of the progression of
inequality:
there is hardly any inequality in the state of nature, all the inequality which now
prevails owes its growth and strength to the development of our faculties and the
advance of the human mind, and becomes at last permanent and legitimate by the
establishment of property and laws.
That is, prior to the institution of the general will, individuals are free and equal, but
they became unequal due to human intellectual, legal and economic development.
Now since Rousseau rejected both the Hobbesian and Lockean versions of the
human state of nature, one is compelled to ask the question: What argument can
Rousseau give to an individual in a pre-political society to justify the individual
leaving it, and joining a civil society? Rousseau introduces the idea of a sovereign
community or popular sovereignty in which an individual gives up his self-interest
for a communal interest. This is interpreted by FUkuyama as giving up the struggle
for recognition for self-preservation.
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1.2.3.2 Popular Sovereignty
According to Jones (2002:25) the theory of popular sovereignty (or sovereign
community) was Rousseau's "radical response to the social conflicts, divisions and
inequalities that characterised and disfigured European states and societies in the
second half of the eighteenth century." Like his predecessors, Hobbes and Locke,
Rousseau was caught up in the fight to resolve the "deep-seated and long-running
problem" in the political theory of the West, namely, the tension between the
yearning for individual freedom on the one hand and "need for social order and
collective authority" on the other (Jones, 2002:25). Unlike his predecessors,
Rousseau sought to "reconcile liberty with order by conferring sovereign authority
on the community as a whole" rather than on the all-powerful Hobbesian Leviathan
or the Lockean trustee representative assembly.
In The Social Contract, Rousseau (1913:12) states the fundamental
problem that his book sets out to solve:
The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the
whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each,
while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as
before.
In providing a purported solution to the problem, Rousseau (in contrast to Locke's
systematic individualism) launched a defiant collectivism based on the
fundamental category that man in the state of nature is not a "natural man", but a
"citizen" of a civil society (Rousseau, 1913:3). A man is a citizen even in the most
ancient and natural of all societies - the family (Rousseau, 1913:4). In this natural
society, there is an attachment or bond between the father and the children
whereby children need the father for their preservation and as a result they obey
him (Rousseau, 1913:4). Once the need for preservation is over, there is common
liberty for the father and the children - the former is released from the care he
owed his children, while the latter are released from the obedience they owed the
father, thus making both sides equally independent (Rousseau, 1913:4). Rousseau
(1913:4) argues that any continued union within the family is no longer a natural
bond, but a voluntary union maintained by convention and based on natural
freedom and equality. Therefore, asserts Rousseau (1913:4), the family should be
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seen as the first model of political arrangements - the ruler being likened to the
father, and the people to the children.
Since, according to Rousseau, there is no conflict in the state of nature, how
and why do people enter into a social arrangement? Rousseau (1913: 11), in his
argument, supposes that people might have- reached a point at which the
obstacles in the way of self-preservation in the state of nature are "greater than the
resources at the disposal of each individual for his maintenance in that state." The
only option at people's disposal is to unite and enter into a formation by
aggregation (Rousseau, 1913:13). Faced with the fundamental antinomies of
modern political thought (desire and reason, individual and society, freedom and
necessity, etc) Rousseau was compelled to find a resolution to the problem of the
future of an individual's natural liberty if he is to join the new collective social order.
Rousseau (1913: 12) argues that, on joining the new social order through the social
contract, an individual is elevated to a moral being whose interest is in harmony
with the interest of the community. In the constitution of such a political formation,
the social contract demands
the total alienation of each associate, together with all his rights to the whole
community; for in the first place, each gives himself absolutely, the conditions are
the same for all; and, this being so, no one has any interest in making them
burdensome to others.
Balibar (2000: 106) comments that the clause, "the total alienation of each
associate" means "total conversion of private individuality to social," meaning
"political individuality." On a similar note, Ansell-Pearson (1991 :80) comments that
"the individual of the state of nature will not simply lose the independence he
enjoyed in this state, but will gain another form of independence, the
independence that is gained through dependence," by being a member of a moral
community built on the twin principles of freedom and equality. The moral-
collective body is absolutely sovereign with, at its disposal, the unlimited collective
power to make law and to change it. In turn each individual citizen owes absolute
obedience to the law (Rousseau, 1913:12-14, 24-25; Ansell-Pearson, 1991 :80-81;
Balibar, 2000:106-107). This contrasts with Hobbes' absolute monarchial
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sovereign who is not part of the contract. He is the one who makes the laws and
the subjects are obliged to obey him.
Rousseau (1913: 13-24) uses the term "general will" to describe this political
form of sovereignty in which the individual is identical to the body politic. The
genera/ will can be understood as a moral/political solution to the problem of
individual freedoms and interest after the realisation of the social contract. This
again contrasts with Hobbes' view. In the Leviathan the will of the individual is
renounced, while in Rousseau it is realised and recognised. The general will may
be interpreted as a claim on Rousseau's part that, as Ansell-Pearson (1991 :81)
puts it, "the plurality of particular wills create community in which exists an identity
between the individual and the universal in a general will."
The notion of the general will is likened to Hobbes's and Locke's natural
law. It is the source of the law (conditions of civil association) and the sovereignty
(body politic) and the basis of political right (Rousseau, 1913:20-22;29-31). Based
on the notion of general will, Rousseau builds his theory of sovereignty. Hence he
(Rousseau, 1913:20) writes:
I hold then that Sovereignty, being nothing less than the exercise of the general
will, can never be alienated, and that the Sovereign who is no less than a collective
being, cannot be represented except by himself: the power indeed may be
transmitted, but not the will.
Rousseau (1913:20-21) argues that sovereignty is inalienable and indivisible. Thus
there is no division or distinction between civil society and the state as separate
entities "fixed in a particular political relationship" as in Hobbes and Locke (Jones,
2002:26-27). Civic society in the Hobbesian and Lockean traditions is a human
creation, i.e., it lies in a convention. Ansell-Pearson (1991 :85) correctly concludes
that, "the originality of Rousseau's political philosophy lies in his argument contra
Hobbes and Locke, that sovereignty is inalienable." The question of the
inalienability of the sovereignty marks the importance that Rousseau places on the
problem of power in political thought. Ansell-Pearson (1991 :85) points out that "the
notion refers to the ultimate source of political authority and power." Sovereignty is
the supreme power that is essentially the power to make laws, as already indicated
above. It is the participation of the whole citizenship of the whole state in the
making and implementing of the conditions of association.
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In discussing the limits of sovereign power, Rousseau (1913:26)
summarises and clarifies his argument concerning the sovereignty in the following
way:
What then, strictly- speaking, is an-acl of Sovereignty? It is not a convention
between a superior and an inferior, but a convention between the body and each of
its members. It is legitimate because based on the social contract, and equitable,
because common to all; useful because it can have no other object than the
general good, and stable, because guaranteed by the public force and the
supreme power. So long as the sUbjects have to submit only to the conventions of
this sort, they obey no one but their own will; and to ask how far the respective
rights of the Sovereign and the citizens extend, is to ask up to what point the latter
can enter into undertakings with themselves, each with all, and all with each.
As already indicated, sovereignty is inalienable and indivisible, meaning that the
general will cannot be divided or alienated if the constituted laws are to serve the
interests of the public and of the individual members of the public.
Rousseau indisputably brought some original and substantial ideas into
Western moral and political thinking. In an attempt to differ with Hobbes,
Rousseau, in effect, endorsed Hobbes's idea of the necessity of a state, which he
(Rousseau) gave the status of a Sovereign. A further difference is shown in that
the Hobbesian Sovereign is a person who is not part of the social contract while in
Rousseau the Sovereign is the people themselves under a new form of association
in which the will of the Sovereign "is the will of each person insofar as reason is in
control" (Levine, 1987:33).
Lest (1988:753), in evaluating Locke and Rousseau, states that however
much they may have differed, both exhibited the germ of all modern liberalism - "its
faith in representative democracy, in civil liberties, and in the basic dignity of man".
It has been demonstrated that Rousseau's notion of the general will exists on the
. basis of the general interest that is superior to the particular interest. The crux of
Rousseau's political philosophy lies in the government's role of preserving the
general interest "and allow[ing] it to prevail over particular interests" (Balibar,
2000:107). If allowed to cause scarcity of material goods, Rousseau's general will
is likely to turn into a Hobbesian saga of all against all.
A closer look at some of the ideas emanating from the three political
thinkers discussed above (Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau) shows that these ideas
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inform Fukuyama's notion of liberal democracy (as he is one of the contemporary
heirs of the liberal tradition). Central to Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau is the
preservation of each individual by establishing a civil society through consensus11
that allows toleration. 12 The idea of consensus features prominently in Fukuyama's
- -notion of libeTal- demo-cracy-~- especially-when-he-talks- of consensus -reception.
Although Fukuyama (1992: 156-157) finds it unacceptable that members of the
state of nature forego their struggle for recognition (in Hobbes they give up the
battle for prestige or glory to achieve self-preservation; in Locke they give up the
battle for recognition for self-preservation and life-endowment with material
comfort; and in Rousseau individuals give up self-interest for communal glory), he
talks of the world (see the fourth chapter of this thesis), as having consensually
given up other ideologies, and chosen liberal democracy - making it the ultimate
ideology for political governance and economic prosperity, regardless of what part
of the world you find yourself in. Thus he follows in the steps of Hobbes, Locke,
and Rousseau in showing that in the creation of a liberal society there should be
consensus first, and then toleration of diversity. Fukuyama uses the path blazed by
these thinkers as both a trans-historical standard to measure difference in socio
and political development and a method to explain what is taking place.
1.3 THEORY OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE
Having looked at Fukuyama's allegiance to the social contract tradition in political
theory, we now turn to his allegiance to the laissez-faire tradition in economic
thought. In the philosophical disputes over economic reforms of the 1770's and
1780's, philosophical enlightenment was intertwined with economic thought
(Rothschild, 2001 :21). This means there was participation of critical thought at that
time in initiatives to establish a means of bettering human well-being in economic
11 The concept of consensus refers to "agreement about fundamental or underlying principles" but
permitting "disagreement on matters of emphasis or detail" (Heywood, 2000:18). In academic
circles, particularly in political science, it consists of two aspects, namely procedural consensus and
substantive consensus. The former refers to what Heywood (2000:18) calls "willing to make
decisions through consultation and bargaining, either between political parties or between
government and major interest;" and the latter as "an overlap in the ideological positions of two or
more political parties reflected in agreement about fundamental policy."
12 Toleration is one of the fundamental principles of liberalism and one of "the central values of
liberal democracy," and guarantees "individual freedom and means of social enrichment"
(Heywood, ~000:149). Locke defends toleration, especially when he deals with religious freedom.
He bases his argument on a belief in human reason, which, he believes, can guide humankind if
consulted.
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terms. The dominant politico-economic view was that the entire system of freedom
of commerce was to leave individuals free to do what they wanted. This was based
on the presumption that each person is the best judge of his own situation.
(Rothschild, 2001 :21). This was laissez-fairism in the making. Laissez-faire is a
theory based on the idea of an absolute minimum of governmental interference in
the economic affairs of individuals and society. As a reformist move to counter the
mercantilist13 economic doctrines of the French monarchy, the physiocrats
14
-
proposed laissez-faire policy. This policy suggested that the monarchial
government should allow people freedom in their economic pursuits or activities
(Lux, 1990:23).
In its classical stage, liberalism was frequently associated with the maxim of
laissez-faire - there must be no interference or invasion of liberty by the state -
thus advocating the theory of just entitlement to property, economic liberty or any
other aspect of liberty.
With the coming of socialism and communism, there were many parts of the
world in which classical liberalism ceased being influential. With the fall of
communism, the maxims of laissez-faire were revived starting in the late 20
th
century. The idea of laissez-faire regained its dominance in Europe, America, and
some other parts of the world.
1.3.1 Classical Political Economy
As already indicated above, at the end of the 18th century the contending schools
of economic thought were mercantilism and physiocracy. The classical school
succeeded the physiocratic school and called for a new approach to economics.
Underlying the classical school of thought that stemmed from· Adam Smith, was
13 The term, "mercantile system" was first coined by Adam Smith to describe an ideology for
political economy that dominated European policy and economic thought from the sixteenth to the
late eighteenth century whose aim was to bring about economic growth to the country by
"restraining imports and encouraging exports" (LaHaye, 2002). In contrast to the physiocrats and
laissez-faire movement, although it served the purpose of "building a wealthy and powerful state,"
mercantile system "served the interest of the merchants and producers" LaHaye (2002).
14 According to Henderson (2002) Quesnay coined the term, "laissez-faire, laissez-passer' and was
the leading figure of the physiocrats. Henderson (2002) explains that the name "Physiocrat" is
derived from two Greek words, namely: "physis, meaning nature, and krafos, meaning power."
Physiocracy is generally considered to be the first school of economic thought whose economic
view.was that "an economy's power is derived from its agricultural sector" (Henderson, 2002). The
physlocrats wanted the government of Louis XV, the ruler of France from 1715 to 1774, "to
deregulate and reduce taxes on French agriculture so that poor France could emulate wealthier
Britain, which had a relatively laissez-faire policy" (Henderson, 2003).
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the doctrine of laissez-faire. This doctrine was to dominate economic thought from
the late 18th to the late 19th century.
Although impressed by the theory of laissez-faire, Smith did not use the
term in his work, The Wealth of Nations. His work was however imbued with this
--spirit, ah6-nence~()n-e- finds references-to "the" simple- secret of perfect liberty" and
the usage of the label of economic liberty (Smith, 1976:687). It was in Adam
Smith's Wealth of Nations that laissez-faire received its classical formulation. Smith
(1976:687) argues "every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice,
is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest in his own way, and to bring both his
industry and capital into competition with those of any other man.... " Furthermore,
in defending his allocating mechanism, or theory of distribution, Smith (1976:687)
argues that government has no strictly economic functions, rather it should be
discharged from a duty, in the attempting to perform which he must always be
exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the proper performance of which no
human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient; the duty of superintending
the industry of private people and of directing it towards the employment most
suitable for the interest of the society.
Based on systems natural liberty, Smith (1976:687) maintains that instead of
interfering with the day to day economic activities of individuals the sovereign
should concern itself with its basic duties:
first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other
independent societies; secondly the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every
member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it,
or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and thirdly, the duty of
erecting and maintaining certain publick (sic) works and certain publick (sic)
institutions... (Smith, 1976:687).
Ricardo, following Adam Smith, supported the doctrines of laissez-faire liberalism
as part of his broader political position. He presented capitalist economy "as if it
were an eternal natural order" (Itoh, 1988:16-17). Ricardo had a more worked out
view of liberalism than did Smith (Itoh, 1988: 16). While Smith believed in an
'invisible hand', Ricardo attempted to demonstrate in a more explicit manner "how
an economic law works to distribute annual production" among the three major
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classes in society (landowners, capitalists, and labourers) (Itoh, 1988:16).
Ricardo's doctrine of comparative advantage shows how much the theory of
laissez-faire influenced his economic thinking - compare his use of the expression
"perfect free commerce."
Jeremy -BeTItnarnalsc became an---exponent of -the new---Jaissez-faire
economics of Adam Smith and Ricardo (Bowle, 1985:997). Bowle (1985:997)
writes that Bentham (in the Essay on Government (1828)) shows a "doctrinaire
faith in a literate electorate as the means to good government" and in "laissez-faire
economics as a means to social harmony." In An Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation (1789) Bentham develops his system of ethics -
utilitarianism. Bentham's utilitarianism was a major force in the political and social
thought of the 19th century. According to this doctrine actions of governments
should be judged simply by the extent to which they promoted the "greatest
happiness of the greatest number" (Clark, 1991 :88; Cf. Bentham, 1970:12).
Bentham (1970: 11-36) elaborates a two-point criterion for making any choice of
action, either by an individual or by society at large. He claimed that pain and
pleasure were the sole criteria in our judgement of right and wrong in our choice
and decision-making (Bentham, 1970:11: 12; Cf. Clark, 1991 :88). That is to say if
any individual or any society is to make a choice as to the best course of action, is
"when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater
than any it has to diminish ... " - maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain
(Bentham, 1970:12-13; Cf. Clark, 1991 :88). West (1990: 170) writes that for
Bentham, any government intervention in an individual's knowledge of his own
interests and skilful pursuit of his interest is viewed as coercion, therefore 'pain'
and evil.
John Stuart Mill, having rigorously scrutinized Bentham's utilitarianism,
modified it by introducing the idea of qualitative differences in happiness, ability to
reason and conscious action. Closely following the ideas of Bentham, John Stuart
Mill, in Principles of Political Economy (1848) treats laissez-faire as the obvious
default political option, with every departure from it having to be argued for, and
justified against, the background of a strong presumption in favour of non-
interference in the freedom of an individual. In another of his works, On Liberty,
Mill (1989:56-74) argues that the state should only interfere with individual freedom
as a preventive measure, in order to ensure that citizens do not harm each other.
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Otherwise a person must be left alone to express his or her individuality, because
it is one of the elements of well-being. Mill acknowledges that individual actions
have consequences that can harm others, and he is of the view that there should
be political and community restraints or deterrents so that people do not harm
each other:------- ---- - ----------- - - -_.
Although Mill (1989:7-9; 230-237) acknowledges that democracy and
capitalism were flawed political and economic systems, he held that they served
fundamental functions in human daily life - as a result he defends economic
competition and free exchange. Mill views individuality as one of the elements of
human well-being. So when one participates in economic competition and has the
freedom to exchange freely, he/she is expressing his/her individuality. Mill
believes that capitalism was there to facilitate economic growth, with the goal of
transforming and rationalising what Clark (1991 :90) describes as "the menial
drudgery of labour." Capitalism permitted individuals "to focus on higher pleasures
that accompany the development of personal capacities for intellectual and artistic
expressiveness" (Clark, 1991 :90).
Mill holds that democracy gives people the opportunity to participate in
public decision-making processes. This participation would give people, as Clark
(1991 :90) puts it, "a sense of self-worth and dignity" - resulting in a desire for
further satisfaction in life.
1.3.2 Libertarianism
Politically, libertarianism gives "strict priority" to individual freedom (understood as
negative freedom) above other democratic values such as equality, and authority
(Heywood, 1999:340). Thus it seeks to maximize individual freedom and to
minimize the scope of state authority (Heywood, 1999:340). According to Haworth
(1994:4), libertarianism claims ancestry, with some justification, from the
philosophical ideas of John Locke and the classical economics of Adam Smith.
Hence, freedom is a central value for libertarianism. According to Haworth (1994:4)
libertarianism maintains a triadic main thesis, namely:
• that the market (or free market) is good;
• that the state - except in its minimal or 'nightwatchman' form is evil',
• that freedom is of supreme value.
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It is the third part of the thesis that leads to the characterisation of libertarianism as
an idea whose central theme is freedom. For the libertarians freedom "is the
absence of coercion" by either the state or other individuals (Clark, 1991 :49). This
allows them to-put extreme--faith in the--individual and freedom: Kymlicka
(2002: 152) comments that libertarians "invoke a non-moralized definition of
freedom when arguing that the welfare state restricts the freedom of property-
owners [but] ... shift to a moralized definition when arguing that capitalism does
not restrict the freedom of non-owners." That leaves the libertarians with a
definition that vacillates between a moral and non-moral notion of freedom.
At the centre of libertarian economics is the free market. It is the virtue that
upholds the fundamental value of freedom and should not be interfered with by the
state. The market is believed to be "the great respecter of individual freedom, more
than any other conceivable system or sets of arrangements" (Harmoth, 1994:18).
Hence libertarian economic theory emphasises the "self-regulating nature of the
market mechanism" and dismiss governmental intervention "as always
unnecessary and counter-productive" (Heywood, 1999:340).
Three prominent 20th century defences of libertarianism were given by
Friedrich Hayek, Robert Nozick, and Murray Rothbard. Heywood (1999:341) holds
that the most influential libertarian was Friedrich Hayek whom he describes as "a
firm believer in individualism and market order and an implacable critic of
socialism." Hayek holds that "the market is the sole means of ensuring economic
efficiency," while viewing "government intervention as implicitly totalitarian"
(Heywood, 1999:341). Central to Hayek's (cited in Haworth, 1994:116; Ct. Hayek,
1982) claim is the notion of the market as a "spontaneous order," a "self-organizing
or self-generating system or pattern" whose fundamental virtues are: (1) it is the
best allocative device (i.e. a functional virtue) that can accommodate human
ignorance, and (2) it is the best device for survival through open competition.
According to Haworth (1994:117) Hayek is convinced that "the cultural traditions
embodied in liberalism and the market order have won the evolutionary
competition against other, more closed and tribal arrangements." Furthermore,
Hayek holds that "the relative success of Western civilization is closely connected
with respect for open traditions" (Haworth, 1994:117). Fukuyama's conception of
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the process of history en route to the "end of history" as he sees it is closely
related to Hayek's view of liberalism and Western civilization.
In Anarchy, State and Utopia Robert Nozick (1974) displays a firm belief in
individualism and the market order. At the same time he presents himself as an
implacable critic of socialism, or any patterned distributive order opposed to a
market conception of distribution (Heywood, 1999:341). His central argument is
that freedom and patterned distribution are incompatible. (Nozick, 1974:150-166).
At the centre of his economic idea is the theme of entitlement with its two-way
structure: just acquisition and just transfer (Nozick, 1974:151). Situations where
past injustices still exist (for example, the unjust acquisition of property) fall foul of
Nozick's arguments for laissez-faire liberalism. In such situations he recommends
state intervention so as to achieve "rectification" by redistribution. Nozick strongly
defends laissez-faire, but he is committed to the rectification of past injustices; this
"leads him to acknowledge the legitimacy of redistributive policies" (Clark,
1991 :48).
Murray Rothbard combines a belief in an unrestricted system of laissez-faire
capitalism with a "basic libertarian code of the inviolate right of person and
property" and, on that basis, rejects the state as a "protection racket" (Heywood,
1999:341 ).
1.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau all agree that free
and equal individuals living outside juridical coercion will fear the antagonism
resulting in death and loss, and will therefore seek peace with each other by
surrendering their rights to an organised society. This model, according to which
individuals in a state of nature agree to unite and surrender individual rights,
represents a liberal shift from a monarchial state to a representative assembly form
of government.
In his explanation of the origin and justification of the state, Hobbes's point
of departure is the state of nature where free and equal individuals do not have
any contractual obligation to each other to be at peace - hence there exists a state
of war of all against all. The severe threat to the fundamental right of self-
preservation eventually compels these individuals to surrender their rights to the
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Leviathan who is described as being above the law. Hobbes moves away from the
idea of an inherited monarchy to an elected absolute monarchy - the Leviathan.
Self-preservation is the fundamental moral fact upon which Hobbes builds
his concepts of justice and right. In a war of all against all in the state of nature,
man, in-fear of death,is-forcedto-choose peace with others. This -is the impetus
behind people's change of heart in the state of nature. It leads to the end of human
warfare and satisfies the desire for self-preservation. The whole process involves
conflicting forces that are the motor behind the historical process.
The agreement to end warfare in the state of nature results in a social
contract where individuals form a body politic under the sovereign who is given
authority to govern the human community. Social or civil life, for Hobbes, rotates
around the sovereignty whose authority permeates every facet of life. The
realisation of the social contract by the installation of the sovereign means that any
moral laws agreed upon are binding. This lays the foundation for Fukuyama's idea
of a liberal state in which people come together to form a government. Fukuyama
would not accept Hobbes' all-powerful state of the Leviathan, although he might
accommodate the process of people coming together in the mood of civility -
tolerance and co-existence. Being a liberal, Fukuyama is also against monarchy.
Locke also starts from an idea of the state of nature, but in opposition to
Hobbes, Locke conceives the state of nature not as hypothetical, but as historical.
Locke takes the idea of the right to self-preservation from Hobbes, but adds to it
the fundamental right to property. Thus the right to life entails the right to the
means to sustain life (land, food, etc). Although the fundamental law of nature
demands that the whole of humanity be preserved, moral deficiencies are common
in human behaviour. The tendency to dispute or provoke each other to the point of
fighting is daily practice in the state of nature. Locke's fundamental law of nature
entails the natural right of all men to equal freedom by virtue of which no one may
legitimately exercise political jurisdiction over another without their consent and
natural duty to each other. However, Locke states that each person chooses to
surrender the control of his executive power of the law of nature into the hands of
the body politic to prevent daily strife among free, equal, and independent
individuals, in the absence of the judiciary.
Upon its installation the body politic upholds the natural law and the natural
rights to life, liberty and property of the contractors. All individuals are in a state of
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nature and remain so until, by their own consent, they become members of a
politic society. The body politic cannot be arbitrary since the rights of individual
members of the society under the law of nature are not autocratic and are given
under consent based on majoritarian decision. As has already been stated, the
[ockean view of apolitical society or civil society and its government is based on
the theory of consent. Locke's view of social contract lays the foundation of a
representative assembly government that plays the role of the trustee of the
community.
Rousseau takes the foundation laid by Locke, and builds a more radical
edifice on it. His point of departure is that the social contract is supposed to solve
the problem of inequality between individual citizens. He introduces the idea of the
"general will" to describe a political form of sovereignty in which the will of the
individual is identical to the will of the body politic. Rousseau understands the
general will as a morallpolitical solution to the problem of individual freedom and
interest after the realisation of the social contract. He launches a defiant
collectivism based on the fundamental idea that man in the state of nature is not a
"natural man", but a "citizen" of a civil society. He rejects the Hobbesian
hypothetical idea of the state of nature found in Hobbes, and used by him to justify
the creation of the sovereign.
In Rousseau the notion of the general will replaces Hobbes's and Locke's
natural law. The general will serves as the source of law (conditions of civil
association) and sovereignty (body politic) and the basis of political right. Although
he differs from Hobbes, Rousseau endorses Hobbes's idea of the necessity of a
state, to which he (Rousseau) gives the status of a Sovereign. This idea is taken
further in Fukuyama. He propounds a liberal state based on liberal democracy and
a free market economy that will satisfy the human desire for mutual recognition.
The theory of laissez-faire calls for a situation of minimum government
interference with market activities. Adam Smith is always referred to as the
ancestor of the idea of non-interference since he warns against the danger of state
interference in the economy, arguing that market forces will take care of things by
themselves - compare his idea of the invisible hand in the economy. This doctrine
remained popular and was reaffirmed in the thought of Ricardo, Mill, Bentham, and
in the fundamental doctrines of capitalism. Libertarianism, with its emphasis on the
value of liberty or freedom above everything, justifiably claims ancestry in Locke
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and Adam Smith. As a result of that, libertarians view the market as a
manifestation of human freedom.
The major thinkers covered in the above historical survey agree that the
state is the creation of individuals who seek a juridical solution to their disputes.
The state is there to-protect· the- rights- ef every individual citizen. The
representative form of government found in Locke and Rousseau is a central
feature of Fukuyama's corpus. Social contract theory and laissez-faire economics
provided Fukuyama with the ideological fundamentals to build his interpretation of
liberal democracy, a system which he claims is a product of both liberalism and
democracy.
The next chapter continues this survey of the major ideas from the history of
philosophy that influenced Fukuyama - this time by focusing on the philosophical
antecedents to his theory of history. This will require a close analysis of the




PHILOSOPHICAL ANTECEDENTS OF FUKUYAMA - PART 11:
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
The Law of Contradiction: everything is inherently contradictory. Contradiction is the root of all
movement-and vitality;~~itjs only in so far assomething~has--acontradictionwithin it that it moves,
has an urge and activity.
- Georg W F. Hegel, Science of Logic (1989).
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle. Freeman and slave,
patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and
oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden,
now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at
large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.
- Kart Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (1967 [1848]).
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Fukuyama appropriates Hegel-as-interpreted-by-Kojeve's philosophy of history,
especially the ideas of the 'end of history' and 'struggle for recognition'. His central
claim is that the triumph of liberal democracy marks the end of history and the
realisation of mutual recognition. The idea of the end of history dates back to the
early days of Judeo-Christian theology. It was graphically presented in
eschatological terms as the realisation of the kingdom of God through the coming
of a messianic era. The idea became secularised during and after the European
enlightenment and was expressed in idealistic and socio-politico-economic terms
that encouraged the emergence of various conflicting ideologies. The intention of
each of these ideologies was to create some hope for a life of economic prosperity
and happiness. This hope could be interpreted as the end of the 'now' and the
realisation of the intended purpose of creation in a 'future epoch.'
The aim of this chapter is to critically discuss selected theories of history
that preceded and underpin Fukuyama's philosophy of history. The reason for this
is that Fukuyama relies upon philosophical writers to lay the foundation of his
thesis of the end of history. This chapter will concentrate on the most important
theories of history in Fukuyama's work, with particular focus on the theories of
Kant, Hegel, and Marx as well as Kojeve's interpretation of Hegel. All these writers
appear to have contributed to Fukuyama's portrayal of history in terms of the
triumphant arrival of liberal democracy_ Attention will be paid to Kant's teleological
view of human history and its ultimate end in a universal history. It is Kant's
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concept of universal history that Fukuyama appropriates in his theory of history. As
for Hegel's philosophy, attention will be paid to the ideas of struggle for
recognition, freedom, and absolute knowing. I shall look closely at Hegel's
dialectical method that pervades the ideas of recognition and freedom as
"envis-aged in- the- "context ofthe notion of the" end of history. In this case Alexander
Kojeve's15 book Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (1969) will be of vital
importance in understanding Hegel. Karl Marx's conception of history also helps in
the interpretation of Hegel, especially his theory of history - historical materialism.
Philosophy poses three basic questions regarding history: Firstly, is history
cyclical or repetitive? Secondly, is history directional? And finally, will there be an
ultimate end to historical progress? The argument pursued in this chapter is that
history does not end with the fall of communism as claimed by Fukuyama; rather it
marks the decline of one era and the rise of another historical era.
2.2 KANT: THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSAL HISTORY
Kant's philosophy of history develops within the context of eighteenth century
teleological thinking. Teleological thinking dates back at least as far as the
philosophies of Plato (the Idea of the Good), Aristotle (all things aim at fulfilling
some good), and Judeo-Christian theological thought (the idea of eternal freedom
and happiness in the life to come). Teleological thinking is a frequent theme in
Kant's writings, particularly in the Critique of Judgment (1790), where he dealt with
teleological judgments at length. In his teleological writings, Kant wrestles with the
idea of progress and with the notion of the development of the human race. In On
the Common Saying: That May be Correct in Theory but it is of no Use in Practice
(hereafter, Theory and Practice) Kant (1999a:306) assumes that the human race is
constantly advancing in terms of culture and is also constantly improving in relation
"to the moral end of its existence." It is possible that "this progress may at times be
interrupted" but it will never be "broken off' (Kant, 1999:306). The fulcrum on which
Kant rests his assumption of progress is the innate duty of every member of every
15 Kojeve ~as a Russian immigrant who fled the Bolsheviks and found refuge in Paris, like many
other RUSSians at the time. Alexandre Kojeve (Whose "real" name was Aleksandr Vladimirovich
Kozhevnikov), in the years 1933-40 gave lectures on Hegel's Phenomenology, and introduced
Hegelian philosophy to a. new generation of French intellectuals, inclUding Bataille and Lacan (Yar,
20?,1; AUlas, 2002). AUlas (2002) describes Kojeve's reading of Hegel as being idiosyncratic.
KOJeve focused on the Master/Slave dialectic, and is highly influential in postmodern philosophy.
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generation to see to it that posterity keeps on making constant progress in cultural
matters (Kant, 1999:306). This is because "practical reason orders us to act on the
hypothesis that the world as a whole is progressing" (Kant in Despland, 1973:39).
According to Despland (1973:17) teleological thinking carries with it the idea
-ot-en-nSlant-pro-gress in nature- -and history;- "aiming-towards -the realisation of a
good goal or a desirable purpose." Its basic assumption is that "the world is
progressing towards a greater perfection" in the sense of heading towards some
end point (Despland, 1973:17). (This is not clearly true of Plato and Aristotle). In
the Critique of Judgment Kant (1952:92-95[430-432]) maintains that the ultimate
end (or purpose) of nature as a teleological system is culture - which is the whole
vocation of humanity - and it is culture that gives man the aptitude for freedom.
Consequently the ultimate end - culture - is "the production of our human capacity
to set our own purposes and make ourselves moral beings independent of nature
... and ordering of all civil states into a cosmopolitan whole unified in a morally
grounded system" (Makkreel, 1989-90:177). Makkreel agrees with Walsh
(1967:321) that Kant proposes that a hidden plan - nature in history - may well be
able to provide conditions for the progressive development of human capacities, so
that men can move from barbarism to culture, thus converting "a social union
originating in pathological needs into a moral whole." The movement from the state
of lawlessness to the state of culture, where humankind embraces the culture of
civil society through the signing of the original contract illustrates the Kantian
theoretical explanation of the progression of human history.
2.2.1 Kant's Theory of a Universal Human History
Kant proposes that Universal Human History will progress towards an end point _
the realization of human freedom - entrenched in a civic constitution. This
universal history is propelled towards its end point through the mechanism of
antagonism, caused by what Kant calls man's "asocial sociability."
The idea of an all-encompassing cosmopolitan16 world in Kant's critical
philosophy first appears in his essay, Idea for a Universal History from a
~6 The c?ncept of a "cosmo~olita~" world appears in the Idea for a Universal History. Kant (quoted
In Cayglll, 1995:137) descnbes It as "the matrix" within which "all the original capacities of the
hur:n~n ra?e may. develop". ~a~gill ~19~5: 137-138) views it as "a necessary step towards achieving
a cIvil society which can administer Justice universally" and achieve universal political security.
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Cosmopolitan Point of View (1784) (hereafter IUH) where human history is viewed
as a teleological extension of natural history (Makkreel, 1989-90:177). In the IUH
Kant (1993:250-251) argues that anything that fails "to fulfil its purpose is a
contradiction in the teleological theory of nature." In effect, Kant is arguing for a
teleotogical-hermeA6tJlie-st-alting-f3oint-in t:listt:leor-y of history. This will allow us to
interpret and understand human history as having both meaning and purpose.
Hence his first and third theses:
First thesis:
All the natural capacities of a creature are destined sooner or later to be developed
completely and in conformity with their end (Kant, 1977a:42).
Third thesis:
Nature has willed that man should, himself, produce everything that goes beyond the
mechanical ordering of his animal existence, and that he should partake of no other
happiness or perfection than that which he himself, independently of instinct, has created
by his own reason (Kant, 1977a:43).
It is then not surprising that in the IUH and in Theory and Practice, Kant (1993:254-
260; 1999a:326) conjectures that human history will realise nature's plan to bring
forth a "universal civic society" (or "a universal cosmopolitan existence") that will
administer universal justice, and "a league of nations" in which all nations on earth
will coexist in peaceful harmony. Central to his theory is the theme of the
development of human innate capacities, contained and driven by reason. It may
be concluded that Kant views the history of humankind as having general trends
that point to a final end; he justifies his claim that history is a teleological process
by appealing to both theoretical and practical reason. According to Walsh
(1967:454) the explanation of these trends "must impute to the historical process a
natural teleology, a purpose or end, which nature, or providence, develops through
the rational agency of human beings." Thus through reason and the freedom given
to him by nature, man must fulfil the highest purpose of nature - peaceful co-
existence with others in a law-governed civil commonwealth (Kant, 1993:254-262).
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Guyer (2000:372-373) points out that the nine propositions (or theses) Kant
enumerates and expounds in the IUH state "the metaphysical presuppositions
necessary to compose a scientific history of human activities on a global scale,"
and are both moral and political in nature. In other words, Kant, in the IUH, is
dealing-with-Uthe-philosophy--of-histery-from--tt:le-standpoint. -of the .. idea of the
historical development and progress of the human species, and the social and
political conditions required for it" (Wood 1996:xx). He envisages the coming of a
universal history based on the conditions of the possibility of a continual
advancement of human freedom, rationality, morality and political development. In
the IUH, Kant outlines a possible form of inquiry - a scientific or rational one - in
which he anticipates the emergence of people intellectually equipped to compose
a genuinely universal history (Walsh, 1967:454). This history will reveal the
underlying rationale of the past (Walsh, 1967:454) and the ultimate plan of nature
which is the constant advancement of human capacities towards the betterment of
life, leading to happiness based on harmony - and moral progress.
2.2.2 The End of World History
Kant envisages the end of history, at some point in time, in universal terms. In the
Critique of Judgment, section 23(84) where he discusses "[t]he final end of the
existence of a world, that is, of creation itself," Kant (1952:98 [435)), defines "the
final end" as "an end that does not require any other end as condition of its
possibility." Thus human history has a final goal- a final universal purpose - which
Kant views as the realisation of human freedom. This freedom, in the practical
sphere, is presupposed by reason (Kant, 1952:58[400)), first in each individual,
and then in a corporate will (after Rousseau's idea of will).
Kant (1952:118[550)) argues that it is through freedom that humanity, under
the moral law, can set itself a final end; the achievement of the highest possible
good in the world - happiness. Happiness is defined in the Critique of Practical
Reason (1788) as:
the state of a rational being in the world in the whole of whose existence everything
goes according to his wish and will, and rests, therefore, on the harmony of nature
with his whole end as well as with the essential determining ground of his will
(Kant, 1999b:240).
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Guyer (2000: 13) comments that
the realization that our own freedom of choice and action is the fundamental object
... _ ..---ofmorality..itseILmak.es a..syslematic_realizatioD...oLhappinessJhe ultirn~te object of
morality, because freedom is, essentially the capacity to set our own ends, and
happiness is, essentially, the realization of our freely set ends.
In effect, Kant attempts to universalize a rational approach to the achievement of
moral and political harmony in the making of a universal history of humanity.
However, Kant (cited in Despland, 1973:41), in his essay, The End of All Things
(1794) still conceives the possibility of a catastrophic end of history as a result of
human stupidity, man's failure to reason well, or through human cultural and moral
immaturity.
To summarize the central argument of Kant's philosophy of history: this
argument follows a teleological process that begins with the cultural and moral
immaturity of the human race under a self-incurred "bondage to instinct" and
"showing a habituated, heteronomous unwillingness to come of age" and to think
autonomously (Sullivan, 1989:237). It is then followed by a transition from this
"animal-like state of nature" to the formation of a cosmopolitan society (Sullivan,
1989:237). This cosmopolitan world order is the inevitable end of universal history
and reflects universal or cosmopolitan values that are categorical imperatives, not
empirical possibilities. Sullivan (1989:237) states that "Kant's teleo-cosmos is a
purely rational, moral version of the Christian redemptive history of the human
race.Jllt may be concluded that at the centre of Kant's view of the end of history is
the universalization of an individual and his rights in a cosmopolitan world. It is a
transition from cultural and moral immaturity to intellectual freedom. Kant's
cosmopolitanism remains a legacy to the political world despite its abstract nature.
2.3 HEGEL: THE IDEALISTIC AND DIALECTICAL CONCEPTION OF HISTORY
In Germany and other parts of Europe, Kantian critical philosophy laid the ground
for idealistic philosophy. In Germany, thinkers like Fichte and Schelling took the
lead in transforming Kantian philosophy into metaphysical idealism (Stumpf,
1999:305). Hegel also participated in this movement to transform Kantian
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philosophy into idealism - compare his claim that he had overcome the aporias of
Kantianism by using the dialectic method. Marx (1977b) criticizes Hegel for
remaining as abstract as Kant, because Hegel approaches history from the notion
of self-consciousness, rather than in more materialist terms.
2.3.1 Hegel's Dialectic Method
Hegel views the whole of human history as a process leading to the realization of
human freedom, embodied in political and social institutions such as the family,
civil society and the state. Dialectic17 logic underpins and characterises Hegel's
philosophy. He presents logic as progressing necessarily; each moment in the
development of spirit gives rise to its own contradiction or opposite. These
opposing moments are believed to shape and direct the movement of things even
in the concrete world, and especially in the history of humankind.
Originally dialectics was the name of the method of philosophical inquiry
"consciously and systematically used" and perfected by Socrates and Plato
(Kojewe, 1969:179; Flew, 1979:94). In Kant's philosophy, especially The Critique of
Pure Reason (1787) the idea of dialectic appears in the section, "Transcendental
Logic" devoted to an exposition of the categories of understanding. This section is
divided into two parts, namely, "Transcendental Analytic" (Kant, 1929:176-296)
and "Transcendental Dialectic" (Kant, 1929:297-570). By Transcendental Dialectic
Kant refers to the use of concepts that are only applicable to the phenomenal
world, to gain the illusion of knowledge of the things-in-themselves. Walsh
(1967:311) draws our attention to the section on the dialectic where Kant attempts
"to show that the faculty of theoretical reason as well as that of the understanding
has its appropriate pure reason" in contradiction to the analytic part. The two
sections are, however dominated by the terms "reason" and "understanding" in
relation to the epistemological and metaphysical inquiry into reality. Understanding
(Verstand) "is the faculty of concepts and judgments" and reason (Vernunft) is "that
of inference" (Inwood, 1992:243). For Kant, the ultimate reality, the thing-in-itself, is
unknowable. Reason allows us to assume certain things about the thing-in-itself
but knowledge of the thing-in-itself is impossible, especially any attempt to apply
17 The word "dialectic" comes from the Greek, dialegesthai meaning 'to converse', 'to discourse', or
'to go back and forth' (Flew, 1979:94; Inwood, 1992:81; Pence, 2000:14).
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phenomenal concepts to the thing-in-itself. It was this metaphysical-
epistemological legacy of Kant's that Hegel reacted to by formulating and
employing his dialectic method.
In his metaphysics, Hegel's use of the term "dialectic" is manifested in an
inextrica51ecbmbination'oflogical c:JhCf historical progression in his philosophical
argument against the legacy of Immanuel Kant. Hegel argued against the ideas of
Kant on two major points: he rejected the notion of an unknowable thing-in-itself
and argued that the nature of reality is thought and rationality, and that ultimate
reality is the Absolute Idea. In doing so, Hegel believed that he had overcome the
dilemma posed by the Kantian use of the terms, "reason" and "understanding"
(Haddock, 1980:111). From this confrontation, Hegel's philosophy took the shape
of an idealistic and monistic metaphysics based on his dialectic method.
Forster (1993: 134) argues that the philosophical motivation for Hegel's
dialectical method involves three functions, viz: pedagogical functions (these
concern the fact that Hegel is teaching a modern audience) epistemological
functions (these concern the justification of his philosophical system), and scientific
functions (these refer to the standards that his philosophy should meet in order to
be characterised as scientific). While the pedagogical functions and the
epistemological functions are dominant in the Phenomenology of Spirit (hereafter,
Phenomenology) where pedagogical functions lead the individual from his
uneducated standpoint to knowledge, the scientific functions are prominent in the
Encyclopedia of Logic, Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Spirit (Forster,
1993:134). These functions are intended to immunize Hegel's philosophical
system against sceptical objection "about its instantiation of its concepts" and to
make sure that the system is "provable for every other viewpoint" and not
susceptible to sceptical problems (Forster, 1993: 135). It all boils down to the point
that Hegel wants to demonstrate that he is not working in a vacuum like Kant.
Kant's concepts can give rise to doubt about whether they have instances in
reality. Hegel, however, substantiates his concepts by referring to things like the
French Revolution and Napoleon's Empire for instantiation.
In the Encyclopaedia of Logic Hegel (1991) presents the first part, entitled
"Logic," as having three aspects, namely (1) the abstract or understandable, (2)
the dialectical or negatively-rational aspect, and (3) the speculative or positive-
rational aspect. Inwood (1992:81) analyses this dialectic framework, and attempts
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to show how this triadic structure functions. The first stage - the stage of
understanding - contains one or more concepts, or categories, which are "taken as
fixed, sharply defined and distinct from each other" (Inwood, 1992:81). The second
stage - the dialectic proper or negative reason - is the stage when we ponder on
such concepts, and in the process, one or more contradictions emerge (Inwood,
1992:81). The third stage - speculation or positive reason - is the result of the
dialectic proper that combines the earlier categories and resolves the contradiction
that might have emerged in them to produce a new and higher category which
Hegel calls a 'unity of opposites' (Inwood, 1992:81).
Hegel (1998: 171 [181]) describes dialectic as that aspect that is "often no
more than a subjective seesaw of arguments that sway back and forth" displaying
itself as the immanent transcending or negation of the "one-sidedness and
restrictedness of the determinations of understanding." For Hegel (1998:171),
"dialectic constitutes the moving soul of scientific progression" as the only principle
through which "immanent coherence and necessity enter into the content of
science." Dialectical thinking works through contradictions (or negations) which
serve as its inner dynamic life-force. While the contradictions serve as the driving-
force of Hegel's dialectical thinking, its triadic structure functions as an organic
form. According to Inwood (1983:293), the Hegelian triadic framework is
"reminiscent of the pattern of unity-disunity-reconciliation" which is known as the
thesis-antithesis-synthesis18 framework. To elaborate on the above description of
the elements: the first element or step (depending on where the process is being
applied) is rooted in the understanding (Verstand), while the other two elements
are the functions of reason (Vernunft) (Inwood, 1983:294). In terms of their
relationship, the second element is the negation of the first, and the third is the
negation of the second - the negation of the negation (Inwood, 1983:295).
Hegel employs his dialectic in relation to social arrangements in the
Philosophy of Right (1896: 164-350), where he illustrates the process moving from
the family to civil society and then to the state. Stumpf (1999:308) comments that
in his dialectic logic, Hegel emphasised that "thought moves and that contradiction,
rather than bringing knowledge to a halt acts as a positive moving force in human
reason." Kojeve (1969:259) contends that
18 Man~ Hegelian comm~ntators tend to ascribe this triadic as having originated from Hegel, but
accordmg to recent Hegehan experts, it is a schematisation not found in any of Hegel's works.
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Hegelian dialectic is not a method of research or of philosophical exposition, but
the adequate description of the structure of Being, and of the realization and
appearance of Being as well.
In Kojeve's, often idiosyncratic, view of Hegel's dialectic, the central focus was on
the master-slave dialectic. Kojeve (1969: 191) argues that "as a philosophical
method, therefore, Dialectic is abandoned only at the moment when the real
Dialectic of the active transformation of the given definitely stops" at the end of
history.
2.3.2 The End of World History
Hegel ends history with the present (his present, that is). This seems incompatible
with his teleological presuppositions. He views history as explaining the
progression of events from the past towards a certain point in the future, and that
future is the present. The present is described as the complete "realization of
freedom and self-consciousness" (Inwood, 1992:119). In the Lectures on the
Philosophy of World History: Introduction (hereinafter, the Lectures), Hegel
(1980:26,28) argues that the sole aim of history "is to comprehend clearly what is
and what has been, the events and deeds of the past ... by means of reason." This
is because reason concerns itself with the absolute, not with particular or finite
ends. This makes it a duty to think of world history in connection with its "ultimate
end", for it is this intention that underlies the world. And this intention is the
knowledge of the "ldea19 of human freedom" (Hegel, 1980:46). Haddock
(1980: 114) points out that it is in the Lectures that Hegel attempts to show that
"while logic was concerned with the principle of reason, history represented the
elaboration of its implications in a concrete form." Hence Hegel's (1980:28)
argument that reason20, as an ultimate design, governs world history, and that
consequently, world history is "a rational process." This may imply that all historical
19 The Idea operates through the medium of the human spirit, and it assumes three forms: (1)
reveals itself in its purest form - thought (reason), (2) expresses itself in the fonn of physical nature,
and (3) takes the form of spirit in the Absolute sense (Hegel, 1980:28). Here Hegel secularises the
Judeo-Christian doctrine concerning God to become the philosophical Idea.
20 Hegel (1980:28) describes reason as being "self-sufficient" and containing "its end within itself." It
is sui creatio and "carries itself into effect" (Hegel, 1980:28). The attributes of God as a person who
is self-existent and ultimate are also ascribed to Reason. That is why he calls on his audience to
put faith in reason in their approach to world history (Hegel, 1980:28).
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events are predestined to usher in a new world order based on the philosophy of
consciousness.
Yar (2001) points out that Kojeve used "the twin lenses of Karl Marx's
materialism and Heidegger's temporalised ontology of human being" to read
.Hegel'g--philosophy·ofconseiotlsness. In the-- process-·Kojeve criticized Heidegger
for "valorising the contemplative side of humanity", preferring Hegel for stressing
humanity's active side, with his argument that the Hegelian subject makes history
- it is active (Attias, 2002a). Although Kojeve preferred Hegel to Heidegger, he
adopted a materialist approach in his critique of Hegel (Attias, 2002a). Attias
(2002a) identifies Kojeve's materialist critique as stemming from "an IsocratiC21
conception of the role of the philosopher as a historical actor". Kojeve similarly
wanted to see philosophy as a political enterprise that should be engaged "in
changing the material world." Arguing in the same vein, Gans (2002) is convinced
that there is "no doubt Kojeve had political reasons" for singling out the "Lordship
and Bondage" section of Phenomenology, "which can be read as an ordinary
analysis of the Marxist category of exploitation." In pointing out this link, Attias
compares Isocrates and Kojeve. Isocrates was famous for his speech to the king
because it symbolized "a particular theory of language as action" (Attias, 2002a)..
According to Attias (1990) Isocrates "wrote treatises as public speeches." It was in
this speech that he argued that every written speech to any "person(s) holding
power in a state is a political theory." Central to his treatise To Nicocles is the
theme of the use of power (Attias, 1990). Unlike Plato, whose goal was to write a
theory of the state (The Republic) that would influence the state apparatus later,
Isocrates preferred to influence the state directly during his life-time - hence his
letter (Attias, 2002a). That is to say, rather than writing something like the
Republic, he wrote To Nicocles offering "a theory that enacted the state by direct
intervention into the functions of the state apparatus" - revealing his commitment
to a philosophy of praxis that aimed at bringing change to the state rather than
speculating about it (Attias, 2002a).
21 Isocrates was a rhetori?ian .at the. time of Plato. He was a pupil of Socrates and Gorgias
(Wo?druff, 1995:~85). He Identified himself as a philosopher rather than a Sophist (and wrote
Agamst the SOphists, and On the Antidosis), but he is known for his theories of rhetoric. He was far
better known than Plato (who in comparison was considered a minor philosopher in his own time)
(Stumpf, 1999:47).
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It is under the preferred influence of Marx, that Kojeve, in contrast to
Hegel's armchair idealistic philosophy, advocated a practical and concrete
philosophy that was relevant to the existing world. Although he does not offer
philosophical advice to the ruling class, as Isocrates did, Kojeve maintains that "the
ehl1osopher had to be a .~~an o!".~ction'~_~!!ias, .2??2a), an.d ~e ~mphasizes "the
element of work as the humanising factor for mankind" (Rauch, 1999:127). This
leaves us at a paradoxical point, because Kojeve (1969:90) simultaneously holds
that a philosopher is always a person who only understands things after their
eventuality. That means, as a standard of judgement, one cannot reliably evaluate
a philosophy before the end of history - hence Hegel's comparison of the
philosopher to Minerva's Owl22 that "takes its flight only when the shades of nights
are gathering." (Attias, 2002a). Attias (2002a) interprets Kojeve as arguing that
philosopher is only able to see things clearly and explain them after the event;
philosophers always arrive too late to say what should happen.
This explains the importance of Hegel's notion of the "end of history" -
Absolute Knowledge is only achieved when history has reached its end (Attias,
2002a; et. Kojeve, 1969:88-99). Attias (2002a) criticises the idea as "a self"'"
referential, closed philosophical system, because whoever has the power to
declare an end to history gets the power to judge history." That is to say, "by
declaring history 'over' one legitimises a concept of "the inherent reasonableness
of existing power relations" (Attias, 2002a).
According to Attias (2002a) Kojeve (1969: 185), in his reading of Hegel,
seeks to address the main problem of historical judgement - viz. finding a criterion
by which human beings can judge their actions in the progress of history. Kojeve
wants an anthropocentric criterion - for he held that human history must be judged
from within human history, not from some external "suprahistorical space" outside
the terrestrial world (Attias, 2002a).
In the Lectures the most important idea tackled by Hegel is the idea of the
"end of history." What did he mean by this phrase? Philosophical commentators
22 Minerva was the daughter of the Greek god Zeus and the goddess of wisdom, war and crafts
(Jones, 2002). Although in his preface to his book, The Philosophy of Right, Hegel (1896:xxx)
writes about Minerva's owl he does not say much about the owl itself. However, the Owl of Minerva
do~trine, according to Inwood (1983:108-109; cf. KojEwe, 1969) holds that "philosophers qua
phlloso~hers should not attempt to change, or to prescribe changes in their own society, because
they arn~~ on the scene t?O late" - making the doctrine contradictory to "action, prescription and
prophecy Hence the doctnne forbade Hegel to predict the future or "to recommend changes which
have not already started to take place" (Inwood, 1983:509).
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have wrestled with this question. Berthold-Bond (cited in Fritzman 2001 :299)
argues that Hegel's fulfilment of history falls into two alternatives:
That is, either Hegel's eschatological vision is of a completely final end, where
-progr:ess-il1-history of-knowledge is impossible,_oL.iLis__a[Lepochal c_oncepJipn, -
where the completion he speaks of is the fulfilment of an historical epoch, leaving
the future open to progress.
This view is echoed by Fritzman (2001 :295-320), who argues that in Hegel, the
future "always is radically contingent, open-ended, and not-yet." Fritzman criticises
Kojeve and Fukuyama for claiming that for Hegel history is over. According to
Kojeve (1969:67) and Graham (1998:454) for Hegel the end of history is not the
coming of the Kingdom of God, but the coming of absolute mind or spirit. Hegel
cannot talk of history as a final end point in time due to his reliance on the
dialectical method. If he did so, it would contradict his triadic framework that
implies a continuous and unending cyclic process, an unending spiral that aims at
reaching Absolute knowledge
Hegel, especially in the Lectures (1980), supposes that history does, at
some time or other, come to a close. In the Lectures the clause - "the ultimate end
of the world history" - refers to the mind's consciousness of its freedom (Hegel,
1980:41). It follows that history for Hegel ends with his era (which he often
describes as the full realization of freedom and self-consciousness), and has little
to do with the future, for the future does not concern the historian. In other words,
we are already living in the end of history. Central to the end of history is the
concept of freedom. Beiser (1993:295) concludes that Hegel, in viewing "the end of
history as the self-awareness of freedom" and "as the recognition that all are free,"
made the French Revolution ideals of liberty and equality, "the very end of history
itself', to such an extent that he saw them as falling under the law of necessity. In
doing so, Hegel intends them to be goals that people "must strive for through the
inherent laws of history itself' (Beiser, 1993:295). The notion of the end of history
according to Hegel involves three fundamental virtues, namely recognition,
freedom, and absolute knowledge. The realization of these three marks the end of
human history.
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2.3.2.1 The Struggle for Recognition
Hegel discusses the idea of recognition in many of his writings, but particularly in
Systems of Ethical Life and Phenomenology of the Spirit. There is a conflict of
views among -scholarsas--to when -in terms of publication - HegeJJirst talked
about reciprocal recognition. Honneth (1995) argues that the young Hegel
developed his model of a 'struggle for recognition' by critically modifying the idea of
'social struggle' initially employed in the social and political philosophies of
Machiavelli and Hobbes. Contrary to Machiavelli and Hobbes's 'struggle of all
against all,' Hegel's idea of recognition takes the fundamental form of interpersonal
recognition as its point of departure. According to Blunden (2003), the idea of
recognition in Hegel begins in his work Systems of Ethical Life (1802-3), where it
arises as property, emerging "from the social division of labour and the exchange
of products." If Blunden's claim is correct, it is an idea that develops from the
market context whereby the property owner's rights are recognised. Honneth
(1995:7-70) also traces the idea of struggle for recognition in Hegel's works
Systems of Ethical Life, Realphilosophie, and Phenomenology of Spirit. He points
out that Systems of Ethical Life shows Hegel's early "philosophical account with
elementary forms of interpersonal recognition" (Honneth, 1995:18-19). In other
words, Systems of Ethical Life gives an elementary and sketchy account with
regard to the motivations that would lead to struggles for recognition. This counters
Blunden's claim that Hegel's idea of mutual recognition began in the System of
Ethical Life. According to Honneth (1995:26-29) Hegel had in Systems of Ethical
Life, npt yet established the "motives for initiating a conflict in the interior of the
human spirit" that could lead to the struggle for recognition - hence he resorts to
the philosophy of consciousness. Crime was a formative factor in the struggle for
recognition that is resolved in reconciliation.
In the Phenomenology Hegel treats "the development of consciousness as
the key to historical change" by tracing the "odyssey of consciousness" from
sense-certainty to Absolute Knowing through a succession of forms (or shapes)
which generate their own movement (Haddock, 1980:113; Cl. Rauch, 1999:76-86).
The emergence of the idea of self-consciousness is illustrated in the account of the
conflict of the master and the slave which Hegel uses to demonstrate the logic of
the dialectic process (Hegel, 1977:111-119; Cf. Haddock, 1980:113). It is in the
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discourse of self-consciousness that Hegel rejects all dichotomies, including the
Platonic dualism of juxtaposing the intelligible and the sensible (Rauch, 1999:78),
because at the end of time everything becomes one, or a spiritual whole.
Rauch (1999:55) asks a very important question: "How do we arrive at self-
consciousness?" -In--normal-drcumstances-it is rare to think about our thinking,
unless there are "problematic aspects of our experience" that will lead us to do so
(Rauch, 1999:55). In other words, it is easier to think about things outside us than
to look inwards, but the act of looking inwards indicates some contradiction. The
journey to arrive at self-consciousness requires a process that begins with thought
(consciousness) thinking about itself as a result of our immediate experience -
namely dialectical contradictions, or unrest, within us. The implication here is that
to be certain of itself, self-consciousness must overcome or "supersede" the
"otherness of itself' (Hegel, 1977:111 [178-181 n·
Hegel makes a distinction between human and animal desires. Human
desire "involves not just the satisfaction of basic needs but also the desire for
recognition from another human being" (Attias, 2002a) He maintains that "self-
consciousness is Desire in general" that it gets fulfilled "only in another self-
consciousness" through "struggle to death for recognition" (Hegel, 1977:104-105;
108-110). According to Hegel (cited in Kojeve 969:192),
Man is nothing but Desire for recognition ... and History is but the process of the
progressive satisfaction of this Desire, which is fully satisfied in and by the
universal and homogeneous State.
Kojeve (1969: 192-193) does not agree with Hegel that this State wi 11 definitely
satisfy man's desire, because it is still in the making and is still far from having an
"empirical existence." Although it is possible that this state can satisfy the desire of
man, Kojeve (1969:192-193) shows that there is a possibility that the very State is
subject to negation someday by "a negating or creative Action ... other than the
Action of Fighting and Work." Furthermore, Kojeve (1969: 193) argues that one can
know about the satisfaction of man if and only if, one has "complete and perfect
knowledge" about man. This "universally and definitively ... valid" knowledge - "the
absolute truth about the satisfaction of man can be attained only at the end of
History" (Kojeve, 1969:193). Although Kojeve talks about the end of history as an
end point when full knowledge about humanity will be acquired, he (Kojeve,
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1969:193) raises a number of questions; who "is precisely to determine this end of
History" and, who declares the end of history?
Kojeve (1969:9-70) turns to the Hegelian master-slave dialectic, claiming
that it is the key to understanding Hegel's philosophy of history and the motor for
--historical--change:Attias --(2002b1 stFuctuFes-KQjeve's- presentatior:l- -of the master-
slave dialectic as follows: (a) the bloody battle, (b) the reign of the master, and (c)
the revolt and triumph of the slave (Attias, 2002b).
(a) The Bloody Batt/e. Kojeve's handling of the master/slave dialectic
alludes to the possibility of the social contract. Attias (2002a) may be correct
in arguing that implicit in the Hegelian master-slave battle for recognition is
"a Hobbesian war of all against all - because humans want recognition from
the other, but without giving reciprocal recognition." This one-sided state of
affairs is described by Kojeve (1969:18-20,45-59; ct. Hegel:1977:113-
116[186-191]) as the "bloody battle" that involves two men engaged in "a
life-or-death struggle that stops short of death" and whose end product is a
one-sided and unequal recognition (Attias, 2000a). The condition of
possibility for recognition of the would-be master emerges at the moment of
the imminent death of the would-be slave, when he feels the intensity of
terror exerted by his opponent, in this fierce battle for recognition. Kojeve
does not view this bloody battle as "a primordial condition or event but
rather the motor of history" that works as his hermeneutical framework for
interpreting and understanding historical progress and all historical change
(Attias, 2002 a & b).
(b) The Reign of the Master. It is after the terrifying battle that the slave
directs his desire for recognition into work for the master. Kojeve (1969:24-
25) contends that "work transforms the World ... civilizes, educates," and
forms the slave to transcend himself to the point of realising himself beyond
an animal, objectively as man. Work liberates the slave by making him "a
supernatural being that is conscious of its reality;" it allows him to liberate
himself from "the terror that enslaved him to the Master (Kojeve, 1969:25-
27). With the passage of time the slave reaches a point where he will
rationalise "his work by developing a slave ideology" which is Christian
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ideology, "to reconcile the ideal of freedom with the fact of servitude" (Attias,
2002; Kojeve, 1969:55-57). In this argument Kojeve (1969) attempts to
show that what motivates the Hegelian dialectic is the attempt to attain
Mastery, and eventually Absolute Knowledge, based on the triadic
- ---movement-(position-ne§alion-sublimation, - or -- thesis-antithesis-synthesis)
towards perfection - an utopian classless society of total reciprocal
recognition at the end of history.
(c) The Revolt and Triumph of the Slave. The rationalisation of his plight
makes it possible for the slave to make a sober evaluation and estimation of
his opponent - the master. This is the moment when the slave realises the
master's dependence upon his recognition, and there is, accordingly, a
revolt against the master. (In Hegelian terms, it is a point of negation
(antithesis)). Kojeve (1969:53-70; ct. Hegel, 1977:123-138[197-230]) shows
that it is during this time that the slave goes through a process of evaluating
various ideologies:
(i) Stoicism - The slave attempts to persuade himself to accept that he is
actually free, thus having an abstract idea of freedom. The slave drops this
ideology because the intention of this invention is to render him inactive,
and therefore unable to fight for his ideal - freedom.
(ii) Nihilism - Out of the boredom of inaction and a lack of negation, the
slave chooses nihilism because it fulfils the Hegelian dictum: "the true being
of man is his action" (Kojeve, 1969:53-54). It is this nihilist ideology that
makes the slave "eventually perceive the contradiction implied by his
existence" (Kojeve, 1969:54, cf. Hegel, 1977:126[206]). Kojeve (1969:54)
argues that it is the awareness of a contradiction that moves a man
necessarily to want to remove the contradiction by transforming it through
action (Kojeve, 1969:54-55; ct. Hegel, 1977:126[206]).
(iii) Unhappy Consciousness (or Christian) ideology - No longer in denial
about the "contradictory character of his existence," the slave moves from
the abstract meaning of freedom to "real freedom" realisable in the world
beyond, where he seeks recognition by submitting to the absolute master-
God (Kojeve, 1969:57). This allows the slave to move further towards
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overcoming the essentially slavish concepts of Christian theology and
implies the idea of a synthesis of the Particular and the Universal that leads
to Individuality (Kojewe, 1969:59-61). To be recognised in his personal,
particular existence, the slave should opt for recognition that is realisable,
_.--- .----not-in a -future-world-to-come,-but-in-this-world =-which'is--already a present
here and now (KojEwe, 1969:59-67, 160n). Kojeve (1969:67) argues that the
slave must replace the Christian idea of the kingdom to come with the State
- vide his detailed explanation:
Therefore, the human ideal can be realized only if it is such that it can be realized
by a mortal Man who knows he is such. In other words, the Christian synthesis
must be effected not in the Beyond, after death, but on earth, during man's life.
And this means that the transcendent Universal (God), who recognizes the
Particular, must be replaced by a Universal that is immanent in the World. And for
Hegel this immanent Universal can only be the State. What is supposed to be
realized by God in the Kingdom of Heaven must be realized in and by the State, in
the earthly kingdom. And that is why Hegel says that the "absolute" State that he
has in mind (Napoleon's Empire) is the realization of the Christian Kingdom of
heaven.
After progressing through all these ideologies, the slave will then have to revolt
against, and triumph over, the reign of the master in order to obtain recognition.
Attias (2002a) interprets Kojeve as viewing the uprising by the slave as
leading to the "formation of a classless society at the end of history." It is marked
by the total satisfaction of the human desire for recognition. Given his Hegelian-
Marxist materialist assumptions, Kojewe (1969:158n-160n) thought that the end of
history was to be a material fact in history. A utopian society, under a universal and
homogeneous state, was "already the present, here and now" in Europe in the
nineteen thirties. It was characterised by the cessation of Action - meaning the
practical "disappearance of wars and bloody revolutions." Furthermore, in this
homogeneous state, the '''specific-differences' ... of class, race, and so on, are
'overcome'" and as a result, the homogeneous state is directly related to a specific
individual who is recognised as a citizen in his very particularity (Kojeve,
1969:237). Any action that followed was an extension "in space of the universal
revolutionary force actualised in France" and the rest of the world, either by
societization (Russia), communisation (China), democratisation (imperial Germany
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and North America), or by accession to independence (on the African continent)
(Kojeve, 1969:160n-162n). Unlike Hegel, who made racist remarks about Africa,
Kojeve was inclusive, if not comprehensive, in his interpretation of history.
Kojeve (1969: 163) finally identifies the end of history as marked by the total
satisfaction-of--human--desire-under---a- classless soeiety--where--- the --state wi II
guarantee that each citizen's desire for recognition is satisfied. Here we clearly see
the influence of Marxist ideas in Kojeve's philosophy. It is at this end of history that
the philosopher can commence his project of historical judgement.
Addressing the issue of recognition, Fukuyama (1992: 161) argues in favour
of Hegel and against Hobbes and Locke. He contends that
Hegel seeks to honor and preserve a certain moral dimension to human life that is
entirely missing in the society conceived of by Hobbes and Locke. Hegel, in other
words, understands man as a moral agent whose specific dignity is related to his
inner freedom from physical or natural determination. It is this moral dimension,
and the struggle to have it recognized, that is the motor driving the dialectical
process of history.
Thus Fukuyama is saying that Hobbes and Locke did not go further than the
empirical aspect - which is the material well-being of mankind. Hegel goes further,
bringing in the metaphysical aspect of humanity - the desire for recognition. It is
this aspect of human life, Fukuyama claims, that it is fulfilled by liberal democracy.
2.3.2.2 Freedom
Hegel maintains that human history, driven by dialectic forces, is moving toward an
expected goal or purposive end - freedom. The idea of the will plays a central role
in Hegel's Philosophy of Right (1896). It exerts a comprehensive influence on
Hegel's conception of the individual, the family, the state, and possibly, civil
society. In the Philosophy of Right Hegel shows that there is an inseparable
connection between the will and right. For Hegel (1896:212 [215]), "right concerns
freedom, the worthiest and holiest thing in man, the thing which he must know in
so far as he is answerable to it" - to the state. Smith (1998) points out that for
Hegel the "idea of Right is inseparable from the realization of the concept of
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Freedom". Based on free will, freedom constitutes the will's substance and destiny.
This freedom must however have some preconditions for it to be actualisable.
In Hegel's view recognition is a precondition for freedom: one can only be
free if one is recognized as such, and one can only be so recognized if recognition
is givenfreely.--Freedom- depenelsen- recegnition by -the other--and constraint
toward the Other. Pippin (1993:52-85) comments that these claims of Hegel's not
only tell us that our freedom is self-determined, but also open up the whole
discussion of the activities that occupy human life - particularly those surrounding
work. Pelczynski (1984:64) describes Hegel's view of freedom as being
'contextual", in the sense that it is always conceived in a "social context" or in a
"context of human interaction." Having followed Hegel's inquiry closely, Pelczynski
(1984:64) identifies four major kinds of freedom with their respective contexts of
human interactions, namely the natural, ethical, civil and political contexts.
Pelczynski explains how these freedoms work:
• The notion of natural freedom refers to independent, egocentric, and
impulse-driven individuals who find themselves in a shared physical space
(Pelczynski, 1984:66; ef. Hegel, 1896:22[11 D. It is a freedom that is
animalistic, without rational determination, as in Hobbes' state of nature.
• The notion of ethical freedom refers to a freedom peculiar to an ethics of
obligation (Pelczynski, 1984:68). Hegel (1896:149) argues:
A duty or obligation appears as a limitation merely of undetermined subjectivity and
abstract freedom or of the impulse of the natural will, or of the moral will which fixes
upon its undetermined good capriciously. But in point of fact the individual finds in
duty liberation. He is freed from subjection to mere natural impulse; he is freed
from the dependence which he as subjective and particular felt towards moral
permission and command; he is freed, also, from that indefinite subjectivity, which
does not issue in the objective realization implied in action, but remains wrapped
up in its own unreality. In duty the individual freely enters upon a liberty that is
substantive.... But duty is not a limitation of freedom, but only of the abstraction of
freedom, that is to say, of servitude. In duty we reach the real essence, and gain
positive freedom.
Ethical freedom is a life of rational fulfilment based on what is expected of
each individual. According to Pelczynski (1984:69-70), freedom "pervades
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all aspects of social life, all relations, institutions and communities" as an
ethical substratum.
Civil freedom. For Hegel, "freedom in common parlance" or civil freedom as
applied in the context-ota civil society-implies the ·presence of various civil
and economic rights, legal rights, and association rights. In Philosophy of
Right, Hegel (1896:202-203[206]) writes:
But when subjective particularity is welcomed by objective order, and given its right
and place, it becomes the animating principle of the civic community, stimulates
thought and promotes merit and honour. The recognition of the claim that whatever
in the civic community and the state is rationally necessary should occur through
subjective free choice is a fuller definition of the popular idea of freedom.
Hegel seems to imply that as a self-conscious ethical agent the modern
person accepts his obligation, but at the same time sacrifices his
individuality in a common society.
• Political freedom appears to be the pinnacle of Hegel's idea of freedom.
Pelczynski (1984:71) comments that the ultimate point of the development
of an individual will be towards freedom in the political realm, that is, the
sphere of the supreme public authority of the strictly political state. Political
freedom is the ultimate teleological goal of Hegel's view of human history.
As Stumpf (1999:315) puts it, in political freedom "the individual acts
according to the universal, rational will of the whole society."
In general, Hegel viewed freedom not just as a psychological phenomenon, but "as
the essence of what should be understood as distinctively human" (Fukuyama,
1992:152). Haddock (1980: 116) comments that for Hegel
men were always implicitly free; but by expressing their social and political relations
in the form of a universal constitution they became aware of freedom as their
essential attribute.
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The emergence and constitution of the state concretely actualises this freedom
(Hegel, 1952:160). And it is only when freedom has been given an institutional
form that people become a relevant subject for world history. Hegel (1980:54)
declares that "world history is the progress of the consciousness of freedom - a
progresswhose-necessity-itis-our busifless-to comprehend," for freedom is the
recognition of necessity. The progress of history points to the final end product of
the dialectics of history - the establishment of the universal state. If Hegel is
understood correctly, it is only after the concrete institutionalisation of freedom and
the acceptance of institutions as "an expression of the character of a people"
(Haddock, 1990:160) that perfect freedom can be experienced.
In Lectures, Hegel (1980: 120) argues that "the state is the spiritual Idea
internalised in the human will and its freedom." The problem is that Hegel here
leaves us with no answer as to whether he views history as cyclical or linear. First
he talks of a dialectical history that will end in the emergence of a homogeneous or
universal state that will satisfy the desire for recognition and freedom. Since
dialectics is a continuous process, when will the final dialectic occur that will end in
final sublimation? Hegel (1980: 124-125) argues that the course of history shows
that historical phenomena, "no matter how great their variety", only show an
"externally recurring cycle", because in nature there is "nothing new under the.
sun." It seems as if Hegel is trying to combine the two perspectives, leading one to
interpret him as saying that some things in nature recur cyclically, while others,
especially the human aspect of nature, advance in a linear fashion towards a
projected goal - absolute knowledge. But a closer look shows that Hegel did not
doubt that history came to an end. His sense of its pattern is that (1) whenever it
would take place it must have the same form, and (2) its form is a cyclical
movement that raises aspirations and world, over and over again until the end _
thus removing the seeming conflict between his thesis that history is at an end
(implying a linear view) and that it is cyclical in its movement.
2.3.2.3 Absolute Knowing
The idea of the Absolute in Hegel points to the completion of a process that is
characterised by what Rauch and Sherman (1999:2) call "successive forms of
consciousness", generally referred to as the 'succession of shapes'. Each form or
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shape of consciousness reflects "the world view of a specific time period." Hence,
Hegel's (1977: 11 [20]) assertion:
Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only in the end is it
__whaLiLtruly_is;_ and_that precis.ely ... in_JtlL~LJ;:Qnsj~t~its .. n~tu[~,.yiz to be actual,
subject, the spontaneous becoming of itself.
Solomon (1983:635) comments that the concept of the "Absolute" in Hegel implies
the ultimate product of a process. Propelled by the inherent motor of dialectical
forces, conceptual development proceeds until "consciousness ascends to that
state which Hegel calls 'Absolute Knowing'" (Rauch & Sherman, 1999; cf. Hegel,
1977:478-493[788-808]). Due to the fact that Hegel rejected the subject-object
separation model of knowledge acquisition, it is in absolute knowing that
consciousness will recognise that "its knowledge of objects is ultimately self-
knowledge, and that self-knowledge is always conditioned by some existing set of
socio-historical categories" (Rauch & Sherman, 1999:2-3). This makes absolute
knowing a context bound process driven by dialectic movement.
Absolute knowing appears simultaneously as the last shape of
consciousness and the truth of "the revealed religion" (Hegel, 1977:480[789]). It is
a process in which "intersubjective self-awareness in the community's institutions
and practices" takes place (Sembou, 2003:276). In other words, absolute knowing
is a point of reflection and comprehension of all the shapes of consciousness -
hence its enthronement above the historical struggle for recognition. For Sembou
(2003:279), fundamental to 'spirit', or interpersonal relationships, is a struggle for
recognition that gives shape to human life and is a driving force for change. Upon
the realisation of this inherent driving force, humans are considered to have arrived
at the point of absolute knowing (Sembou, 2003). It is only then that humans
discover that they are responsible for defining "the beliefs and values of the society
in which they live and that these beliefs and values in turn underlie social and
political institutions, as well as governing all relationships among them" (Sembou
2003:279). They thus express their deep-seated and long-standing aspirations for
freedom.
For Hegel, human history is a succession of shapes, a series of dialectical
forms through which humans pose their deepest aspirations, and the world is seen
as the expression of these aspirations. These aspirations, according to Kojeve and
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Fukuyama, are condensed in the notion of recognition. Gradually through the
dialectic of shapes and aspirations, humans come to synthesise their aspirations,
and to remake their worlds into better forms. When finally the world and aspiration
do not conflict, these aspirations are fully realised, and it is at this moment that the
-nation·state~appears~-It- is at this moment-when aspirations are fully realised, in
other words, when history is fully knowable, that history can be reviewed by
philosophy. For Hegel the sole task of philosophy is therefore to know our history,
to achieve absolute knowledge of the gradual unfolding of the Idea of human
freedom. However, he leaves us wondering whether this end implies that there will
be no further human experience, or any further need for knowing ourselves.
2.4 MARX: THE MATERIALIST AND DIALECTICAL CONCEPTION OF
HISTORY
According to Leatt et al (1986:202), in Marx's philosophy, "man is the beginning,
the centre, and the goal of all history." Man, as an individual, is described by Marx
as the 'universal individual' whose unique trait, freedom, can never be sacrificed to
the collectivity. This is despite the fact that man recapitulates mankind and all its
potentiality (Leatt at ai, 1986:202). For Marx the world is not constituted and
governed by the universal acknowledgement of divine rule, but waits to be created
by imaginative human endeavour, freed from the constraints of economic
necessity (Graham, 1998:455). Up until now, however it has been a world created
out of conflicting interests - as Marx (1967:79) asserts: "The history of all hitherto
existing society is the history of class struggles."
2.4.1 Theory of History: Historical Materialism
Marx developed his original ideas about the inner motion of capitalism (political
economy) and historical or dialectical materialism under the influence of Hegel's
dialectical philosophy, French utopian socialism, and Classical political economics
(Adam Smith and Ricardo) (McBride, 1995:465; O'Hara, 2001 :701; Marx & Engels,
1967:106-118). In The Communist Manifesto and other writings, Marx never
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directly uses the terms 'dialectical materialism' or 'historical materialism,23 to refer
to his theory of history. However, Rohmann (1988: 104) describes historical
materialism as that theory of history that is derived from material (especially
economic) conditions, which carries with it the idea that "history progresses
according to--dialectical-Iaws."-Although Marx did not use the term historical
materialism, Engels used it to refer to his elaboration of Marx's theoretical concept
that history is propelled by technological advancement and changes in social and
economic organisation (Rohmann, 1988:104).
Marx's theory of history - historical materialism - attempts to deal with
specific laws that govern the historical development of human society and to
"demonstrate how the logic of capitalist production created the conditions for the
emergence of a new order" (Haddock, 1980:131). The logic of capitalist production
engendered, as Haddock (1980:131) puts it, "implacable hostility" or "class conflict"
between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. According to Wood (1993:431-432)
Marx's theory of history "sees the history of society fundamentally as a history of
economic structures or 'modes of production' rather than a political constitution."
Hence Marx's argument that the 'real basis' of social life is to be found in the
"social relations of production" that people create and enter into in their co-
operative production.
In The German Ideology, Marx (1977a:160-5) shows how the theory of
historical materialism is based on materialist premises. Firstly, it is based on the
premise that "men must be in a position to live in order to be able to 'make history'"
- referring thus to "the existence of living human individuals" (Marx, 1977a: 160-
162, 165). This calls for the first historical act, the "fundamental condition of all
history", namely, the production of the means to satisfy the basic material needs of
shelter, food and clothing and also "the production of material life itself' (Marx,
1977a:165-166). For Marx, before (1977:164) the production of ideas, conceptions,
and consciousness can become a separate activity, or metaphysical enterprise, it
"is directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of
23 There is a tendency to deal with the Marxist theory of history as expressed by the terms _
dialectical materialism and historical materialism, interchangeably. The two terms might share
common ancestry and context but their differentia specifica lies in their functions and meanings.
Dialectical materialism is said to be a common metaphysical doctrine held by many Marxists - but
not by ~arx himself - that ~sserts the primacy of matter and lays down dialectical laws that govern
the motion of development In all matter (Flew, 1979:94-95). Historical materialism is viewed as the
Marxist theory of history that deals with more specific laws that govern "the development of human
society and thought" (Flew, 1979:94).
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men, the language of real life". This is what is referred to as the base or
substructure. In this statement Marx openly and directly dismisses Hegel's dictum
that all reality is rational - thus opposing materialism to idealism. Furthermore,
human existence implies sustenance and hence production. People have to enter
--inte--soeial-relations-to meet-the demaAds--of-tRe material conditions-that-determine
their production (Marx, 1977b:161). These relations entail the division of labour
and internal intercourse (associations or cooperatives).
Secondly, historical materialism is based on the premise that "definite
individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into ... definite social
and political relations" (Marx, 1977b:164). Marx focuses his analysis on the
material order and specifically on the manner in which human beings are "engaged
in the act of production" (Stumpf, 1999:381). Marx emphasizes that the act of
production takes place in a social environment - it is a social act where human
beings struggle with nature as a community, or as societies, based on the
interaction between individuals (Stumpf, 1999:381). The idea of production
relations is the core of Marx's analysis of society and at its heart is the ownership
of property (Marx, 1977:162-165; Stumpf, 1999:281 )). To determine how
individuals relate to each other, in the relations of production, one must understand
their relations to property in terms of the historical epoch in which they lived.
Thirdly historical materialism gives its own account of the production of
ideas, conceptions, and consciousness (Marx, 1977:164) - the superstructure. The
first two premises discussed form part of the substructure which contains the
dialectic forces that propel history. The superstructure, on the other hand, is
merely the human reflective engagement with the basic and actual material reality
or condition of "the historic period" (Stumpf, 1999:386). Marx (1977:164) argues
that the mental intercourse of humans is influenced by their material order or
existence. For Marx (1997: 164) it follows that "consciousness can never be
anything else other than of conscious existence and the existence of men in their
actual life-process." Marx (1977:164-167) is attempting to account for the
relationship between the material environment (the empirical aspect of human life)
and its conceptualisation. Hence, in contrast to the German philosophical tradition
he opposes, he maintains that "life is not determined by consciousness, but
consciousness by life" (Marx, 1977b:164). Ideas, conceptions, and consciousness
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are, according to Marx, directly (even if sometimes also critically) related to the
material order. Hence his assertion:
Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains
. so as IOng.as.men.exist at aiL. C~orlscio.ll~l1ess is at first, of course, merely
consciousness concerning the immediate sensuous environment and
consciousness of the limited connection with other persons and things outside the
individual who is growing self-conscious (Marx, 1977:165).
Marx states that consciousness is grounded in economic reality. The conflict of
ideas in society generally arises around the conceptualisation of needs (the action
of satisfying them and instruments of satisfaction).
The conflict between the human conceptualisation of needs and their
satisfaction leads to a succession of modes of production from tribal, to ancient
communal and State, to feudal or estate, to capitalist, and, according to Marx's
prediction, to socialist and then communist ownership of property. These shifts
demonstrate stages of class conflict or struggle in human history. The most naked
class-conflict according to Marx occurs under capitalism.
Marx points out that under capitalism, society has been reduced to two
classes, namely, the ruling class, the bourgeoisie - who own and control the
means of production (Marx, 1967:79; 1977:135,176, 186), and the proletariat -
who are wage labourers without any means of production, and as a result are
reduced to selling their labour for remuneration in order to live (Marx, 1967: 79;
1977:134-135). As owners of the means of production, the bourgeoisie have a
corresponding political power over the proletariat. This state of affairs will
ultimately give rise to the violent overthrow of the ruling class by the proletariat
(Marx, 1967:90-94). The classes are fundamentally at odds with each other,
because of the disproportionate distribution of economic goods - their contribution
to the production of economic goods is not at all reflected in the share of those
goods assigned to them in the capitalist system (Marx, 1977:178-9; Stumpf,
1999:382). This discrepancy exists due to the market forces of supply and demand
that determine the wages for labour. According to Marx, the wages do not
correspond to the value of the product when sold - (Marx's theory of surplus
90
value24 is constituted around this contradiction in the capitalist system of
economics and politics). The exploitation of labour would, according to Marx, lead
to a proletarian uprising and finally a communist revolution.
Engels (in Adoratsky, 1943:186) speaks of this prospective proletarian
re'ilolution-as l~humanity!-s--leap--ffom-therealm--of··Aecessityinto-the realm of
freedom." The completion of this transition marks the end of human history.
2.4.2 The End of History: Classless Society
Marx contends that history will end with the emergence of socialism and ultimately,
the final shape of communism - the classless society. Kojeve understands Hegel
and Marx as locating the future in the present, because the homogeneous state
has already been ushered in - the Napoleonic Empire and capitalist society, as
prehistoric stages of human society, have come to a close. Inwood (1983:517), on
the other hand, argues that for Marx the end of history is something that is still to
take place in the future, due to the continuous conflict of classes.
Although there are important differences, Marx's philosophy of history
cannot be discussed without investigating its roots in Hegel's philosophy. Marx's
theory of history aims to give an "account for history's structure and direction by
identifying a real causal process internal to human history, an endogenous
process" that gives history "a determinate trajectory" that works without
"countervailing exogenous causes" (Levine, 2002:252). In other words, Marx's
theory of history identifies contradictions in history that work to drive the natural
movement of human history to an intended end point. The parallels with Hegel's
conception of historical development are unmistakable.
The dialectics of class struggle will eventually end when a classless society
emerges from it. According to Graham (1998:453) Marx's theory of history self-
consciously abandons religious aspirations; it dismisses them as "products of
false-consciousness and it seeks their replacement with purely material (most of it
economic) alternatives." Marx does not invoke divine intentions, but historical laws.
These laws govern economic change from feudalism to capitalism and socialism,
and finally to the Marxian ideal of a classless communist society. For Marx people
24 Beca~s~ "the product of I~bour could be sold for more than the cost of labor" (Stumpf, 1999:382),
the capitalist can reap the dIfference (Marx, 1977:455-470), which Marx calls surplus value.
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determine their history as they struggle to achieve their destiny, the defeat of
feudalism by capitalism and the emergence of socialism, as the resolving
synthesis, that leads to communism.
For Marx (cited in Love, 1986:73), "communism is the solution for the riddle
of history:" -He-describes communism as "not a state of affairs which is to be
. - .- . . -_ ..._-_.
established, as ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself [but] the real
movement which abolishes the present state of things," that is to say the
supremacy of the bourgeoisie (Marx 1977b:171). Communism would abolish
private property and bring about the "liberation of each single individual ... in the
measure in which history becomes transformed into world history" (Marx,
1977b:171). This transformation links the proletariat with "world-historical
existence." According to Marx (1977b: 171), "world-historical existence of
individuals means existence of individuals which is directly linked up with world
history." This implies the internationalisation of the individual, or to put it in
Fukuyama's terms, it is the recognition of the individual in a global perspective.
Thus the recognition of the individual implies worldwide integration.
Marx and Engels (1967) distinguish communism from other ideologies of
working-class, or proletariat struggle. Communists will identify and "bring to the
front" the common interests of the international working-class, as they represent
the interests of the movement world-wide (Marx & Engels, 1967:95-96). For Marx
and Engels (1967:95-96) the distinguishing feature at the core of communism "is
not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property." The
reason for abolishing bourgeois private property, according to Marx and Engels
(1967:96) is that modern bourgeois private property had become the ultimate and
fullest "expression of the system of producing and appropriating products that is
based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few." Marx and
Engels (1967:97) reject the capitalist view that capital is purely personal; capital
should rather be seen as a collective product, a social power that should therefore
be "converted into common property;" in this way it loses its class character (Marx
& Engels, 1967:97). Furthermore, if capital is not changed, it will maintain the
status quo of bourgeois society where "capital is independent and has individuality
while the living person is dependent and has no individuality" (Marx & Engels,
1967:97). Marx and Engels (1967:98) describe freedom under bourgeois relations
of production as "free trade, free selling and free buying," a condition that
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communism will abolish. "Abolition of private property" (Marx & Engels, 1967:96) -
was thus one of the central points in the programme of the Communist Party. By
calling for the abolition of private property, communism does not aim at depriving
any person of
the power to appropriate the products of society; all that it does is to deprive
him/her of the power to subjugate the labour of others by means of such
appropriation (Marx and Engels (1967:99).
It appears that communism acts in contradiction to "past historical experience." In
the resulting new era of a classless society everything will be in perfect and
perpetual balance. One is led to the conclusion that there can be no further
developments in history after the communist epoch. A condition without class
conflict brings history to a halt.
2.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
What clearly emerges from the theories of history that I have discussed is their
teleological nature. This teleological view of history assumes that history is moving
towards an end point, or fulfilment of a purpose. In his teleological writings, Kant
wrestles with the idea of progress, the notion of the development of human society,
and the formation of the state. The all-encompassing cosmopolitanism in Kant's
critical philosophy (where human history is viewed as a teleological extension of
natural history on a global scale) envisages the coming of a universal history that
is based on the possibility of a constant advancement of human freedom,
rationality, morality and political development.
Due to his teleological view of history, Kant also suggests the end of history
at some point in time. His teleo-cosmos is a completely rational and secularised
moral version of Christian redemption. At the end of history, society will have
matured rationally, and through good reasoning will unite under an original contract
to form a civil society that will produce a just civic constitution that assumes a
universal nature. This idea is most clearly demonstrated in Kant's idea of a League
of Nations.
Underlying Hegel's philosophy of history is the law of contradictions that
propels the dialectical movement of history towards its end. The dialectical process
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of history is characterised by the human desire for recognition - especially worked
out by Hegel in the "Lordship and Bondage" section of the Phenomenology. The
struggle ends with mutual recognition between conflicting individuals and the
realisation, and absolute knowledge, of freedom.
Marx-appropriates HegeFs law of contraElietien-in order to frame his theory
of history - historical materialism. This leads him to claim that all human history is
a history of class struggle. Marx sees the end of history as the overcoming of the
bourgeoisie by the proletariat. This leads to the superseding of capitalism by
socialism and the ultimate triumph of a classless society in communism.
A comparison of these three theorists indicates points of convergence and
divergence. Central to Hegel and Marx (and Engels) is the idea that human history
advances dialectically, through conflicts within the prevailing order. These conflicts
are resolved through synthesis, resulting in the development from necessity to a
perfect and perpetual freedom. Hegel legitimises the existence of the state and its
institutions as a coming of age, but Marx destroys the state at the end of history,
for a classless society. Both Kant and Hegel reach the stage of a state community
and they call for a homogeneous state. Kant goes further in calling for a League of
Nations. Central to all these theories of history are the elements of reason and the
universalizatieA-eH-he-iAdividHal-r-i€}Rt--te-freeGl0nl.---- -
The discussion of the philosophical antecedents of Fukuyama's theory of
liberal democracy indicates that Fukuyama makes use of a number of
philosophical ideas central to the writing of Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Most
importantly, Fukuyama appropriates the idea of recognition, and the concept of a
homogeneous, or universal state, in his declaration of the triumphant emergence
and the global character of liberal democracy. The third chapter will deal in detail
with Fukuyama's concept of the end of history.
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CHAPTER 3
"THE END OF HISTORY": AN ANALYSIS OF FUKUYAMA'S DECLARATION
OFTHE TRIUMPH OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
A remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy as a system of
government had emerged throughout the world over the past few years. as it. conquered rival
ideologies like hereditary monarchism, fascism, and most recently communism. LIberal democracy
may constitute the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution" and the "final form of human
government, " and as such constituted (sic) the "end ofhistory. "
- Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (1992).
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In the article "The End of History" (1989) and the book The End of History and the
Last Man (1992), both written in the millennial spirit, Fukuyama argues that the fall
of communism marks "the end of history" and the triumph of liberal democracy
over other ideologies such as hereditary monarchism, fascism, and communism -
as already indicated in the first chapter of this thesis. Hill (2002) comments that
Fukuyama set off "an international intellectual furor that has not subsided yet,"
when he argued "how and why he believes that liberal democracy will triumph _
not only over fascism and communism - but also over its own internal
weaknesses." This is typical Hegelian-Marxian dialectic - talking about overcoming
internal and external contradictions. Sanoff (1992) comments that "Fukuyama
paints a picture of a nation whose fate is far from secure despite liberal
democracy's triumph."
Fukuyama (1989, 1992) argues that human history should be perceived as
entailing a number of stages of evolutionary development marked by ideological
conflicts. These conflicting ideologies drive the progressive movement of history
and at the same time inspire scientific and technological advancements.
Communism was considered an alternative ideology to liberalism; Fukuyama
interprets its collapse as the "end of history." In his project, Fukuyama avoids
suggesting that the triumph of liberal democracy means that there will never
emerge any other ideology whatsoever. What he suggests, instead, is that
whatever ideology emerges, its continual marginalization as a result of the ever
growing "remarkable consensus" in the worldwide reception of liberal democracy
will render it insignificant.
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Following Immanuel Kant on the universality of history, and Hegel-Marx on
the dialectical homogenization of human history, Fukuyama revisits the idea of the
end of history. The end of human historl5 has been realized in the triumphant
emergence of liberal democracy and the free-market economy over all other
systems,as the OIUilrate-legHtmate-form-of--government -and system of economic
planning and distribution, consensually received worldwide in the establishment of
liberal states, argues Fukuyama. His argument carries with it ideological
connotations and ethical implications that have attracted a host of criticisms. These
prompted Fukuyama to elaborate on a necessary condition for the success of
liberal democracy en route to political stability - social trust and economic
prosperity - and to warn against moral decadence due to radical individualism.
This chapter sets out to critically analyze the argument with which
Fukuyama backs up his declaration of the triumph of liberal democracy and free-
market economy as the ultimate forms of government and economic system,
respectively, that will bring about equal and mutual recognition to humankind -
hence prosperity and life satisfaction. This chapter attempts, simultaneously, to
show how Fukuyama appropriates Hegel-as-interpreted-by-Kojeve's philosophy. I
will also look closely at how Fukuyama demonstrates and legitimizes the triumph
of liberal democracy, and how he explains why social capital (and trust, its key by-
product) is indispensable for a successful democracy. This involves an
investigation into Fukuyama's views on the definition and origin of social capital
and how its presence or absence affects democracy. I will next look at the question
of whether the notion of trust as a key component of social capital is in fact useful
for improving our understanding of political and economic behaviour, especially
concerning Fukuyama's claim that liberal democracy will bring. about mutual
recognition at the end of history. I conclude the chapter with a close look at
Huntington's alternative interpretation in terms of the clash of civilizations. This is a
reference to the radical individual created by technological advancement and the
25 Don Hill (1999) explains what Francis Fukuyama meant by declaring the end of history as the
demise of co~munism and the triumph of liberalism. Hill (1999) claims that when Fukuyama
declared that history had come to an end, he did not mean "history" in its common sense as "the
chro~icle o~ human. events" rather he referred to the meaning that Hegel gave it. As already
mentlon~d '~ th~ thlr~ chapter of this dissertation, by history Hegel meant a process by which
humankind IS dialectically evolving its moral and "political principles and ultimate form of
government and economic organization" (Hill, 1999).
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rationalization of economic activities that challenged the communal moral order
and caused social disruption from the 1960s to the 1990s.
This is a good moment for a brief introduction to Francis Fukuyama - his
academic development and published works central to this thesis.
3.1.1 Introducing Francis Fukuyama
Francis Fukuyama was born in Chicago in 1952. He graduated from Cornell
University with a B.A. degree in classics, after which he studied at Harvard
University, earning himself a Ph.D. in Political Science (Sanoff, 1992). In the wake
of the Cold War, Fukuyama studied under Allan Bloom, who was in turn a follower
of the political philosopher Leo Strauss (Yar, 2002; Herwitz, 2000:223). It was
Strauss who introduced Bloom and his other students to KojEwe's thought (Yar,
2002).
Fukuyama was a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND
Corporation from 1979-1980, then again from 1983-89, and from 1995-96 (Kimball,
1992). In 1981-82 and in 1989 he was a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the
US Department of State, the first time as a regular member specializing in Middle
East affairs, and then as Deputy Director for European political-military affairs
(Kimball, 1992). In 1981-82 he participated in the Egyptian-Israeli talks on
Palestinian autonomy as a member of the US delegation.
As a scholar, Fukuyama has written widely on issues relating to questions
concerning democratization and international political economy. His most
important publications for the purpose of this thesis are as follows: (1) The End of
History and the Last Man (1992) (hereafter The End of History), (2) Trust: The
Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (1995) (hereafter Trust), (3) The
Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstruction of Social Order (1999)
(hereafter The Great Disruption).
At the writing of this thesis, Fukuyama had published the most recent of his
works, which is not part of the projected corpus: Our Posthuman Future:
Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (published in April 2002). It is a
follow-up on its predecessor, The Great Disruption. I am not going to include it in
my study
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3.1.2 Unity of Thought in the Projected Corpus
Fukuyama's (1992) approach in The End of History can be characterized as that of
a social visionary who looks at the "end of all pervasive flux and turmoil of the
human condition''-by arguiAlltM8t "'history' ends--with--liberaldemQcracy- but does
not put this forth as a testable proposition, more as a trend in line with human
nature" (Anonymous, 2002). He claims that the triumph of liberal democracy
coupled with a free market economy, however imperfect it may be, is still the best
form of social arrangement available for fulfilling the universal human desires for
recognition and gain. This does not mean that Fukuyama brushes lightly over the
problems of liberal democracy; indeed he discusses them at length - especially in
Trust (1995) and The Great Disruption (1999), where he discusses the idea of
social capital, which he (Fukuyama, 1999:16) defines as "a set of informal values
or norms shared among members of a group that permits cooperation among
them" In The Great Disruption Fukuyama illustrates how liberal democracy can
deal with its internal contradiction of excessive individualism versus communalism.
He shows that during times of social disorder, social capital is lacking, but it can be
reconstituted after the period of disruption has come to an end. Fukuyama
attempts to link the thirty-year period of social disruption in many Western
countries with his claim that the triumph of liberal democracy marks the end of
history (Fukuyama, 1992), but warns that without the social virtue of social capital,
and its key-byproducts trust and a stable social order, liberal democracy is
unrealizable. After giving a gloomy picture of the social context of the West, he
offers some hope by concluding that a reconstruction of social order in the
Western world is possible.
In Trust, Fukuyama (1995:23-41; 349-359) continues with the theme of the
"end of history" and the triumph of liberal democracy by critically assessing the
emerging global political and economic order "after History," and scrutinizing a
variety of cultures around the world with the intention to discover hidden values
that make for a peaceful and prosperous world - challenging the conventions of
both extremes, the Left and Right. In The End of History and Trust he goes back
and forth showing the link between the two themes - the end of history and social
capital (including trust). He maintains that neoclassical economics is to a large
extent correct, but that it ignores the role of social capital (that includes reciprocity,
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moral obligation, duty toward community, and trust) in facilitating the "stability and
prosperity of post-industrial societies" (Carroll, 2002). Comparatively so-called
"high-trust societies" like Japan, Germany, and the United States develop the kind
of flexible organizations that the global economy demands far more easily than do
what he calls "Iow-trust societies" or "familistic" societies like China, France, Italy,
and South Korea, which have difficulty in creating large economic institutions to
enable the operation of business (Fukuyama, 1995:149-266).
In The Great Disruption Fukuyama (1999:4-7) warns that at the end of
history society will be extremely "rights-centred," and intensely individualistic,
especially because of the "information-based economy." He argues that because
of freedom and equality, excessive individualism has the potential of weakening
the "social and moral life" of American society for it has already "corroded all forms
of authority and weakened bonds holding families, neighborhoods (sic), and
nations together." The "Great Disruption" is Fukuyama's term for the seeming
collapse of the American social fabric since the late 1950s.
In summary, under liberal democracy, each individual's rights are
recognized. These individuals are said to be connected to each other through
social capital that is lubricated by trust. The extreme emphasis on individual rights
threatens to lead to radical individualism, and thereby to overshadow and destroy
the relevance of social trust.
3.1.3 Method: Hegelian-Marxian Law of History
Fukuyama's methodological framework for interpreting history derives from Hegel's
dialectical method and Marx's historical materialism through Kojeve's creative
interpretation of Hegel and application of Marx's materialistic approach to history.
In Trust Fukuyama (1995:3) acknowledges his debt to Hegel and Marx when he
reminds his readers that he follows the "Marxist-Hegelian sense of History as a
broad evolution of human societies advancing toward a final goaL" Fukuyama, as
already indicated in the third chapter, tries to find out whether Kojeve's view of the
end of history from a materialist historical perception corresponds with the
triumphant emergence of liberal democracy in the West and the collapse of
communism in the East. From that angle, Fukuyama evaluates Kojeve, asking
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whether Kojeve is correct or not, given the material events that took place at the
end of the twentieth century. Fukuyama (1992:207) argues:
Kojeve's claim that we are at the end of history therefore stands or falls on the
stranglb_.of th~:Lassertj9l].thgtJhe re.Q.9gnitjollJ)rQyid_~d.bY_Jh_e_contemporary liberal
democratic state adequately satisfies the human desire for recognition.
Fukuyama (1992:207) also tries to ascertain whether Kojeve's dialectic
understanding of modern liberal democracy, which he (Kojeve) believed was a
successful synthesis of slave morality and master morality, "overcoming the
distinction between them even as it preserves something of both forms of
existence," will permanently satisfy its citizens by the mutual and equal recognition
it offers them.
In the third chapter it was already shown that Kojeve (1969:9-70) sees the
Hegelian master-slave dialectic as the motor for historical change. In the
Phenomenology (1977) and the Lectures (1980), (see my second chapter) Hegel
expounds the ideas of the end of history, the struggle for recognition, and the idea
of the homogeneous state. To motivate his preference for Hegel over some of his
predecessors, Fukuyama (1992:144-161) compares the political ideas of Hobbes,
Locke, and Hegel. He concludes that Hegel's concept of recognition introduces a
moral dimension that is lacking in the political ideas of Hobbes and Locke (Hill,
1999; Cf. Fukuyama, 1992:145-148). This is because Hobbes and Locke gave
"higher relative moral weight" to self-preservation and human passions than
recognition" (Fukuyama, 1992:158-161). As a result, argues Fukuyama
(1992: 161), this led to the development of a society of individuals consumed with
"immediate self-preservation and material well-being."
Fukuyama (1992:160-161) argues that "Hobbesian or Lockean liberalism
provided no reason why society's best men should choose public service and
statesmanship over a private life of moneymaking," while Hegelian liberalism is
valued because it "seeks to honor and preserve a certain moral dimension to
human life, ... and the struggle to have it [moral dimension] recognized, that is the
motor driving the dialectical process of history." Consequently, Fukuyama adopts
and adapts Hegel's idea of the struggle for recognition (discussed in the second
chapter), contending that it plays a "central role in the affairs of human beings"
(Hill, 1999). It was Hegel, in the Phenomenology, who first argued that the advent
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of the end of history can only be realized when humans had achieved absolute
knowledge of their freedom that enables them to fulfil their basic desires and that
that end point shall be realized in the emergence of the liberal state (Fukuyama,
1992).
--Halfa centurylater-K:arl Marx,-partly- afollower-andpartly a critic of Hegel's
philosophy, came along and "adopted the Hegelian view of directional,
progressive, evolutionary history" (Hill, 2000) without however emphasizing the
triadic framework in the dialectical development of history (Atkinson, 1988).
Furthermore and contrary to Hegel, Marx "determined that the ultimate destination
of history was communism," which will supersede or come as a synthesis of "all
other forms of human economic and political Alliance," and which he views as
necessary stages for the realization of communism (Hill, 2000; Cf. Marx & Engels,
1967). For Marx, the bourgeois "liberal state failed to resolve one fundamental
contradiction, that of class conflict" with the result that the "struggle between the
bourgeoisie and proletariat," continues and freedom is not universalized
(Fukuyama 1992:65). Marx's argument was that through these class conflicts, at
the end of history, the classless society of the "universal class," the proletariat, will
emerge (Fukuyama, 1992:65). However, Fukuyama (1992:61-65) accuses Marx
and (more especially) Engels of mystifying Hegel's dialectic method by trying to
separate it from the whole system of Hegelian thought. Given Fukuyama's debt to
Kojeve, he possibly inherits some of the weakness of Kojeve's framework.
3.2 FUKUYAMA'S EMPIRICAL-METAPHYSICAL DIALECTICAL CONCEPTION
OF HISTORY
In his critical exploration of Fukuyama's end of history project, Herwitz (2000:222-
223) argues convincingly that Fukuyama's end of history theory consists of an
empirical aspect and a metaphysical aspect, although it is difficult to distinguish
them. Thus Herwitz (2000:222-223) seeks to explore the oscillation of Fukuyama's
argument regarding the end of history between "empirical description" and
"philosophical conceptualization", with the intention of encouraging skepticism
about their dialectic relationship. Regarding the empirical aspect of Fukuyama's
claim, Herwitz (2000:223) shows that Fukuyama looks at certain developments
occurring towards the end of the millennium - the collapse of communism and the
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birth of Eastern European liberal democracies - and interprets them as heralding
the coming of the end of history. Regarding the metaphysical aspect, Herwitz
(2000:223) argues that Fukuyama's central claim is the following: liberal
democracy "is an historically emergent shape finally expressive of human essence,
of whathtlmanityrequires for its flourishing" - notably the satisfaction of the
-_._------. .._--~--
human desire for recognition as an individual by others, by the state, society,
political and economic institutions and communities. According to Herwitz
(2000:223), the "end of history" thesis is metaphysical in nature, and depends
crucially on the philosophy of Hegel.
Below we will analyze Fukuyama's argument for the end history closely,
with special attention to the directionality of history, the conflict of ideologies and
the triumph of liberal democracy, the ability of liberal democracy to solve its
contradictions, and the ultimate goal of history - the liberal state. These four
headings cover the fundamental arguments put forward by Fukuyama to legitimize
his vision of the triumph and consensus reception of liberal democracy. Within
these stages, Fukuyama illustrates the empirical and metaphysical dialectic in
American society by referring to the creation and depletion of social capital which,
he argues, makes liberal democracy realizable by enabling mutual and reciprocal
recognition. At the end of this chapter I compare Fukuyama's idea of a conflict of
ideologies to Huntington's idea of the clash of civilizations.
3.2.1 Directionality of History
Fukuyama's (1992:71) argument starts with the question: "Is history directional,
and is there reason to think that there will be a universal evolution in the direction
of liberal democracy?" The question of the directionality of history is an old one,
whose answer has generally oscillated between two main views, viz. the
teleological (or directional) and the spiral (or cyclical). In the first place Fukuyama
(1992:71) tries to show that no matter which direction history takes, it cannot
exclude social change and this change is multi-facetted, however it is centrally of
political and economic nature. FUkuyama (1992:72-74) contends that it is "the logic
of modern natural science" and "the struggle for recognition" that drives the
direction of human history. That is to say, scientific achievements in the form of
technological developments driven by competition lead to a dynamic economy in
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which humans concentrate on satisfying their desires, while the search for respect,
recognition, and dignity inflames passions and, consequently puts history in
continual motion. The question of the directionality of history was resolved by the
discovery of scientific method that "created a fundamental, non-cyclical division of
historical-time-periods-beforeand-after" -(Fukuyama 1992:73). ThisdisCQvery has
also shown that "the progressive and continuous unfolding of modern natural
science has provided a directional mechanism for explaining many aspects of
subsequent historical developments" (Fukuyama, 1992:73). Featuring prominently
in these developments is the conquest motif, that takes various shapes or forms
depending on the dialectical forces involved.
Fukuyama (1992:73-81) attempts to show that the logic of modern natural
scientific achievements produces historical change that is both directional and
universal - directional in the sense that it is moving towards a certain end and
universal in the sense that its outcomes are universally accepted and unify
mankind. He shows it in two ways: (1) military competition, and (2) the progressive
conquest of nature for the purpose of fulfilling human desires - economic
development through industrialization. Concerning military competition, Fukuyama
(1992:73) argues that because of the perpetuation of war and conflict in the
international sphere, natural science "confers a decisive military advantage on
those societies that can develop, produce, and deploy technology" in an effective
way in defence of their political autonomy and sovereignty. Each state is under
pressure to acquire and deploy technology that will either match or outdo its
opponent's technology as a deterrent. History shows many cases of this logic at
work, such as the colonial conquest of Africa by European nationals and the
Napoleonic conquests. With reference to the progressive conquest of nature for
satisfying human desires, Fukuyama (1992:76-78) points out that it involves not
only the intense application of technology but also the application of human reason
to problems of social arrangement and the rationalization of the division of labour _
hence labour markets, and the resulting mobility of labour. According to Fukuyama
it was through modern natural science that military competition ended up with the
option of liberal democracy as a form of polity, and it is also through science that
the need to satisfy desires led to the creation of the market - the two central
features of the progressive movement in history.
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Because scientific discoveries and inventions cannot be undone, history
moves irreversibly towards an end point. Fukuyama (1992:82-88) asks rhetorically
if it is possible for humankind as a whole "to reverse the directionality of history
through the rejection or loss of scientific method," that has brought about
teehnolo~ieal--~ains-ane--ratienalized--S0Giet-y. In- the-midstQf -r:esponding to his
rhetorical question, Fukuyama (1992:85-88) acknowledges the horrors, both of a
moral and a physical nature, inflicted by science. However, Fukuyama (1992:88)
argues that we can think of cyclical history only if we postulate the "possibility that
a given civilization can vanish entirely without leaving any imprint on those that
follow." Furthermore, Fukuyama (1992:88) maintains that
if the grip of a progressive ... natural science is irreversible, then a directional
history and all of the other variegated economic, social, and political consequences
that flow from it are also not reversible in any fundamental sense.
It follows that if science is so powerful and irreversible then history cannot, in
Fukuyama's words (1992:89) "even under the most extreme circumstances"
become cyclical rather than linear. Therefore, history is moving towards some end
point (Fukuyama, 1992:89). This end point can only be understood in terms of the
evolutionary emergence of liberal democracy following the dictates of modern
natural science in its contemporary familiar forms of technological innovation and
rational arrangments of labour (i.e. labour markets). Therefore, the core of
Fukuyama's claim is the thesis that natural science rather than economics as in
Marx, or a Victorian or Protestant religious ethic as expounded by Weber, is the
central "regulator or mechanism" of modern history's directionality, whose central
motif was to satisfy the desire for recognition - hence the conflict of ideologies.
3.2.2 The Conflict of Ideologies and the Triumph of Liberal Democracy
Following Hegel's dialectical analysis of historical change and Marx's dialectical
analysis of society (in both cases via Kojeve's interpretation) Fukuyama critically
reviews the competition between various ideologies in human history. He begins
with the empirical aspect by looking at what happened in the history of ideological
development. FUkuyama sides more with the Hegelian conceptualization of history
than the Marxian one. Although Fukuyama (1992) follows the driving motor of the
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dialectic framework - conflicting systems - he recognizes hereditary monarchical
rule as an organized form of government that existed in many different societies in
Europe and other parts of the world. Fukuyama (1992:74) points out that
monarchical absolutism in the French society had a "levelling effect" that reduced
-1'afislocratlc--pri\7ile-g-es,"--leading-to--the emergence of-new· social structures that
would later contribute to the French revolution. According to the Marxian law of
history and analysis of society, there were always and constantly two or more
conflicting classes: "freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-
master and journeyman," in short, "the oppressor and the oppressed" (Marx &
Engels, 1967:79-80). The emergence of a new ideology is understood as being
intrinsically bound up with class conflict. For example in the case of monarchical
state societies, the two conflicting classes are the kings and their judges
(considered as the ruling or oppressing class) on the one hand; the dispossessed
and slaves (considered as the ruled or oppressed class) on the other hand (Taylor,
1967:7-45). When the opposing forces of the society get into conflict and the
community gets destroyed a new system emerges out of the destroyed society.
According to Marx and Engels (1967), from the struggle between the
opposing classes of the monarchical state, especially in European society (France,
Germany, Britain, Spain, etc), emerged the feudal system of society. The feudal
system (Fukuyama, 1992:218) was destroyed when the monarchy was centralized
and modernized. This left behind a strong state power, on which its citizens were
so dependent that they failed to organize themselves in private associations so as
to take charge of their own lives. In its origins and functioning as a political
ideology, absolute monarchism (in the Hobbesian sense) only managed to provide
an individual with the natural right to self-preservation but failed to establish
reciprocal recognition. Monarchical state societies began to crumble down and left
strong states. These strong states oscillated in their allegiance between liberalism
and socialism, leaving an ideological vacuum that was filled in by fascism. Sutton
(1937:258) argues that the two factors that gave birth to fascism "are the decay of
Liberal-Democracy and the rise of Marxism." Fukuyama is not explicit as to the
factors influencing the rise of fascism but indicates that it was one of the
contending ideologies.
In its emergence, fascism showed its inherent propensity to militarism and
definition of governance in terms of racial superiority. Similar inherent inclinations
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were revealed in Mussolini's Italian fascism, Hitler's German Nazism, Franco's
Spanish fascism, and the aggressive, elitist nationalism in Stalin's Soviet Union
(Quinton, 1994:358-360). Sutton (1937:257) points out that fascism did not achieve
international recognition as a political creed that could be "forced down the throat
-of-every- nation'L·-as· it ·was-in th-e--case of-liberalism and communism. Fukuyama
(1992: 16-17) believes that fascism did not, like liberalism and communism,
achieve universality as a political doctrine because "it denied the existence of a
common humanity or equality of human rights" and also due to its principle that
"the ultimate source of legitimacy was race or nation, specifically, the right of
'master races' like the Germans to rule other people." At the centre of this principle
is the idea of the will to power over the voice of reason or equality that saw military
confrontation or war for overcoming other nations or cultures as a "normal rather
than pathological condition" (Fukuyama, 1992:16). Hence the idea, "a healthy
nation is always mobilized for war" (Quinton, 1994:359). For Mussolini (1932:254-
257),
Political doctrines pass; nations remain .... The key-stone of Fascist doctrine is its
conception of the State, of its essence, its functions, and its aims. For Fascism the
State is absolute, individuals and group relative. Individuals and groups are
admissible in so far as they come within the State.... The State, as conceived and
realized by Fascism, is a spiritual and ethical entity for securing the political,
juridical, and economic organization of the nation, an organization which in its
origin and growth is a manifestation of the spirit.
Quinton (1994:358) confirms that the primary element of fascism is the supremacy
of the nation (or state) and control over all the aspects of the social life of each
individual citizen, as well as control over other nations. As for the nation-state's
power, well-being, and effectiveness, it takes "absolute precedence over the wants
and needs of the individuals who compose it," and it must possess "the unity of
will" embodied in a charismatic leader, backed by a committed elite - hence the
highest and greatest duty of its citizens is to serve it even to the point of death
(Quinton, 1994:358-359). Citizens were not allowed to dissent from the party's
beliefs, if they did, this usually resulted in imprisonment or execution.
Mussolini (1932:248-251) shows that fascism was a considered ideology
that derived its philosophical foundations from Sorel and other sources that were
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very influential at the time. The philosophical ideas that underpinned fascism
include
Fichte's idea of the special national mission of Gennany; Nietzsche's idea of the
superman, who casts__aside CNistJan humility and philanthropy for an ethic of
heroic self-affinnation; Sorel's notion of readiness for violence as an index of
spiritual health; widespread repudiation of rationality and objective truth in favour of
intuition; and finally the idea of struggle as an end in itself (Quinton 1994:359).
As can be expected, none of the thinkers cited above as sources of fascism was a
proponent of democratic liberalism - compare Mussolini's (1932:251-254)
statement that fascism negates socialism, democracy and liberalism. Fukuyama
(1992: 17) argues that when fascism put its inherent militarism into practice, this
led to war and consequently to a "self-destructive conflict with the international
systems" - resulting in Hitler's defeat. That inherent militarism is what Fukuyama
(1992: 17) points out as the major factor that eliminated fascism as a serious
competitor to liberal democracy.
Although Hobsbawn (1999a: 130; Cf. Parker, 1999:153, 166) describes
communists as "the best anti-fascists," some of the traits of fascism overlapped
and linked it with the then advancing communist order - for instance the
assumption of absolute authoritarian and totalitarian governance, of which the then
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China were major examples. These two
world powers functioned under the socialist-communist ideology. Hobsbawn
(1999:3) argues that the victory of the Bolsheviks in October 1917 was the "first
proletarian revolution" and the "first regime in history to set about the construction
of the socialist order." For Hobsbawn (1999:3), this proves both the "profundity of
the contradictions of capitalism, which produced wars [and] slumps;" and the
possibility of the success of the worldwide socialist revolution. Parker (1999: 166)
adds that the rise of fascism in the West between the two world wars made it
easier for the Soviet Union to spread socialism.
In contrast to Hobsbawn's view Fukuyama (1992:24) argues that after
seizing power in the 1917 coup, the Bolshevik regime systematically attacked and
eliminated "all potential competing sources of authority in Russian society," such
as "opposition political parties, the press, trade unions, private enterprises" and
religious organizations. According to Fukuyama (1992:24) the communists
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advanced socialism by targeting the human relations - family, language, religion,
and historical memory - that underpinned the social fabric of Russian society;
systematically and methodically atomizing society and dispossessing individuals of
their close relations by imposing other relations on them. Fukuyama (1992:24)
argues thaCthe Soviercommunists~~not only~deprived the individual of his freedom
but made him "fear his freedom in favour (sic) of security, and ... affirm the
goodness of chains even in the absence of coercion." Fukuyama may have a
point, but overlooks socialism's attempt to create an egalitarian society, while in
liberalism it is only the market that distributes the common good - redistribution is
not present.
In his article, "The study of the nature and justification of coercive
institutions" Sterba (1995:629) argues that contrary to liberalism
26
and
communitarianism, "socialism takes equality to be the basic ideal and justifies
coercive institutions insofar as they promote equality." In a capitalist context
where the means of production are owned and controlled by a relatively small
number of people and used primarily for their benefit, socialists favor taking control
of the means of production and redirecting their use to the general welfare (Sterba,
1995:629).
That is to say, socialism views the capitalist context as a situation where
redistribution is not possible due to the principle of the free market whose
operation is blamed for causing economic and political inequality. Fukuyama
(1992:289-299) reacts to this critique by acknowledging the existence of inequality,
saying that it "will continue to preoccupy the liberal societies." He argues that
inequality should be explained by understanding that human beings are not
biologically the same. To avoid the inequalities engendered by the market,
socialism uses coercive institutions. Coercive institutions were expected to
become unnecessary once equality was achieved and the means of production
were in the hands of the workers. But the the revolutions inspired by Marx's ideas
(or anybody else claiming even-handed equality) in practice never realized the
egalitarian ideal in name of which they were made in the first place. To borrow AI-
Braizat's (2001: 169) expression, such egalitarian expectations do "not hold up to
2~ Liberalism justi~e~ coercive institutions as long as they promote liberty - either as positive acts
(I.e. acts of commission) or negative acts (Le. acts of omission) (Sterba, 1995:628).
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empirical testing" - there will always be an elite group that will be unequal to
others.
Fukuyama shows how the worldwide collapse of communism paved the
way for the triumph of liberal democracy. The 1990 amendment to the Union of
Soviet--Socialist Reptlblics'-Gons-titution which revoked 'Article Six', which made the
Communist Party the sol~ -legitimate representative government of the people,
heralded the eventual fall of communism. After this, the independent Russian
Republic elected Boris Yeltsin as President. Yeltsin and some of his supporters
advocated the "restoration of private property and markets" (Fukuyama, 1992:27)-
which are the essential components of liberal democracy. Informed by the
European philosophies of universal history (especially those of Kant, Hegel, Marx
and Kojeve's interpretation of Hegel), Fukuyama concludes that the shocking
.coJlapsaoLcommunism truly was the end of history, in that th~ ideological ~onflict
between communism and liberalism is now a thing of the past. For Fukuyama, the
fall of communism eliminated liberal democracy's last competitor for the role of the
true ultimate destination of evolutionary history. According to Fukuyama (1992:xvi-
xxiii; 199-208) the advent of liberal democracy means that Hegel's "struggle for
recognition" and "tyranny, imperialism and the desire to dominate" cease being the
perennial problems they were throughout the whole of human history. This implies
that all the older ideologies failed to solve these problems, and that now liberal
democracy has triumphed over other ideologies and has managed to bring
reciprocal and equal recognition, and political and economic progress, to all
people.
_Parker (1999: 176) characterizes Fukuyama's conclusion as "renewed liberal
progressivism." By this Parker (1999: 176) means Fukuyama's postulation that
economic growth brought about "through integration in the world free-market
economy would progressively wean off ideologically inspired interventionism at
home and military adventures abroad." It follows that, because of the consensual
adoption of the principles of liberal democracy by many nations (including former
communist nations), as a natural consequence of their liberal economics nations,
would be able to secure peace through negotiated settlement in moments of
disputes "within the rules of the international market" (Parker, 1999:176). This
favoured outcome can only be secured if liberal democracy is globally
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acknowledged as the only reliable ideological framework, with no rivals to
challenge it.
The problem with Fukuyama's liberal state is that it has not yet reached its
ultimate goal, since history is still in the making and liberal democracy first has to
deal with its- internal contradictions.. Fukt1yama~argues· that having superseded its
ideological opponents, liberal democracy in its final stage has to deal with its
internal contradictions such as that of the individual in conflict with communal
ethics - for it not to be superseded in turn.
3.2.3 Can Liberal Democracy Overcome its Contradictions?
Hegel's (1969:439) law of contradiction holds that "everything is inherently
contradictory" and that "contradiction is the root of all mQvement and vitality."
Without contradiction within it, a thing or system, or notion cannot move or have an
urge or activity (Hegel, 1969:439). For Hegel (1969:438-439), contradictions can
be distinguished as either subjective (contradictions in thought) or objective
(contradictions in things). Inwood (1992:65) explains the distinction between
objective contradictions and subjective contradictions as follows:
Objective contradictions are, for the most part, inner conflicts produced by a thing's
entanglements with other things. SUbjective contradictions are often the result of
an attempt to keep distinct concepts, such as those of cause and effect, that are
conceptually interdependent.
According to Inwood (1992:64), Hegel's law of contradiction "is a law of thoughts"
that tells us that contradictions are thinkable and can happen in the world. It should
be borne in mind that for Hegel one cannot distinguish between thought and the
world since all reality turns into spirit - "thoughts and concepts are embedded in
the world" (Inwood, 1992:65). When these contradictions occur they should be
overcome, since according to Hegel's view anything that is contradictory is untrue
(Hegel, 1969; Kojeve, 1969; Inwood, 1992).
The idea of the overcoming or sublimation of contradictory situations, or
notions, is illustrated in the Master-Slave account of Kojeve's interpretation of
Hegel. The situation portrays the slave fighting to overcome his bondage to the
master (an external contradiction). Although the slave accepts the "contradictory
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character of his existence," he justifies it by arguing that "all existence necessarily,
inevitably, implies a contradiction" (Kojeve, 1969:55). Kojeve (1969:54-55) points
out that to become aware of a contradiction "is what moves human, historical
evolution [and] is necessarily to want to remove it."
-As-said- -above, -Pukuyama --adopts-a-'-Hegelian-Marxist dialectic as his
method for interpreting history. The dialectic method shows us that there is a clash
of desires and conflict of political ideologies that collapse as a result of their own
internal contradictions, after which they are superseded by those with less
contradictions. Since liberal democracy triumphed over (or superseded) its
competitors such as communism, it has less internal contradictions than them.
Fukuyama implicitly concedes that liberal democracy has internal
contradictions, like its predecessors or any other political system. He portrays
contemporar..y ..Iiberal.democracy as_Jhatpolitical form of governance that is tree
from the "grave defects and irrationalities" that led to the collapse of its competitors
- hence "liberal democracy was arguably free from such fundamental internal
contradictions" (Fukuyama, 1992:xi). Liberal democracy is also "free of
contradictions" because it is said to have satisfied the twin pillars of "rational
(economic) desire and rational (personal) recognition" upon which the historical
process rests (Fukuyama, 1992:139; 1995:358,359). Possibly aware of his critics,
Fukuyama (1992: 136) asks:
Are there any 'contradictions' in our contemporary liberal democratic social order
that would lead us to expect that the historical process will continue and produce a
new, higher order?
If liberal democracy has internal contradictions, how will it overcome them so as to
avoid being succeeded by a new ideology in turn? Fukuyama (1992:136) argues
that there is no contradiction in the present liberal democratic system that can be
"a source of social discontent sufficiently radical to eventually cause the downfall of
the liberal societies." In other words, liberal democracy simply has problems, not
contradictions. He writes:
A "problem" does not become a "contradiction" unless it is so serious that it not only
cannot be solved within the system, but corrodes the legitimacy of the system itself
such that the latter collapses under its own weight (Fukuyama, 1992:136).
III
Fukuyama seems to deliberately overlook the seriousness of the inherent
contradictions of liberal democracy. As Fukuyama (1992: 136) well knows, the
internal contradictions of liberal democracy are responsible for such serious
-problems as-drugs, homeIessness,- therise-' of crime, environmental- destFl.lction
(especially by corporate activities) and consumerism.
According to Fukuyama, without a stable social order liberal democracy can
collapse. He puts the spotlight on a time when the American social order was not
stable. He describes a world of peace, followed by the disruption of this peaceful
social order, and then a possible way out in the form of a communal triumph over
excessive individualism, through social capital. Fukuyama thinks that the
contradictions (or weaknesses) of liberal democracy can be overcome in this way.
In this section JwiJlpay attention to two bCiSic contradictions that are commonly
ascribed to capitalist liberal democracy: the disruption of social order as a result of
excessive individualism, and inequality. These are serious problems that can
destroy the social fabric in newly instituted democracies, and even in older,
apparently well-established ones.
(a) On the Disruption of Social Order.
Fukuyama holds that although liberal democracy has fulfilled the long standing
desire of humankind for political and economic recognition, it requires a stable
social and/or communal order to sustain this recognition. This double barrel
satisfaction of human desire cannot last long without the social virtue of social
capital, with its by-product trust. The danger is that satisfied persons become so
radically individuated that the communal moral order that sustains liberal
democracy is overthrown. Fukuyama's (1999:27-46) thesis in The Great Disruption
(1999) is that between the 1960s and the early 1990s, most western countries
experienced a disruption of social order that took the form of rampant crime, a
decline in interpersonal trust and the breakdown of the family. Fukuyama sees this
disruption as the cause of high rates of illegitimacy and divorce. Leigh (1999)
acknowledges that there is indeed a correlation between crimes, decline in
interpersonal trust and the breakdown of the family, but difficulties arise when one
tries to establish, like Fukuyama, a causal relationship between the three
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phenomena - we cannot for instance simply assume that children from a divorced
family are the ones likely to commit crime.
In The Great Disruption, Fukuyama closely examines empirical evidence of
the social changes that took place during the modernization of industrial societies
after World~Warll;-to-argue-that£long-termdeGline in- social conditions has taken
and to some extent still is taking place, thereby depleting social capital. Dobell
(2000) notes that Fukuyama makes a "slightly contrived attempt to introduce an
image of a social upheaval parallel to the Great Depression" that spread to all
post-industrial countries of the West. Gordon (1999) does not think Fukuyama's
thesis is true, and accuses Fukuyama of not addressing the problem of the uneven
distribution of social capital. Fukuyama recognizes that it is a "serious problem"
even to use "social dysfunction data as a negative measure for social capital." For
GQ[c:lQD(1~~$tidentifying "increases in crime, drug use, family break-ups ... may
not show a general downturn in trust," for people from different cultural and political
backgrounds can still do business together based on mutual trust; the social
pathological trio (rampant crime, a decline in interpersonal trust and the breakdown
of the family) is thus not the indicator of the Great Disruption as Fukuyama takes it
to be.
The free and independent individual is at the centre of Fukuyama's whole
argument of the end of history that began in The End of History, was extended in
Trust (where we encounter Fukuyama declaring the triumph of liberal democracy
and market economies), and continued into The Great Disruption where Fukuyama
cautions that "this triumph is not necessarily accompanied by corresponding moral
and social development ... [rather] there is a tendency for liberal democracies 'to
fall prey to excessive individualism'" (North, 1999). In Fukuyama's (1999:91) own
words: "the essence of the shift in values that is at the center (sic) of the Great
Disruption is ... the rise of moral individualism and the consequent miniaturization
of community." This is an indirect consequence of the technological mechanization
and rationalization of labour that brought the substitution of physical labour by
mental labour, resulting in women flooding the labour market, thereby undermining
family traditions. In turn, these social changes led to social disruption.
Fukuyama (1999:4) asserts that in a modern democracy, freedom and
equality are two of the most highly valued goods and indicators of an information
driven society. There was a technologically driven transition from a hierarchical
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and bureaucratic society (that characterized the industrial age in both political and
economic (corporate) spheres) where everything was under control through "rules,
regulation and coercion", to an information society. This transition empowered
individuals and gave "them access to information" that led to political and
econ6Tliic particip-ation-for--all-{Fukuyama, -1999:4; 6}.-Henotes that the transition
was so dramatic that the decline of moral values and the breakdown of social order
became the central themes of social discourse (Fukuyama, 1999:5). This decline
was not just something that people were subjectively convinced of, it was also
reflected in hard statistical data on the rampancy of crime, illegitimacy, poor
educational results, job opportunities and distrust (Fukuyama, 1999:5).
As the Great Disruption manifested itself, people sought to establish and
understand its cause. At least four arguments were proposed regarding which
phenomen_a_caJ)s_ed_it:
• Increasing poverty and/or income inequality. The first argument is that "the
Great Disruption was caused by poverty and inequality" (Fukuyama,
1999:64-68). Fukuyama rejects this argument. He (Fukuyama, 1999:64-65)
points out that the debate on "the direction of causality between economic
and cultural factors" is "ideologized" by those on both the Right and the Left.
The Left's argument, according to Fukuyama (1999:64-65), is that "crime,
family breakdown, and distrust are caused by lack of jobs, opportunity,
education, and economic inequality more generally," - hence social
dysfunction. On the other hand, the Right sees the welfare state as the
cause of family breakdown (Fukuyama, 1999:65). Fukuyama (1999:65-68)
acknowledges that there is some linkage or correlation between poverty-
inequality and each of the three indicators, viz. crime, family breakdown,
and distrust, but still maintains that they do not have a causal relationship.
Poverty and inequality cannot be a cause of family breakdown in
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development countries because
even though they "have extensive welfare state protection," this has not
"solved the underlying social problem," argues Fukuyama (1999:65).
Furthermore, he rejects the notion that "poverty and inequality beget crime,"
dismissing it as a "commonplace among politicians and voters in democratic
societies who seek reasons for justifying welfare and poverty programs"
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(Fukuyama, 1999:67). His counter-argument is that although income
inequality rose in United States during the Great Disruption, crime remained
rampant in Western countries that are more egalitarian, such as Sweden
(Fukuyama, 1999:67).
• Growing wealth and security. Opposed to the poverty-inequality argument
as an attempt to explain the cause of the Great Disruption, is the general
explanation in terms of growing wealth and security made by Daniel
Yankelovich, who surveyed the shift from communal values to individualistic
values in the 1950s (Fukuyama, 1999:68-70). The argument is that if
income rises "the bonds of interdependence" that tie together family
members and community members "will weaken, because they are now
betteLabletogetalong without each other" (Fukuyarna, 1999:69). That is to
say greater economic prosperity results in increasing individualism and
social disorder. For Fukuyama, this is a more plausible argument than the
first one.
• Modern government policies. This argument contends that the Great
Disruption is a "product of the welfare state", created through its "perverse
incentives" (Fukuyama, 1999:63). It refers to the welfare programme which
the United States government developed and operated during the Great
Depression - during both the downturn in output between 1929 and 1933,
and the recovery between 1934 and 1939 - code named Aid to Families
.with Dependent Children (Fukuyama, 1999:70). The program provided
welfare help to single mothers but penalized those who married the fathers
of their children (Fukuyama, 1999:71). In a way it appeared to the
conservatives as if the government policies were a "moral hazard"
(Fukuyama, 1999:71-72), encouraging single-motherhood, illegitimacy,
divorce and cohabitation in place of marriage among the middle and upper
class individuals in the Western world. Fukuyama (1999:72) rejects this
conservative argument, and holds that "illegitimacy is ... primarily
associated with poverty in the United States and most countries."
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• A broad cultural shift. This argument maintains that the broad cultural shift
that caused the Great Disruption in the West was shown in the growing
individualism and the weakening of communal social controls that had "a
huge impact on family life, sexual behaviour, and the willingness of people
to obey-the-law"-tFukuyama,-1999:72)-;-The-bro-ad cl::ll-tl;;lfal--shift that saw the
undermining of Victorian moral control in the West was influenced by
Western rationalism, popular culture (promulgated through literature and
media) and actual behaviour (abstract or popularized ideas put into practice
by large groups of people) (Fukuyama, 1999:73-74). Fukuyama dismisses
the broad cultural shift and the antecedent arguments as cause of the Great
Disruption, arguing that these cannot be satisfactory explanations
applicable universally; rather there should be a better explanation.
Contrary to these general explanations of the Great Disruption, Fukuyama
(1992:55-97; 1999:4-7; 12-14) contends that the whole social disruption was
initiated by the widespread introduction and usage of technology in the areas of
information and medicine from the 1960s to the 1990s, leading to phenomena
such as the sexual revolution or the feminist movements, that "sought to free
individuals from the constraints of traditional social norms and moral rules".
On the question of rising crime, Fukuyama attempts to show that there is a
close antithetical relationship between social capital and crime. Social capital,
according to Fukuyama (1999:27-36), is a "cooperative norm that has become
embedded in the relationship among groups of people." It contrasts with crime in
that crime "ipso facto represents the absence of social capital because it is a
violation of a community norm." In an attempt to explain why crime rose between
the 1960s and 1980s and declined in the years that followed, Fukuyama (1999:77-
80) gives four answers from various sources, ranging from "male propensity to
violence", through the influence of modernization and related factors such as
"urbanization, population density and opportunities for crime," through the idea of
crime concentration among social or ethnic minorities (social heterogeneity), to the
idea of the deterioration of family life. According to Fukuyama (1999:80-82), it is in
family life that a person in the early years of life learns "out of habit" to obey the
law and learns a "basic level of self-control" - leaving the rest who failed to learn
that during their early childhood as likely to become repeated law offenders.
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Concerning the question of the family, the broad social disruption caused a
shift in social norms which relate "to reproduction, the family, and relations
between the sexes" (Fukkuyama, 1999b:36); family life underwent major
upheavals that were fuelled by the sexual revolution and the emergence of
feminism that sought to see the liberation of women and change of gender roles in
all spheres of life (Fukuyama, 1999:36-46, 92-94). Fukuyama's (1999:36-38) point
is that the family as the most fundamental social unit where initial cooperation,
forged through biological ties, is practiced, has lost ground in many countries of the
Western world, and has been replaced by impersonal social ties that are market
oriented. The decline in fertility due to the birth control pill, decrease in marriage
stability, increase in divorce, increase in childbearing out-of-wedlock, and
movement of women into the paid labour force - all impacting negatively on social
<:QgitaL__ IH~LtQJb~IO?sof the value of the family (Fukuyama, 1999:36-46, 92-111).
Because of the pill, women were able to control their own reproductive cycles -
enabling them to take up positions in the labour force. Family unity suffered
variegated blows that shattered many families, promoting what Fukuyama calls a
"miniaturization of community;" that causes a displacement of affiliation, and the
creation of a "smaller radius of trust" (Murray, 1999).
Consequently the disruptive transition transformed the workplace from a
man's world into a women's world. Instead of women staying at home, cooking,
bearing and nursing children as used to be the tradition, they took up executive
and technical positions in workplaces that used to be the centre and source of
male hegemony. Postrel (1999) argues that by suggesting the mid-1960s as "a
good starting date for the beginning of the Great Disruption," Fukuyama implies
that "the emancipation of women ... is at the root of social disorder." In the same
vein Dobell (2000) says that Fukuyama stops just short of arguing that "it was
feminism and the pill that led to social disorder." In the process Fukuyama corrects
himself .and redirects his focus to the question of "re-establishing male
responsibility in the continuing ties which can support essential investment in early
childhood development" (Dobell, 2000).
Fukuyama (1995) describes trust as a key by-product of the social virtue of
social capital. He (Fukuyama, 1999:47-49) argues that there is increasing
individualism in democratic societies, where people exercise excessive freedom of
choice to associate with any persons they wish to, but fail to make "moral
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commitments," connecting them to other people. This results in "moral
miniaturization," that in turn undermines group authority, while increasing
individualism. The net result is that there is a decline in public trust, especially in
the United States - indicating a shift from the Victorian morality that used to
dominate-Iife,lo anera-ofsocial disorder.
Fukuyama (1999:85-87) gives two basic reasons why there has been a
broad-based decline in trust, both in public institutions and in other individuals.
Fukuyama (1999:85), agreeing with Robert Putnam that the decline of trust is
"associated with the rise of television watching whose programmes are dominated
with sex and violence", firstly points out that individuals spend long hours in front of
the television, resulting in a lack of opportunities for social interaction. Secondly, in
the light of the National Opinion Research Centre's analysis of data from a survey
car[jed_Qutby_TomSmith, Fukuyama(t999:86) claims that
distrust is correlated with low socioeconomic status, minority status, traumatic life
events, fundamentalism, failure to attend a mainline church, and age cohort [as
well as] traumatic life events affecting trust [that] include, not surprisingly, being a
victim of crime and being in poor health.
In our individualistic society, people feel they cannot count on each other or on
institutions, because so many people do not fulfill their commitments, fail to honour
norms of reciprocity, or choose opportunistic behaviour (Fukuyama, 1999:49). To
summarize Fukuyama's ideas on this point: the Great Disruption was the result of
a broad cultural shift that included the decline of religion, the disruption of the
communal moral order and the promotion of individualistic self-gratification over
obligation to the community, all of which led to the collapse of what had been
fundamental to Western virtue. This disruption of social order also breeds
inequality. However, Fukuyama does not leave it at this pessimistic conclusion; he
tries to show that social hope can be generated through a reconstruction of the
social order.
(b) On Inequality
In this thesis I do not address the problem of inequality in its full breadth; I rather
restrict myself to those aspects of it that are relevant to the context of Fukuyama,
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especially in the area of socio-political and economic inequality in liberal
democracy. Fukuyama (1992:289) acknowledges that the problem of political and
economic inequality "will continue to preoccupy liberal societies for generations to
come because they are, in a certain sense, unresolvable (sic) within the context of
. tiberalism."···
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1913) points out that most philosophical
investigations into the foundations of society could not avoid the question of
inequality because of its importance in all human spheres of life, especially the
natural (physical), political and economic spheres. He (Rousseau, 1913:160)
distinguishes two kinds of inequality, namely "natural or physical" and "moral or
political." The former consists of such things as "age, health, bodily strength, and
the qualities of the mind or of the soul," while the latter is the result of the social
. conditions and circumstances of humi3nkind. Rousseau (1913) argues that
dependency on any human authority that infringes on one's freedom leads to
inequality. Rousseau's argument can be understood by looking at its converse:
that equality requires that nothing infringes on one's freedom, unless there is
consensual agreement on deliberate infringement. Hence, his call for a popular
sovereignty that will give every individual the power to see to it that all things are
handled in an equitable manner. The problem is that usually the model does not
match the de facto historical record - meaning that there will always be a human
propensity to elitism.
For Hegel it seems there is a co-existence between inequality and equality
- one is empirical and the other is metaphysical, respectively. In the empirical
aspect of human life - one's earning of a livelihood from universal and permanent
resources - Hegel (1998:366[199]) maintains that there is some unavoidable
inherent inequality:
The possibility of sharing in the universal resources - i.e. of holding particular
resources - is, however, conditional upon one's own immediate basic assets (i.e.
capital) on the one hand, upon one's skill on the other; the latter in turn is itself
conditioned by the former, but also by contingent circumstances whose variety gives
rise to differences in the development of natural physical and mental (geistigen)
aptitudes which are already unequal in themselves (fOr sich). In this sphere of
particularity, these differences manifest themselves in every direction and at every
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level, and, in conjunction with other contingent and arbitrary circumstances,
necessarily result in inequalities in the resources and skills of individuals.
As to the metaphysical side of human life, Hegel (1977: 111-119[178-196]) in the
"Lordship and Boodage" section of the Phenomenology implies that inequality is
caused by lack of mutual recognition. He argues that prior to the process of
recognition,
self-consciousness ... [a]t first ... will exhibit the side of the inequality of the two, or
the splitting-up of the middle term into the extremes which, as extremes, are
opposed to one another, one being only recognized, the other only recognizing
(Hegel,1977:112[185]).
For Hegel,equality takes place where there is mutual and equal recognition of
individuals. In the "Lordship and Bondage" section of the Phenomenology, Hegel
shows that in the initial encounter of a master with the slave, there is no equal
recognition. At a later stage this gives rise to a bloody war of freedom and equality
- thus for independence and recognition.
Fukuyama cites two basic criticisms of liberal society from the Left and
Right. From the Left the argument is that the promise of universal, reciprocal
recognition continues to be fundamentally unfulfilled due to economic inequality as
a result of liberal societies' adoption of capitalism, where distribution of recognition
remains unequal (Fukuyama, 1992:289; Ct. Fisk, 2003). Critics from the Right
argue that "the goal of equal recognition itself' is not achievable. In response
-- -Fukuyama-(-1-992:zB9)--argtJesthat-"htJman neiflgs are-inAerently-uneElHa!"-,-am::j-aAY--
attempt to treat them equally denies them their humanity. In defence of unequal
treatment of human beings and based on categories of human conventions and
natural necessity in affirming human differences, he holds that there are natural
barriers to equality such as the "unequal distribution of natural abilities or attributes
within a population" Fukuyama (1992:290). This agrees with the idea of Hegel. He
claims, however, that in principle liberal societies are dedicated to the eradication
of conventional sources of inequality.
If inequality is an inherent feature and drawback of liberal democracy, then
that raises doubts as to whether it is the ultimate form of government that the
whole world will embrace without coercion. Fukuyama has not yet supplied any
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solution to this contradiction or weakness of liberal democracy. Failing such a
solution, liberal democracy cannot accomplish its mission to be a universal and
valid form of governance that fulfils its promises of equal and mutual recognition
and prosperity.
The harmful effects of inequality compel one to seek some form of remedy -
obviously - some way to achieve greater equality. In most cases where
conceptualization of equality takes place, it has fallen prey to the idea of thinking
equality in terms of even-handedness. The central question with regards to
equality is about its desirability. Why should equality be desirable or needed?
Locke's "formal egalitarianism," underpinned by natural rights, accepts a high level
of social and economic inequality that ends up dominating social and political life.
For Bentham equality should be understood not in terms of natural rights, to
bO[LOW Jones' (20~02: 153) formulation,
but rather in terms of the notion that all human beings were equally experiencing
pleasure and pain ... each person ... should therefore be considered equally as an
individual capable of maximizing his or her happiness or well-being [and] everybody
should thus 'count as one, and nobody as more than one.'
Mill, who opted for equality of civil and political rights and opportunity, rejected the
idea of equality based on natural rights. The danger of equality of opportunity is
that it assumes the concept of meritocracy - that one gets an opportunity because
he/she deserves it - and as a result perpetuates inequality. Equality is desirable in
order to facilitate an individual's rights and freedom to pursue life sustenance and
- ---------~-~-----------~--- ---- -- ---- --- -satisfaction. --~ -------.---- .~-~~------- ..... --... _--
3.2.4 Resolving Contradictions: Rebuilding Social Order
Fukuyama (1999:10-12) asserts that while social order is indispensable for the
future of liberal democracy, the greatest question is whether "modern information
age democracies" (that always fall prey to excessive individualism, and chronic
inequality) are able to maintain social order in the face of the onslaught of
technological and economic development, which always bring social disorder in
their wake. In an attempt to figure out possible answers, in the second part of The
Great Disruption Fukuyama adopts Nietzsche's 'genealogical' method so as to
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"question the basic nature, purpose, and means of creation of social order"
(Dobell, 2000), at the same time discussing the social virtue of social capital and
social cohesion as a source of social hope for a society traumatized by the Great
Disruption. If social order is to be rebuilt, then the question is: What foundation and
with-whichtoels-should be used?
Fukuyama holds that mutual and equal recognition is a social link between
politics and economic life that can only come with the advent of liberal democracy.
Its longevity depends on the level of social capital that is in turn maintained by
social trust as a lubricant. Fukuyama does not forget the idea of virtue. As a result,
the central thesis in Trust (1995) is that intra-family loyalty is detrimental to political
and economic development, especially the growth of large scale business, and
that inter-(beyond)family trust has become the basis for political and economic
CQ()P_~I§ltion and the pro~perity that results from it. Encapsulated in the concept of
social capital is the idea of trust that appears as its key component, although in
Trust Fukuyama (1995) discusses the two concepts as being distinct but
inescapably intertwined. To establish a clear and inclusive account of the notion of
trust, we must first analyze the notion of social capital. 27
3.2.4.1 The Mechanism for Rebuilding Social Order: Social Capital
The concept of social capital relates closely to what the French aristocrat and
traveller Alexis de Tocqueville (1945: 111-119) in Volume 11 of his book, Democracy
in America, called the "art of association." By the art of association, de Tocqueville
--------··--meaAt-t-Ae-H0fms-that--aI10w-Giti2:sns--Gf-8...p8r=t-iGbllal"-demQcr:at~c-al"r:angernenL....,,_jn____ .. __ __
this case the USA - the freedom to continually exercise their right of association as
the practice of cooperation in their civil, political or economic activities. According
to Fukuyama (1999a: 19), while the term 'social capital' was first used by Hanifan to
describe rural school community centres, it was James Coleman "who was
responsible for bringing the term social capital into a wider use in recent years."
(Fukuyama, 1999a:19). Coleman, in "Social Capital and the Creation of Human
Capital" (1988), and in Foundations of Social Theory, (1990) formally introduces
and illustrates the concept of "social capital" to describe a resource of individuals
27 Coleman (1990:303-304) distinguishes social capital from natural capital, human capital physical
capital, and financial capital. '
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that emerges from their "social ties." The notion of social capital "describe[s] the
social norms and expectations that underwrite economic activity, but which could
not be accounted for from a strictly economic perspective." Coleman argued that
"social capital was a public good and therefore would be produced by private
agents-interaeting-in--markets"--(Fukuyama 1999a:19). The concept was further
developed by Pierre Bourdieu, who used it to refer to the advantages and
opportunities accruing to people through membership in certain "communities." In
the passage of time, the term arguably "expanded beyond its economic genesis" to
designate such formations or arrangements as networks, associations, and
"shared habits that enable individuals to act collectively" (Warren, 1999:9).
Borrowing from Coleman and others, Robert Putnam (1993:167), in his
book, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy describes social
GcU)ltgLc:is th~"f~atLJres of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks
that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions." In this
connection Putnam (1993: 167) remarks that "like love, kindness, and
understanding, social capital increases with use and atrophies or dwindles into
depleted stock unless it is used." Putnam (1993: 170) remarks that "like all public
goods, social capital tends to be undervalued and undersupplied by private
agents." Echoing Coleman, Putman (1993: 175-176) subsequently argues that
various networked groups from all walks of life (ranging across sports groups, civic
associations, cultural groups, cooperatives and, non-governmental organizations)
have a great impact on the function of political and economic institutions. In a later
publication, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community,
----- --- ---Ptlinam-(-2S88A-9HAlreeltlees-lhec-eneepl-ef--8eeialeaJ3ital-as-fellews:--
Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to the
properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections among individuals _
social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from
them. In that sense social capital is closely related to what some have called "civic
virtue". The difference is that "social capital" calls attention to the fact that civic
virtue is most powerful when embedded in a network of reciprocal social relations.
A society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is not necessarily rich in social
capital.
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For Putnam, and unlike Fukuyama, social capital in the final analysis amounts to
nothing other than human relations to each other with reciprocal expectations. In
this case, social capital is not used as a tool to judge cultural competence to trust
outsiders so as to enhance economic prosperity.
. For Fukuyama, social capital is not only critical to civil society, which is in
turn a requirement of modern democracy; it is also critically important as the basis
for economic activity. Fukuyama argues that the way in which trust or social capital
is embodied or instantiated is crucial. Fukuyama (1995:26) defines social capital
as "a capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in certain
parts of it" that can "be embodied [my italics - RW] in the smallest and most basic
group, the family, as well as the largest of all groups, the nation" and other groups.
In The Great Disruption and his article, "Social Capital and Civil Society and
SoJida[itY,"_Eukuyama(t999a:16;J999b)revisits his defioitiQn of§Qc;ial capital -
redefining it as follows: "informal values and norms that promote cooperation
between two or more individuals." The norms that constitute it "can range from a
norm of reciprocity between two friends, all the way up to complex and elaborately
articulated doctrines" such as those in religions like Christianity or Confucianism.
The idea of instantiation links back to Hegel and KojEwe. By instantiation
Fukuyama (1999b) means that social capital must become a fact in an actual
human relationship. The "norm of reciprocity exists in potentia" in one's dealings
with all people, but is actualized only in the dealings he/she has with his group or
social network. By this definition, Fukuyama (1999b) tries to show that trust,
networks, civil society, and many other factors which have been associated with
--"-------'-social-capital-are-~II---e-piphenomena1-;-aris-ing-as--a-re-stJ-I-t---ef--s-eeial--e-a13-it-aI-Btlt--Aet-­
constituting social capital itself." It follows that not any instantiated norms constitute
social capital, but only those that produce cooperation in communities - such as
those related to traditional virtues like the keeping of commitments, "honesty,
meeting of obligations, and reciprocity" (Fukuyama, 1999a:16-17; 1999b).
Cooperation has the potential to spread beyond the immediate social group that
shares the instantiated norms.
The phenomenon of cooperation spreading outside the immediate group in
turn raises the question of whether social capital is a social good or not. Fukuyama
(1999b) argues that it is less obviously a social good than physical or human
capital, for "it tends to produce more in the way of negative externalities than either
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of the other two forms." As his reason, Fukuyama (1999b) asserts that "solidarity in
human communities is often purchased at the price of hostility towards out-group
members," arguing:
. - There- appears to -be -a-natural-human pmclivity-fordividing the world-into friends
and enemies that is the basis of all politics. It is thus very important when
measuring social capital to consider its true utility net of its externalities.
In this connection, Fukuyama (1999b) suggests that the concept of "radius of trust"
can be used to establish how far cooperation has spread. All groups embodying
social capital possess some kind of a "circle of people among whom cooperative
norms are operative" (Fukuyama, 1999b). This bears on the question of the origin
or source of social capital. Fukuyama (1999a) asserts that trust is "frequently a by-
proa-ucfof religi6n-,fradifiOn~·shared·historical experience, .and other factors that lie
outside the control of any government." At the centre of all these phenomena is
some form of cooperation.
(a) Functions of Social Capital
Coleman (1988:8198) points out that the notion of social capital is usually
employed as part of a general theoretical strategy that accepts rational action
(especially rational economic action) as a point of departure but rejects the
extreme, individualistic premises that usually accompany it. This is reflected in
Fukuyama's works where he discusses the idea in detail. Fukuyama (1999b)
-_.__._"-------_._".._-,.__._-_._"----_._.._----~ ._------_..__._._._-----_..•-.._~,--_._----.- .._---_ ..--~--_._._- ..,._-_._.~_._---_. '-"-'--"'" -..__._.,.-
explains the function of social capital in a free-market liberal democracy as that
which sustains the success of a liberal democratic state. In an economic context
social capital "reduces the transaction costs associated with formal coordination
mechanisms like contracts, hierarchies, bureaucratic rules, and the like"
(Fukuyama, 1999b). Although he acknowledges that it is possible to get
coordinated action within a group of people without social capital, Fukuyama
(1999b) presumes that that action has to entail extra "transaction costs of
monitoring, negotiating, litigating, and enforcing formal agreements." He argues
that no contract can foresee all the specifics that can occur between the parties;
contracts generally rather "presuppose a certain amount of goodwill that prevents
the parties from taking advantage of unforeseen loopholes" (Fukuyama 1999b).
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Detailed contracts "that do seek to try to specify all contingencies ... end up being
very inflexible and costly to enforce" (Fukuyama 1999b). There were times in
history when there was no formal law or organizations, so that social capital was
the sole modus operandi for achieving "coordinated action" (Fukuyama 1999b).
FukuyamaLs-t1-999b) point is--that no matter hew technologically sophisticated
economic activities become, coordinated action "based on informal norms" (Le.
social capital) continues to play a significant role in modern economies, both "high-
tech" and "non-hi-tech," as a convenient and practical way to reduce costs in terms
of both time and money.
With regards to the political function of social capital, Fukuyama (1999b)
describes Alexis de Tocqueville's "art of association" as the best elucidation of
social capital at work in a modern democracy. According to Tocqueville (1945:100-
1D11inFranceJeomJhe "outset of democracy," individual citizens were left free and
equal but without a strong bond of association, due to the fact that the Revolution
overthrew the Church and the central power - the French aristocratic regime. In
The Ancient Regime and the French Revolution, Tocqueville (1955:50) claims that
the purpose of the French Revolution, as a movement of political and social reform
that underpins modern democracy, was to replace feudal institutions with a "new
social and political order, at once simple and more uniform, based on the concept
of the equality of all men." Fukuyama (1999b) comments that modern democracy
"tends to wipe away most forms of social class or inherited status that bind people
together in aristocratic societies," as indicated in Tocqueville. As already noted,
Fukuyama's (1999b) critique of modern democracy identifies its vice as promoting
.- ---. ----'!.excessive-ifldivielualisffi"··wlgeFeby-Gfle-is··preeeeupied"witfl-oHe's--pFivate--life-aHd-.....
family," and there is "an unwillingness to engage in public affairs." Tocqueville
(1945:102-103, 115 121-127) commends American society for combating the
tendency towards excessive individualism by having "free institutions" such as
voluntary associations that embody the right of association. Fukuyama (1999b)
remarks that the installation of these voluntary associations contrasts with the
situation in Tocqueville's native France, where individualism was more extreme
than in America. Such extreme individualism could only be tamed under civil
associations that served as either a direct channel to participation in political life or
"as 'schools of citizenship' where individuals learned the habits of cooperation that
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would eventually carry over into public life" (Fukuyama, 1999b; Cf. Tocqueville,
1945, & 1955).
For Fukuyama it is through the "radius of trust" that we can measure how
extensive and effective the social groups are within which an individual is able to
trust others, since "some societies limit trust to family or tribe" which has highly
deleterious social consequences (Fukuyama, 1999b). However there are large
social groups in which the extent of trust extends beyond the level of tribe or
family, such as "business associates, religious congregations, associations,
political parties, civic groups [and] educational institutions" (Fukuyama, 1999b).
"[S]uch large radii of trust enable the development of civic society" 28 (Fukuyama
1999a) which he views as the foundation of liberal democracy.
(b)--Tbe-Ideaot_Trust
Fukuyama's (1992:42,90-91) credo is that liberal democracy has remained a
fundamental ideological framework of "potentially universal validity" for governance
in modern societies, and that its inseparable alliance with capitalism (or market
economy) has also remained as the most viable economic system ever. However
neither liberal democracy nor capitalism is self-sustaining. Both depend on
irrational factors such as religion, cultural traditions, nationalism, and the
maintaining of standards (Fukuyama, 1992:234). Fukuyama (1992:216,233)
acknowledges the long-standing influence of cultural traditions when he states that
"capitalism depends in some measure on survival of pre-modern traditions" that
- ----------h-ave-Temainecr-influentiai-right-up--to--Otli -efa:---FtJktlyama-(-4-995:-§l--r-eIHetaRt~y----­
acknowledges Huntington's argument that "cultural differences will necessarily be
the source of conflict," criticizing it for being "less [than] convincing." However,
according to Fukuyama (1992:233) the consensus reception of liberalism (political
or economic) by many nations will not resolve the problem of cultural differences.
In examining the impact of culture on economic life, society, and competition in the
new global economic order, Fukuyama (1992) concludes that culture pervades
28 Fukuyama (1995:4-5) describes civil society as that "complex mixture of intermediate institutions
inclu.~ing businesses, voluntary associations, educational institutions, clubs, unions, media:
Chantle~, ~nd ~hurche~, which build, in turn, on the family, the primary instrument by which people
are soclahz.ed mto their culture and given the skills that allow them to live in broader society and
th.ro~gh ~hl.ch values and knowledge of that society are transmitted across the generations." It is
within thiS kmd of framework that members associate.
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that culture pervades economic life, just as it does political life and all spheres of
life in human society. Culture is then highly pervasive, and thus influences a
nation's prosperity by stimulating cooperation on the basis of shared norms -
hence economic life, pervaded by culture, depends "on moral bonds of social trust"
(Fukuyama, 1992): In herbook-r6view of-Trtlst, Garroll--(1995)daims tRat
[i]n the global struggle for economic predominance that is now upon us - a struggle
in which cultural differences will become the chief determinant of national success
_ the social capital represented by trust will be as important as physical capital.
One of Fukuyama's (1995:4) central theses in Trust is that, after discovering that
what social engineering seems to have promised the world did not materialize, it
was abandoned, and it follows that "virtually all serious observers understand that
liberalp-olificar arid economic inslitulibhsdepend on a healthy and dynamic civil
society for their vitality." It is through these communities that members of the public
are able to associate with each other. Fukuyama (1995:25) points out that the
ability to associate in any community rests solely on the measure to which people
share norms and values and are able to put aside their self-interests in favour of
those of the community. It is out of such shared norms and values that trust
develops.
The "aggregate of behavioural norms," "social networks (horizontal and
vertical)" and trust make up a fundamental cluster of components that form or
create social capital (Streeten, 2002:42-43). It links with Putman's (2000) (cited in
Streeten, 2002:43) argument that the origin of social trust in modern social
---------------- - --- -
arrangements "can arise from two related sour~es ::.- norm-s ofreciprocity-and--------
networks of civic engagement" in intra-group or inter-group relations. But what is
trust? Fukuyama (1995:26, 336) defines trust as
the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative
behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of the
community ... [It] ... is the product of pre-existing communities of shared moral
norms or values.
Other scholars have identified problems in Fukuyama's conception of trust.
According to Koehn (1996) it can be generally agreed that Fukuyama is correct to
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assert "cultural traits, precisely because they are by definition pervasive, affect the
way in which religion, law and business are practised;" however it is more dubious
to claim that trust "is the major determinant of economic performance and the
social virtue par excellence." He also worries that Fukuyama's definition has a
propensity for "cronyism" wh-ereby we trust oflly -members of the -community who
share exactly the same norms and values as we do. This destroys the whole idea
of equal and mutual recognition that is supposed to characterize the end of history.
Koehn (1996) argues that trust should not be based on the idea that people should
subscribe to precisely the same norms or values; diversity of norms and values
should not be seen as a hindrance to trusting the other person. It is good for
people to recognize that there is value in diversity and that we can trust a person
with different norms and values, without this trust being disappointed by
subsequenLexperience.
In contrast to Fukuyama, Offe (1999:45-55), in trying to establish what
determines the supply of trust as a cognitive and moral resource that motivates
cooperation, defines trust as "the cognitive premise with which individual or
collective/corporate actors enter into interaction with other actors." Thus he sees
trust as a cognitive premise that "relates to the behavioural preferences and
inclinations of others in terms of their preparedness to contribute, to cooperate,
and to refrain from selfish opportunistic and hostile courses of action" (Offe,
1999:45). Apart from being a cognitive premise, Offe (1999:46-47) also describes
trust as a "belief concerning the action that is to be expected from others," a belief
that they will "contribute to my/our well-being and refrain from inflicting damage
upnmTrefl:ls." --------------------__
(i) Value of Trust and its Application
Fukuyama's view of trust raises several issues. One of them concerns the value of
trust and how it is applied outside the limits of familiarity. Fukuyama (1995:26-27)
contends that social capital cannot be acquired on an individual basis; rather "it
requires habituation to the moral norms of a community and, in its context" can
only be acquired through trust. Fukuyama maintains that trust is a social virtue that
plays a key role in the creation of social capital by permitting individuals to create
social relationships. Koehn (1996) disagrees, contending that "even if we accept
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that trust creates social capital, this does not make it a virtue." This is because "the
shared norm that forms the basis of trust might be a mutual dislike of outsiders or
of some other racial group" resulting in distrust (Koehn, 1999). As already
indicated above, Fukuyama restricts the value of trust and its application to people
sharing the- same--soci-al-·normsand values: -For trust-to-be--applicable outside the
bounds of familiarity, Fukuyama (1995:27) introduces the term, "spontaneous
sociability," which he describes as constituting a "subset of social capital" that
includes "a wide range of intermediate communities distinct from the family or
those deliberately established by governments." Spontaneous sociability goes
beyond family lines into the formation of large-scale business corporations that are
governed by professional business leaders (Koehn, 1996). In Trust Fukuyama
(1995:61-268) distinguishes three types of society, namely, high-trust, low-trust
andno~trusl s_o_cj~tjes: .
• High-trust societies are countries (like Germany, the United States, and
Japan) that have developed large economic institutions and community
groups "above the family and below the government" (Cox, 2002; Ct.
Fukuyama, 1995:63, 149-266). Voluntary associations that emerge from
high-trust societies result in economic associations, which in turn lead to
economic development (Cox, 2002).
• Low-trust societies are countries (like China, Italy, France, and Korea) that
lack strong civil societies, where trust is limited to the family (hence strong
family unity) and "universal organizations like state religion or government"
--------ceox~002;-Fuktlyama-, 1-995-:-65-1-4-57-:--1f1-tflese-soeiet1es,----laf§e~sGale-··----­
economic institutions or businesses are established and managed by the
state, for example the French state owned and managed company that
manufactures aircraft - the Airbus (Fukuyama, 1995:113; Cox, 2002).
Fukuyama's (1995) categorization of China as part a low-trust society is
disputed by Inglehart (1999:93), who argues Fukuyama was mistaken
because according to both the 1990 and 1996 World Values Surveys,
"China shows about the same level of interpersonal trust as Japan," which
Fukuyama characterizes as a high-trust society (Inglehart, 1999:93; Ct.
Fukuyama, 1995:65-145).
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• No-trust societies are countries (like Russia, Central Africa, and Southern
Italy) where there is even lack of strong family unity and "government is
either totalitarian or corrupt" (Cox, 2002; Cf. Fukuyama, 1999:30-31 and
passim). Cox (2002) points out that the only intermediate level associations
available in these societies are organized crime.
Fukuyama (1995:62-64) maintains that business in high-trust societies that is
"organized around large corporations" thrives, while business in low-trust societies
is organized around and owned by families. Koehn (1996) comments that while in
high-trust businesses outsiders are trusted and professional managers are
appointed to govern economic institutions, in family-owned businesses outsiders
are not trusted and family members are appointed to run the business.
(ii) The Trustor and the Trustee.
Fukuyama (1995:26, 27) holds that the only persons or institutions to be trusted
are the ones with whom one shares common norms and values. The ontological
structure of participation has two sides, the trustor and the trustee. Koehn (1996)
critically argues that Fukuyama's view of trust leaves us with a concern that
centres on "how we identify who qualifies as a trustor, trustee or object of trust and
how we determine when we are justified in saying that someone is or is not
"trusting."" According to him (Koehn, 1996) the question of the "identification of the
trustor, the trustee and the object of trust is highly theory-dependent," something
-------------~ukuyama-doe~not__seemio-acknowledge:------------ -- ------ -- -- -- ------- __
Koehn (1996) criticizes Fukuyama for having "a largely monocausal theory
of human relations", for holding that trust is the key to successful economies and
"worker cooperation" and for concluding that any nation with labour discords must
have "Iow-trust agents." Fukuyama (1995: 113-125) discusses French political and
economic developments at length, especially the issues surrounding management
and labour. He tries to understand why labour seeks help from the state ministries
to solve its disputes with management rather than engaging management itself.
Koehn (1996) argues that the example does not prove that the French lack trust,
rather it shows that the French trust persons in the ministry, not their local
management. That is to say, instead of concentrating on intra-group trust, they
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exploit out-group trust. The same applies to African-American communities, which
Fukuyama criticizes as having looked up to political authority "instead of economic
associations to promote their economic interests." This restricts the meaning and
exercise of trust to circles of business without applying it to other social spheres of
life, 'for life '" is 'not-limited -to- the economic- sphere. KoeRn-~(1-99€)~launches a
corrective argument against Fukuyama's view about African Americans.
Concerning their seeking of political power to solve their socio-economic
problems: African-Americans historically attempted "to form alliances with whites
but their efforts have been rebuffed" (Koehn, 1996). In a bid to deal with the
conditions they found themselves in, African-Americans "associate with one
another in substantial numbers," but when they do that "they are frequently viewed
with suspicion" (Koehn, 1996). Apropos of Fukuyama, he warns against confusing
the "question ofwhether persons are trusting with the issue of who or what they
choose to trust" (Koehn, 1996).
If Fukuyama is correct to view trust as "a capitalistic social virtue," then
voluntary associations should all revolve around competition since those relations
are based on the market idea (Koehn, 1996). Viewing or measuring economic
success or failure on the basis of trust is then problematic. Fukuyama presents
Japan as a high-trust society, while simultaneously claiming that the Japanese "did
not move away from tight, family businesses until after \J\MIII." This happened only
after "the intervention by the United States to destroy the zaibatsu" (a large family
owned industrial conglomerates), before which business in Japan was owned by
"huge family ... conglomerates ... that dominated Japanese industry before World
. -, , 'WarII'-LtFukuyama~1995}-Fef-KoeMn+t996);
Instead of economic and social conditions being a function of trust, it appears that
the supposed high trust of the Japanese emerged only after the United States'
intervention changed the Japanese social structure for them (Koehn, 1996).
In other words, had it not been for the intervention. of the United States, Japan
would have continued on the same path as before, and would not have been as
successful as they are now. In a way this confirms the critique of Kurtz that
Fukuyama believes that the US should go out there, indoctrinate and enforce
liberal democracy irrespective of cultural preconditions. This leaves us with one
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civilization dominating the rest of the world without recognition of the importance of
the other.
3.2.4.2 Sources of Social Order
Fukuyama (1999a: 137) asks a number of questions regarding the depletion of
social capital: (1) "How can we rebuild social capital in the future?" (2) "Does this
mean, then, that contemporary liberal societies are fated to descend into
increasing levels of moral decline and social anarchy, until they somehow
implode?" In response, Fukuyama (1999a:137) claims that understanding our
situation is not as hopeless a task as it may appear; what is needed is "to study
social order per se at an abstract level." Using the Nietzschean theoretical
framewarknf j~~ g~neaJQQYQfmoraLs, Fukuyama (1999a)_ draVl~ from a large pool
of literature and synthesizes ideas from various academic disciplines:
anthropology, biology, sociology, political science, and economics - arguing that
these disciplines give us insight into the broad sources of social order, namely,
human nature and spontaneous processes of self-organization.
The central point in Fukuyama's (1999a:5-7) analysis of a modernized and
information-driven society is the power of a self-organizing, self-generating, non-
hierarchical social order that helps to create moral rules that bind citizens of a
liberal society as a community. Social order emerged, "not as the result of a top-
down mandate by hierarchical authority, whether political or religious, but as the
result of self-organization on the part of decentralized individuals" (Fukuyama,
-----1-B99ai3-)~n-his-stljdy~ttktlyama-(-1-999a~-38)-Eliseever-s-tAat-seeiaj---eroer--aRG--------­
social capital come from two broad sources:
The first is biological, and it emerges from human nature itself. There have been
important recent advances in the life sciences, which have the cumulative effect of
re-establishing the classical view that human nature exists and that their nature
makes humans social and political creatures with great capabilities for establishing
social rules. The second basis of support for social order is human reason, and
reason's ability to spontaneously generate solutions to problems of social
cooperation.
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This view contains echoes of classical Greek philosophy, both in content and
method, especially Aristotle who views humankind as a political animal. Johnson
(1999) in his review article of The Great Disruption argues that Fukuyama's
methods are not different from Aristotle's in that he (Fukuyama) observes and
. interprets the ·errfplricarworld, then seeks metaphysical-explanaHon~
Tracing human nature and social order through the annals of anthropology,
sociology, evolutionary biology, and economics, Fukuyama (1999a:155-156) looks
at the concept of cultural relativism which he describes as
the belief that cultural rules are arbitrary, socially constructed artefacts of different
societies ... and that there are no universal standards of morality and no way by
which we can judge the norms and rules of other cultures.
Ifs-roots date back to modern philosophers such as Nietzsche (Fukuyama,
1999a:156). What it means is that the moral laws of the past were constructed,
and that it is possible to do the same today. This supports Fukuyama's view that
the Great Disruption can be remedied by developing new rules that suit the
contemporary contexts of various communities - creating some hope for the
despondent human family. In an attempt to unify the sources for rebuilding social
order, Fukuyama (1999a:155-162) tries to establish common lines between
various disciplines by appealing to the old concept of the transferability of method,
especially when he talks of "methodological borrowing" between evolutionary
biology and economics, indicating that some factors from either discipline
undermine the other or support the other. For instance, evolutionary game theory,
developed by economists as a framework "to explain- the behavior of markets," was
borrowed by biologists as a mathematical model for explaining "how certain
altruistic behavioral characteristics could be selected and spread within
populations of competing individuals" (Fukuyama, 1999a: 161).
Fukuyama (1999a:161) points out that evolutionary biologists and
economists accept "methodological individualism." They then seek to explain
group behaviour in terms of the interests of the individual, but not vice versa. In the
past, social observation and/or philosophizing "assumed that the primary human
unit was the group and that nature prepared individuals to sacrifice their own
interests for the sake of larger groups" (Fukuyama, 1999a:161). As already
indicated above, all classical models of liberalism have a common problem to deal
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with, namely, individualism. This continuous and excessive individualism creates
an internal contradiction within liberal democracy. It is a contradiction because in
liberal society the spirit of civility is supposed to prevail. Each individual will be
fighting for personal recognition while the community demands submission to its
moral norms. As a result there will be a conflict between the individual and the
community.
In an attempt to show that liberal democracy can overcome its internal
contradictions, Fukuyama (1999a), following evolutionary anthropology and
biology, points out that individuated human beings have a propensity to
socialization, cooperation, and self-organization into political communities.
Concerning cooperation, Fukuyama (1999a: 168-169) argues that kin selection and
reciprocity, upon which individual interests are based, lead to social cooperation.
It}U~__§S r:L~QQI~J~2~C3JE3cjIYiQtefc:l~tthE3y_~illcome to know each other and
reciprocally trust one another.
3.2.4.3 Rebuilding Social Order
Fukuyama (1999:137) argues that we as human beings "are by nature designed to
create moral rules and social order for ourselves." He presents a hopeful vision of
a future in which there is a reconstruction of the social order that was once
disrupted (Fukuyama, 1999:247-282). Fukuyama (1999:263-282) documents both
the blessings from a more technologically sophisticated and information-based
economy and the moral decay triggered by the same technology, resulting in the
--------Elisf~ptieA-ef-seGial_erQer_,_as-iAgiGateg-tly--suGI'"l-soGi-al-patholog~es-as-Grirne-lev-els, _
declining fertility, increasing births out of wedlock, decreasing levels of trust, and
the dismantling of family structures. Fukuyama (1999:263-282) claims that there
has been a reverse of all these social pathologies since the 1990s. This makes the
Great Disruption, as North (1999) puts it, "just a temporary interruption on the way
to an ever better future." Furthermore, Fukuyama (1999a) is stuck with the problem
of increasing individualism, which he describes as having fuelled innovation and
prosperity but at the same time as also having "corroded virtually all forms of
authority and weakened the bonds holding families, neighbourhoods, and nations
together." The situation raises the question of how social order is going to be
rebuilt.
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Reconciling theory with empirical data concerning the past and present
disrupted condition of the Western world, and closely focusing on the effects of a
free market economy and technology on social order, Fukuyama (1999a:262,282)
asserts that "[o]ur only reason for hope is the very powerful innate human
capacities for recol9stitutiflg-seeialerder;"-=t=Ais-links-with Kant's teleological vision
that at the end of history the plan of nature is to see development to maturity of
human innate capacities, contained and driven by reason to build a global social
order that will respect the freedom, equality, and independence of individuals.
Fukuyama does not offer any guarantee that our human propensity to socialization
can reverse the ongoing social disruptive human creativity that has effectively
destroyed the social infrastructure of a communal moral order. Nevertheless, he
believes in the innate self-organizing, self-generating human power to create a
non-hierarchical social order. This brings about social hope, "not the victory or the
triumph of outright libertarian individualism, but a victory of the community and
acceptance of the modest degree of authority necessary to social order over
excessive individualism" (Dobell, 1999). However Huntington (1996:71-72)
correctly asserts that individualism remains a central and distinguishing mark of
Western civilization. The individual's struggle for recognition and the liberal
democratic promise of equal and reciprocal recognition between individuals seems
to be the impetus behind the individualistic zeal for identity, respect, dignity and
gain (or self-interest) - hence the locus of American politics, as Fukuyama argues,
has shifted from economic issues to the realm of the thymotic - linking Fukuyama
with classical Greek ideas.
-.. -···--------Gr:it~-Gally--examir:Jir:Jg---col'"lsel"¥ativ.e-_reJigioo---as.--ao ... -allematblH__basis__ JQL... _
resolving the problem of moral decline in order to build social hope, Fukuyama
(1999a:278) argues that it will create a conflict of religious expectations and
practices due to the fact that there are different versions of orthodoxy in modern
diversified communities. Any such attempt is bound to raise the question: whose
version of orthodoxy should prevail as a standard doctrine for preserving the
communal moral order? In addition, he argues:
[a]ny true orthodoxy is likely to be seen as a threat to large and important groups in
the society, and hence would neither get very far, nor serve as a basis for a
widening radius of trust. Rather than integrating society, a conservative religious
revival might in fact accelerate the movement toward fragmentation and moral
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miniaturization: the various varieties of Protestant fundamentalism would argue
among themselves over doctrine; orthodox Jews would become more orthodox;
Muslims and Hindus might start to organize themselves as political-religious
communities, and the like (Fukuyama, 1999:178).
So it is difficult, if not impossible, to rebuild social order on a religious foundation,
especially in a diversified context. However Fukuyama anticipates that a burning
desire for belonging to a community and ritual fulfilment will compel people to
return to religion and form faith-based associations.
Fukuyama claims crucially that society will re-normalize. It will re-normalize
through market exchange, which he claims provides the habit of reciprocity and
"the best hope for securing norms of integrity, tolerance, and self-control
necessary for expanding our circle of trust and undergirding general social
cooperation" (MacGraw, 1999; Cf. Fukuyama, 1999:259-262). But this position is
not without problems, of which Fukuyama (1999:281-282) acknowledges two:
• "[S]ocial and moral order do not necessarily follow in the wake of political
order and economic development. .. " This is because, firstly, liberal societies
achieve political order on the basis of "moral consensus," and secondly,
liberal societies only give moral guidelines that relate to "universal
obligations for tolerance and mutual respect" (Fukuyama (1999a:281),
without promoting practical practices in which these guidelines are made
concrete.
-"- --- -----------_.__ .._ .._--._--_.
---- -
• The second problem is th~ threatp;-s-ed"t;ytechnoIOglcaf changes-tolibe-ral""-
societies' own cultural bases. Technological change often dictates the
supply and depletion of social capital as family units disband and/or reunite,
such as happened prior to, during and after the American and European
industrial revolutions (Fukuyama, 1999a:282).
These two problems lead Fukuyama (1999:282) to think that there are two
processes at work in history:
In the political and economic sphere history appears to be progressive and
directional, [this] ... has culminated in liberal democracy as the only viable choice
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for technologically advanced societies. In the social and moral sphere, however,
history appears to be cyclical, with social order ebbing and flowing over the course
of generations.
For FUkuyam~"_li~~ral ~E3mocracy has come to stay and w!" neverbe moved or
changed, for the process leading to it is linear. It is the social and moral order that
will change due to the influence of technology and other phenomena: social life is
cyclical in that norms can be redefined in order to curb social disruption and to
rebuild social order. While Fukuyama upholds capitalist liberal democracy as "the
apotheosis of politics and economics", Leigh (2000) contends that it is but one kind
of many Great Disruptions that will therefore inevitably be followed by a "Great
Reconstruction." This 'Great Reconstruction' will lead to the realization of the
ultimate goal of history - the liberal state.
3.2.5 The Ultimate Goal of History: the Liberal State
Liberal democracy has triumphed, but it has not reached its ultimate goal of
establishing a global (or universal) order through the universal and homogeneous
liberal state that will end social conflicts and usher in peace and prosperity _
thereby satisfying the desire for recognition. It is only when liberal democracy has
overcome its internal contradictions that its ultimate goal of a universal liberal state
will be achieved and there will be a political order that will bring about universal
recognition. Fukuyama (1999a:280) argues:
-----~-------- ---------------
Only a political order based on the univ;~sal~ecog~ition o-T-humand ig"nity=:.-Of-the-- -
essential equality of all human beings based on their capacity for moral choice _
could avoid these irrationalities and lead to a peaceful domestic and international
order.
Citing Kant's republican form of government with its principle of rights and Hegel's
universal and homogeneous state with its principle of universal recognition,
Fukuyama (1999a:280) attempts to show that these aspects are enshrined in
virtually all contemporary liberal democratic societies, for instance as a Bill of
Rights (a prescription for every democratic state) and in the Universal Declaration
of Rights.
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The Hegelian idea of a universal human history whose processional
movement subjects all schisms to reconciliation, resulting in the end of history that
marks a universal society of equal and mutual recognition of individual citizens,
underpins Fukuyama's conception of the ultimate goal of history - the liberal state.
This equal and mutual recognition of individuals will remove the motive for war and
--- - -~._-_.~~------ ------ ~_.._. - --
struggle, and therefore bring about peace. At this historical endpoint a political age
of a global (or universal) order is reached in which dualisms such as that between
master and slave has been overcome. This universal order is a society of free
people who will reciprocally recognize each other's rights and freedom. For Hegel,
this universal order is a political community that will formulate law which confers
universal recognition upon each individual citizen, culminating in satisfying the
desire of each individual for affirmation as an equal among others. For Fukuyama,
thi§glgbal (gfuniversalJ political community can only be brought about at the end
of history when liberal democracy has become the sole framework of governance
and gain.
Fukuyama has already argued that previous ideological alternatives failed
humanity. A recapitulation of what I have discussed in the first chapter shows that
Hobbes rejected a monarchial state based on the divine right of kings to rulership,
or the natural superiority of those who win the fight over the weak in the state of
nature, in favour of the Leviathan. The Leviathan stems from the agreement
among the governed to escape the brutish, cruel, and death-wielding situation of
the state of nature in an attempt to secure peace and self-preservation by willingly
surrendering their rights to the state in signing the social contract. The Leviathan's
- - ------ ---fl:lle-peFFFleate-s---all---spt:leres-Qf-the-Gitizel=ls'__livesr-eaming.itseILtbe_de.scriptino__ol
absolute monarchial sovereignty. The shift from accepting the divine right of the
monarchial state to advocating a government established by the people can be
interpreted as a move to liberalizing the state. It is because of this move that
Fukuyama (1992:200) describes Hobbes as the "foundationhead of modern
liberalism." We saw in the second chapter of this thesis that Jones (2002) argues
against seeing Hobbes as a liberal. Hobbes' "liberal" state under the absolute
monarchial sovereignty did not go down well with Locke who viewed it as
tyrannical and worthy of facing a rebellion to replace it with a liberal state based on
the twin principles of freedom (or liberty) and equality, and private property
ownership. In such a liberal society citizens have a "reciprocal and equal
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agreement" to respect each other's lives and property (Fukuyama,1992:200).
Hegel gives a new twist to the Hobbesian legacy by viewing liberal society as "a
reciprocal and equal agreement among citizens to mutually recognize each other"
(Fukuyama, 1992:200).
Comparing and contrasting Hobbesian-Lockean liberalism with Hegelian
~ -- --------_._--_.. _-
liberalism, Fukuyama (1992:200) notes that the former can be interpreted "as the
pursuit of rational self-interest" and the latter as the pursuit of rational and
universal recognition, where each person's dignity "as a free and autonomous
human being is recognized by all." Fukuyama (1992:200), picking up from Hegel,
asserts that "the liberal democratic state values us at our own sense of self-worth"
satisfying all aspects of needs, with happiness as result. Reconciling the two
distinct views (that of Hobbes and Locke), Fukuyama (1992:201-202) contends
thc:iJ
[t]he liberal state, on the other hand, is rational because it reconciles these
competing demands for recognition on the only mutually acceptable basis possible,
that is, on the basis of the individual's identity as a human being. The liberal state
must be universal, that is, grant recognition to all citizens because they are human
beings, and not because they are members of some particular national, ethnic, or
racial groups. And it must be homogeneous insofar as it creates a classless society
based on the abolition of the distinction between masters and slaves.
Furthermore, Fukuyama (1992:202) holds that the rationality of this "universal and
homogenous state" is based on principles developed through public debate in
-~~__~ wbicb_citizens_agre~ how the)' want th~_state to b~ and Jo function. The idea of the ~
universal and homogeneous state comes from Kojewe (1969:158n-180nff; Cf.
Chapter 2 of this thesis) who asserted that history had ended because the state
had totally satisfied the human desire for recognition by replacing the split structure
of society of master and slave with the recognition of all the citizens. According to
Fukuyama (1992:xxi, 203) this refers to liberal democracy, which he says solved
the problem of recognition by "replacing the relationship of lordship and bondage"
with recognition for each citizen. I disagree with Fukuyama because this and
empirically false claim in that not all individual citizen of in the world have the same
recognition and affirmation of their rights.
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3.3 CONFLICT OF IDEOLOGIES OR CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?
Fukuyama (1992:45, 211-212) claims that there is a remarkable and general
consensual reception of liberal democracy as the only valid ideology that has
"survived intact to- the-end of the- -twentieth-century· ... with pretensions to
universality, [and] .. ,claims [on being] the most rational form of government."
Nevertheless Fukuyama (1992:42) maintains that in the worldwide revolution of
liberalism, the fall
of authoritarianism and socialist central planning have left only one competitor
standing in the ring as an ideology of potentially universal validity: liberal
democracy, the doctrine of individual freedom and popular sovereignty.
lri-arguinglfiis way, FukUyarila is not turning a blind eye tathe existence of Islam,
of whose strength to challenge liberal democracy Huntington (1997) warns the
Western world. In The End of History, Fukuyama (1992:45) acknowledges that
Islam as a "systematic and coherent ideology ... with its own code of morality and
doctrine of political and social justice" still gives liberal democracy quite a
challenge, even defeating liberal democracy in some parts of the world. In a way,
he agrees with Huntington who argues that Islam still stands as a big challenge to
Western liberal democracy. Like any other ideology, Islam's appeal has the
potential to reach out to other places, even to places where it is not politically in
control. Fukuyama's (1992:45) critique of Islam as an ideology is that it neither has
much "appeal outside those cultures that were not Islamic," nor is a factor in those
countries where Islam does not take a fundamentalist form. Fukuyama misses out
on the fact that liberal democracy is often only accepted if military and economic
advantages are dangled in front of the government in question - as in the case of
developing nations through transnational companies, the World Bank and the
IMF's Economic Structural Adjustment Programs (Kurtz, 2002; Cf. Carbo &
Fischer, 1995:2846-2924; Huntington, 1996:183-186; Chang, 1998: and Martin,
1999:253-278). The best example is the case of Pakistan's military leader
Musharaf, concerning whom Kurtz (2002) says that in the run-up to the US attack
on Afghanistan to oust the Taliban government, US President George Bush held
out exactly such enticements to attract him to the Western camp. Kurtz (2002) is
correct to conclude that ultimately, Fukuyama's "scientific-economic mechanism of
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modernization" attracting other nations to the market economy, became fact in that
it "enabled the United States to pry Pakistan loose from its erstwhile Islamist
allies."
Kurtz (2002), comparing and contrasting Fukuyama and Huntington, shows
that the fundamental differsflce--6etween-thetwo-is-thattl':leir-.viewpoints translate
into radically contrasting ideas about the goals of American foreign policy.
Fukuyama wants to see America actively involved in promoting democracy abroad,
while Huntington "warns about the potentially disastrous effects of an arrogant and
na"ive democratic policy." For Huntington democracy and capitalism can only be
suitable in a Western cultural arrangement. He would prefer the West "to defend its
democratic traditions as a specifically Western cultural heritage, not as magical
solutions to the problems of the world" (Kurtz 2002). In his essay for the Atlantic
C()LJDcil of the United States, entitled "After the Fall: U.S.-Russian Relations in the
Next Stage of Post-Soviet History" Stravrakis (1998:viiin) comments that both
Fukuyama and Huntington
miss the central point demonstrated by Russia's recent experience: the spread of
official corruption and its subversion of the liberal state may substitute power of the
clan for state power in the next century.
He argues that after "the great ideological conflicts that have risen from the
dynamics of political history" were overcome, "leaving the ideas of Western liberal
democracy within the grasp of all societies," American foreign policy "has operated
as if economic and political reform would change the nature of Russian culture,"
---------. (Strav~~ki~~-998:vii i,2T-St~a~~akis-thus-does--not seetFlefalTo-TcommunTs·m-as-a- -- -- - -------
simple shift that will see the triumph of liberal democracy in Russia and most other
parts of the world.
For Fukuyama (1992:212) the reason why liberal democracy has not yet
become a universal ideology is that the correspondence between the realm of
peoples and the realm of states is incomplete. The realm of peoples or
communities, which Fukuyama (1992:213) refers to as "sub-political," is "the
domain of culture and of society," where peoples have common moral beliefs
originating from a shared traditional background. With the realm of states
Fukuyama (1992:213) refers to "the realm of the political, the sphere of self-
conscious choice about the proper mode of governance." The former realm can
142
affect the establishment and sustaining of political liberalism and can disable the
working of economic liberalism (Fukuyama, 1992:233), while the latter can
enhance liberal democracy. Although he differs from Fukuyama to some extent,
and although he warned his readers in the early parts of his essay that he is not up
to allocating blame, Stravrakis (1998:2)-argues-that if Russia did not-reform as "the
US had hoped, the problems lie not in the goals of liberal democracy but in
obstacles of Russian politics and society that impede an outcome."
Be this as it may, Fukuyama (1992:243-244) believes that the world is
becoming increasingly homogenized through modern economics and technology,
which will ultimately lead to the broad triumph of capitalism and liberal democracy,
resulting in the broad consensual reception of liberalism. Fukuyama does not dare
to spell out whether this broad consensus will be a deliberate decision by those
nations or will involve coercion of some sort. Let us not forget that social change
---- - - ------ ...- - ---. --- --.----._------- --_. -_. - -_. - - -. ---. - -
only occurs if powerful social forces drive it.
Fukuyama (1991: 19) argues against the geopolitical practice of the 19th
century when nations could plausibly solve economic problems through territorial
conquest. He would rather opt for the modern approach of creating wealth based
on peace and legitimacy. He insists on a 'New World Order' to come that "will not
be built on abstract principles of international law, but upon the common principles
of liberal democracy and market economy" (Fukuyama, 1991:19). Making a
political prediction, Fukuyama (1991: 19) maintains that geopolitically, the Gulf is
changing into a "growing part of the world that is democratic and capitalist" _
transforming the Persian Gulf into a region we as _a human race "will ultimately
-------f-1Bve-te-mak-e-el;.lf--AGffit::e-;-."------ _
Norris (1991:12), commenting on Fukuyama's 1989 article "The End of
History," lists Fukuyama among those intellectuals he describes as having drifted
towards a conformist way of thinking - or rationalizations of the ideological status
quo - among well-placed commentators on the intellectual scene whose views
have understandably received wide coverage in the US and British media.
Norris' (1991:12) point of departure is that Fukuyama's article was written under
the auspices of a US State Department think-tank, and was greeted as a major
contribution to former President George Bush's (Senior) "New World Order,"
making the article "perhaps the most notable recent instance of the feedback
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mechanism at work." He asks whether Fukuyama is arguing that history should
now be written from the stand-point of the victors. Norris (1991 :34-36) criticizes
Fukuyama's failure to grasp the facts behind the Gulf War that include the coming
to power of the (now deposed) Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party
- thraugh-a-CIA--supported-coup;-Furthefmore,-Norris (1-991:36) points out that what
is not clear about Fukuyama's account is
the extent to which recalcitrant local populations might need to be persuaded,
induced or coerced to accept this vision as their own best interests or to give up
those archaic habits of thought (the geopolitics of the 19
th
century) which so far
held out against the manifest logic of the equation liberal democracy + market
capitalism = qualification for entry to the New World Order.
rhe-September _1J,.2D.02_attackon tbe twinJQw.ers In ~~w__XQrJs_~llq thePeDtafJOn
in Washington (USA) by al-Qaida emerged as an alien event that moved the focus
from Fukuyama to Huntington_ It was at this point that Fukuyama's claim of a
consensus reception of liberal democracy was put to the test. Stanley Kurtz
(2003), in his article, "The Future of 'History'" compares and contrasts Fukuyama's
concept of the end of history and Huntington's concept of the clash of civilizations_
After September 11, Huntington's ideas were seen in the intellectual world
as the ideas of the moment, for it was the fulfilment of his prediction that "the
dangerous clashes of the future are likely to arise from the interaction of Western
arrogance, Islamic intolerance, and Sinic assertiveness" (Huntington, 1996:185).
Prior to the publication of The Clash of Civilizations, Huntington published an
-----aTtlc1e--entitleu-;--''l-ne-e1ash-of-e;viiizations7-=t=he-Next-P-aH-em--ef-€-eflfl+eF-(-1-993}--lfl·--------
the article Huntington (1993) puts forward his hypothesis that the "fundamental
source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily economic" or political as
Fukuyama argues, but due to "the great divisions among humankind ___ the
dominating source of conflict will be cultural."
In The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century,
Huntington (1991:15) defines a
wave of democratization ... [as] ... a group of transitions from non-democratic to
democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that
significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period.
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The disintegration of the communist bloc falls in the third wave, which he dates as
occurring from 1974 (overthrow of Portugal's dictatorial regime) till 1989 (the fall of
the Berlin wall and the disintegration of Eastern and Central European communist
-regimes). According to Huntingtefl the-w0flEl's period of democratization is over;
what the world is faced with now are new conflicts based on cultural differences. In
contrast to Fukuyama, Huntington, in The Clash of Civilizations (1996:31, 183-186)
argues that the central problem that separates the West from the rest is "the
discordance" between the West's efforts to universalize Western culture and "its
declining ability to do so." It follows that the fall of communism worsened "this
discordance by reinforcing in the West the view that its ideology of democratic
liberalism had triumphed globally and hence was universally valid" (Huntington,
199Q:J63; CL FLJKl.IYCiIl1Ci,J992).
While Fukuyama thinks that the conflict between the West and the rest of
the world is ideological, Huntington argues that it has nothing to do with ideology
but it has to do with difference of civilizations. Huntington (1996: 193) argues that
the West is generally Christian and that democratization in many cases was
consensually received in countries that were Christian and where Western
influence was strong. In places like the Islamic countries of Asia and Africa, where
these two conditions did hold, and where democratization was imposed on the
people, it led to conflict. In addition, Huntington (1996:209) argues that
the ideological conflict between liberal democracy and Marxist-Leninism is only a
_____f1eeting and su[>erficial historical phenomenon as compared to the continuing and
. ~----------------_.- ---------- ----
deeply conflictual relation between Islam and Christianity.
For Huntington (1996:217) to understand the conflict between Islam and the West
we must understand how they perceive each other: on the one hand, the West
perceives Islamic fundamentalism not as the principle problem, rather "a different
civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are
obsessed with the inferiority of their power." On the other hand, the basic problem
of Islam is neither the CIA nor the US Department of State, but the West,
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a different civilization whose people are convinced of the universality of their
culture and believe that their superior, if declining, power imposes on them the
obligation to extend that culture throughout the world (Huntington, 1996:217-218).
~LJl1t!l1gton (1~~~~30.1) cor~~c~~~ points~u~_~.~~~~~_ the. univ.ersal state of a
civilization emerges, its adherents "become blinded" by what Toynbee (quoted in
Huntington, 1996:301) calls "the 'mirage of immortality'." This convinces its
adherents that their civilization "is the final form of human society." Such was the
trend with many empires of the world that have fallen, such as the Roman Empire
or Napoleon's empire. Hence when any society assumes the end of its history, this
shows that that society in question is about to decline (Huntington, 1996:301) - the
West being no exception. The applicability of this claim to Fukuyama is obvious.
Yar (2002) sees The End of History as "nothing else than a triumphal
vindfcafionof KojEWe's supposedly prescient thesis that history has found its end in
the global triumph of capitalism and liberal democracy." With the final fall of Soviet
communism, and the global hegemony of capitalism and the world reaching "a
homogenized state in which the combination of capitalism and liberalism will reign
supreme," Fukuyama's claim of the end of history seems to have become fact
(Yar, 2002; Cf. Kojeve, 1969, Fukuyama, 1989, 1992). Contrary to this kind of
thinking, Huntington (1996:301) argues that "history ends at least once and
occasionally more often in the history of every civilization."
Fukuyama's interpretation of history seems to imply that human thinking in
terms of political and economic ideology has come to an end and there will never
again be an opposing framework of thought. To be fair to him, his position is
-- --. ---------~ubtler th-~n this: hi~~I~i~j;th~t-any--n-ewideQjogyop-posTn9i,beraT-derr,-ocracyw,n--- ---------
not supersede it, but will either fail, or blend with it.
3.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Fukuyama appropriates the method of Hegel-as-interpreted-by-Kojeve - the
dialectic - to interpret historical events at the close of the 20th century. Ironically,
he also follows Marx in holding that where there is a conflict of systems, the
system with less contradiction in its institutions will remain standing, while the rest
will collapse because of their internal contradictions. While for Marx it is
communism that will remain standing, for Fukuyama it is liberal democracy.
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Fukuyama's conception of history has an empirical aspect and a metaphysical
aspect. He looks at the development of historical events empirically, and then
gives them a metaphysical interpretation. In his historical overview of the last few
centuries he concludes that there has been an ongoing conflict of ideologies driven
by 'the logic of modern---natural-science'-and 'the struggle for recognition.'
Furthermore, the political and economic events in Eastern Europe and the then
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that led to the collapse of communism, marked
the triumph of liberal democracy and capitalism, which thanks to Fukuyama has
become as the end of history. Fukuyama's claim is that in the course of history,
capitalist liberal democracy has triumphed in the conflict of ideologies that included
monarchism, aristocracy, fascism, and communism.
Fukuyama also addresses the question of whether democracy will be able
__ to__oYeLcomeJ.ts..jQt.ern...algootr~g[~tiorJ~, na_m_~lyJQ~ ~qnf!ictbetw~e~ the _i.J:ldiyicjual
and the community, and inequality. He believes that liberal democracy requires the
social virtue of social capital and a stable social order. His argument is that through
human nature and spontaneous self-organization, human beings have the
potential to cooperate and solve these contradictions. But to us it seems
implausible that liberal democracy can resolve these long-standing contradictions.
The unequal distribution of goods through the distributive mechanism of the market
has not been resolved up to now.
Drawing on Hegel's notion of a universal and homogeneous state,
Fukuyama envisages a global order that will be ushered in by the universal and
homogeneous liberal state, which is the ultimate goal of liberal democracy. He
even argues that the Universal Declaration of Rights and the basic human rights
enumerated in the legal systems of virtually all contemporary liberal democracies
in the world today enshrine the Hegelian principle of universal recognition of the
rights of individuals. So it is the duty of the liberal state to ensure equal and mutual
recognition and affirmation of each other's freedom.
Fukuyama's claim of the end of history can be contrasted with a different
approach to developments in the international political and economic scene - that
of Huntington. Huntington's counter-claim is that what is at stake here is not a
conflict of ideologies but a clash of civilizations. While Fukuyama thinks that the
West should missionize liberal democracy to the world, Huntington disagrees,
arguing that democracy can only work in countries that are Christian. The debate
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between the two scholars gives us two opposing views of the same thing. On the
one hand, history has ended with liberal democratic capitalism as a victor
(Fukuyama), and on the other hand every end to history is at best provisional
(Huntington).
Fukuyama claims that the two fundamental forces shaping and propelling
- - - - - ~ .- .-.......-- ..~ - ---~ . -- - _.- -- ---
the course of human history are science and the desire for recognition. Will
science stop progressing and unfolding? Will liberal democracy definitely bring
mutual and reciprocal recognition and prosperity, and thereby human happiness?
A marked danger of Fukuyama's declaration of the end of history is that it limits the
progress of scientific development which it claims to espouse. If history ends here,
then it means that the end of scientific search, for the search for the meaning of
nature has then been accomplished. Ideology must also be understood as a
fram~wprklnwhich scL~ntific research channels its efforts. It is to the realization of
ideological demands that education, industry, political, technology and military are
accordingly designed, rather than to the achievement of human satisfaction.
It is unlikely that democracy will be consensually received everywhere, the
case in point being the Islamic countries and some socialist or communist
countries. If democracy is built on the pre-existing conditions and traditions of
Western culture, how will it work in other cultures? Like any other culture, Western
culture is neither perfect nor objective. Huntington's claim that democracy only
works in those places where Christianity has been a dominating religion may
initially sound plausible, but it does not cater for countries such as Israel, Japan,
Turkey, South Korea, and India where Christianity is not dominating.
Be this as it may, I am largely convinced by Fukuyama's argument that
liberal democracy satisfies the human desire for recognition much better than all
previous ideological alternatives. This leads us to the fifth chapter's central
question: Is recognition all humanity yearns for? In an attempt to discuss this




RECOGNITION OR WELL-BEING?: FUKUYAMA VERSUS SEN
ON LIFE SATISFACTION IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY
There are some who think that justice is nothing more or less than reciprocity. But reciprocity
cannot be squared either-withdistributive or corrective justice.- .
- Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1953
Right by its very nature can consist only in the application of an equal standard; but unequal
individuals ... are measurable only by an equal standard in so far as they are brought under an
equal point of view. Only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety
and society inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability, to each according to his
needs.
- Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme 1977 [1875]
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Both- Fukuyama--and- Senliave faith in- ffeemarket,-liber:al ...rigl::lts, freedom, and
criticize the existing order, but they do it in different ways by different means.
Fukuyama focuses on liberal democracy as having satisfied the human desire for
recognition. Sen on the other hand, endorses democracy as a universal value that
has the potential to satisfy the need for well-being - hence the freedom for being
and doing.
Fukuyama criticises the Anglo-Saxon liberalism of Hobbes and Locke that
accords moral primacy to self-preservation, arguing that it misses out on the
satisfaction of the human desire for recognition. As already indicated in the
previous chapters, he contends that human history is driven by the human search
for satisfaction of the desire for recognition:
Every human being seeks to have his or her dignity recognized (Le. evaluated at its
proper worth) by other human beings. Indeed this drive is so deep and
fundamental that it is one of the chief motors of the entire human historical
process. In earlier periods, this desire for recognition played itself out in the military
arena as kings and princes fought bloody battles with one another for primacy. In
modern times this struggle for recognition has shifted from the military to the
economic realm, where it has the socially beneficial effect of creating rather than
destroying wealth. Beyond subsistence levels, economic activity is frequently
undertaken for the sake of recognition rather than merely as a means of satisfying
natural material needs (Fukuyama, 1995:6-7).
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In addition to that and based on Hegel's idea of "struggle for recognition"
Fukuyama (1992:89-97, 1995:358-359) claims that there are two major forces at
play in the process of human history, namely, rational desire and the desire for
recognition. The former has to do with the satisfaction of human "material needs
through accumulation of wealth," while the--Iatter has to do with the desire of all
human beings "to have their essence as free, moral beings recognized by other
human beings" (Fukuyama, 1995:358). For Fukuyama only a homogeneous liberal
state can fulfil the desire of each citizen for reciprocal recognition. Thus Fukuyama
like Hegel anticipates the creation of a state at a global scale - universal statism.
In contrast, Sen holds that democracy is a universal value that enjoins all
national states to bring substantial freedom and equality of opportunity to their
citizens. For Sen the importance of democracy lies in its role of bringing about the
priDlafyvalu~offr~ec1()m into each individual's endeavour to achieve well-being.
Unlike Fukuyama's homogeneous state, democracy is not viewed in terms of
instituting any specific social arrangements, nor in changing cultural values to align
with the cultural values that underpin a Western conception of liberal democracy.
Sen argues that human beings need well-being; for it is well-being in its totality that
brings life satisfaction. Furthermore, for Sen, democracy, if adopted, will create the
conditions for each individual to do and be what he/she values most. While
Fukuyama uses historical events to substantiate his claim that recognition is the
main human desire, Sen uses capabilities and functionings as the substances of
rights and freedoms to achieve well-being. Sen convincingly argues that all
individuals need well-being, whether they choose it or not. Freedom, recognition,
rights, and other values are part of well-being. In order to satisfy the need of well-
being Sen further argues for a space of equal access to opportunities for all which
he advocates through his capability approach. According to DeMartino (2000: 107)
the capabilities equality approach is resolutely resistant to "'end of history'
narratives that anticipate the achievement of some final state of social
organization," such as the narrative in FUkuyama, because "the principle of
capabilities equality promotes extensive (indeed perpetual) social
experimentation." This makes Sen's position concerning life satisfaction favourable
to me and justified for contending against that of Fukuyama.
This chapter introduces a debate on human satisfaction within liberal
society. Its aim is to show that Fukuyama's claim is not shared by all who
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subscribe to liberal democracy, such as Sen whom I regard as belonging to the
camp of the 'left'. The central questions are: Can human happiness be
systematised or universalised as Fukuyama tries to argue? How can we integrate
well-being and recognition? Or is there any reason to separate them?
--The-discussion-below-will focus on issues such as the influence of ideology
on moral conception and judgment, the dilemma of difference, the problem of
even-handedness and some ideas that relate to global justice in the distribution of
economic goods at the end of history. It will also recognise and stress the
conditions that underpin the ethics of liberalism. In this way the question of socio-
economic inequality that shapes human well-being, will be analysed in an attempt
to clarify it.
4.2.__THE lSSUE:_SATISEACIIONOF HUM8NOESIREfQR RECOGNITION
VERSUS SATISFACTION OF HUMAN NEED FOR WELL-BEING
According to Deigh (1995:243) there are two approaches to the question of what
ends ought to be pursued for life satisfaction. The first approach looks at questions
concerning "the components of a good life," while the second looks at "what sorts
of things are good in themselves" (Deigh, 1995:243). A person naturally seeks a
good life, consequently, "one can determine what ends we ought to pursue;" or
one can assume that "whatever is good in itself is worth choosing or pursuing"
(Deigh, 1995:243). Deigh (1995:245) holds that the first approach leads to the
concept of human happiness where one would seek the good life; while the
second leads to the theory of intrinsic value - things that are good in themselves _
where one seeks that which he/she has reason to value as good in itself. The first
approach emerged from the ancient ethics of eudaimonia (Greek for happiness),
while the latter is rooted in Socrates' conception of virtue and Plato's theory of
forms.
At the centre of Socrates' moral thought are the concepts of knowledge and
virtue. He viewed them as inseparable - arguing that "if virtue has to do with
making the soul as good as possible, it is first necessary to know what makes the
soul good" - thus requiring knowledge "to be able to distinguish between what
appears to give happiness and what really does" (Stumpf, 1999:40). Socrates
understood virtue as the proper knowledge of one's circumstances. One chooses
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the correct course of action in each situation, as it would be impossible to do
otherwise. This is further expanded in Plato's ethics of virtue and goodness and
acquires the meaning of inner harmony, well-being, and happiness (Stumpf,
1999:64). Harmony occurs when all parts of the soul function together without
interferin-gwith"each other.-Thisplaces a-person in a harmonious state and-Brings
about a feeling of well-being. Aristotle distinguished between Socratic-Platonic
intellectual (dianoetic) virtue and moral virtue, or between abstract wisdom
(sophia) that contemplates universal principles and practical wisdom (phronesis)
that directs good conduct (Rohmann, 2000:421; Cf. Stumpf, 1999:92-96). For
Aristotle, the key to achieving moral virtue was to observe the mean between
extremes. This mean he called eudaimonia - generally translated as happiness or
satisfaction.
---- -The-question ot.how to find this mean - satisfQctton - conJil1l.1~.s t9 be
debated and recurs in various forms. The process of resolving issues surrounding
the theory of life satisfaction soon split into two views, namely, hedonism and
perfectionism. The most famous exponent of hedonism was Epicurus. He taught
that "excelling at things worth doing," especially the use of intellectual power and
moral virtue is the true way to satisfy human desire (Deigh, 1995:245). The ancient
followers of hedonism were Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics (Deigh, 1995:245). They
were followed by the modern defenders of classical hedonism and perfectionism:
John Stewart Mill and Friedrich Nietzsche respectively. The idea of happiness
finds its way into contemporary thinking as the ultimate confirmation or indication
of the fulfilment or satisfaction of human desires (preferred by Fukuyama) -
seeking for that which is good in life, or needs (preferred by Sen) - seeking for that
which one has reason to value as good in itself.
4.3 DISCUSSION: SEN VS FUKUYAMA
In this section I aim to show that the views of the two theorists diverge even though
they share a common ideological framework - liberal democracy. As already
indicated above, Fukuyama claims that the advent of liberal democracy and the
free market economy satisfied the human desire for recognition and gain - thereby
bringing about happiness. For Sen, democracy, if adopted, has the potential to
bring freedom for one to conceptualise his/her economic and political needs, and
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the opportunity for fulfilling one's capabilities, above all it has the potential to bring
about human well-being - resulting in life satisfaction.
4.3.1 Fukuyama: Liberal Democracy Satisfies the Human Desire for
Recognition
Drawing on Plato's theory of thymos and later on Hegel's idea of the struggle for
recognition Fukuyama is adamant that the human desire for recognition has finally
been fulfilled in the emergence of liberal democracy. He sees life, especially
American life, both economically and politically, as having moved from material
accumulation to a thymotic level - meaning that they have passed the struggle for
material satisfaction and they are now concerned with satisfaction of their desires
s_uc_h~_s_ regognitiorl, Thi~_deVel()Qm~Qt ful~l.~ tb_~ gesire te>. be. recognised as free
and equal participants in the activities surrounding daily life.
4.3.1.1 Point of Departure: Liberal Democracy
Fukuyama declares that liberal democracy is a triumphant ideology that has
brought a miracle to the whole world. It has made it possible at last for the human
race to satisfy the desire for recognition and thereby to achieve happiness. A
closer look at his view of liberal democracy shows that Fukuyama (1992:42-44),
following Sutton (1937:258) separates liberalism from democracy, arguing that the
two are theoretically different concepts although closely related. According to
Sutton (1937:258), it was only later that these two concepts were combined to form
"liberal democracy" - which he views as a special product of the French
Revolution. Fukuyama (1992:44-45) appears to agree with this view, as he argues
that it is possible for a country to be democratic without being liberal. This is
because formal democracy alone does not guarantee equal participation and the
protection of minority rights by the rule of law. In this regard, Fukuyama (1992:44)
quotes the cases of eighteenth century Britain and the Islamic Republic of Iran, in
the time of the Shah.
Fukuyama (1992:43-45) appears to understand liberalism as having two
aspects: political and economic. Politically, liberalism is seen as "the rule of law
that recognizes certain individual rights or freedoms from government control"
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(Fukuyama, 1992:42). Economically, liberalism is seen as "the recognition of the
right of free economic activity and economic exchange based on private property
and markets" (Fukuyama, 1992:44). By democracy he means "the right held
universally by all citizens to have a share of political power, that is, the right of all
citizens to' vote and--participate-inpolities"- (Fukuyama, 1992:43}.-ACE;ording to
Fukuyama (1992:43) a country is considered democratic if it gives its citizens the
right to elect their own government "through periodic, secret-ballot, multi-party
elections, on the basis of universal and equal adult suffrage." Of course,
Fukuyama (1992:43) acknowledges that formal democracy does not guarantee
that there will be equal participation by the citizens and respect of citizens' rights.
This is because democratic principles can be manipulated by elites, so that
government seems to be a true reflection of the will of the people, while in fact not
beingthataLall This_ha_$ res!.Jlted in thedistinctign between "formal" democracy
and "substantive" democracy. The former refers to the provision of "real
institutional safeguards against dictatorship," while the latter refers to the
justification of democratic practice by a political party or government in the name of
the people - resulting in party dictatorship - a case in point is Lenin and the
Bolshevik party in the then Soviet Union.
Emerging from the intellectual, political and economic debates on the
general idea of liberalism are the inseparable coupling of two distinguishable
ideas: liberal democracy (political liberalism - polity) and neo-liberalism (economic
liberalism - market economy). This also holds for Fukuyama's conception of
liberalism. Neo-liberalism is characterized by economization. This means that
everything is subjected to the laws of the market, whose most prominent law is that
of free competition.
There is a synergy between liberal democracy and neo-liberalism
(capitalism) - they both need each other. Fukuyama (1995: 11) explains this
synergy based on the view that "the liberal democracy that emerges at the end of
history is therefore not entirely 'modern, '" rather it is that kind of democracy which
should coexist and function properly with capitalism. This is because, according to
his (Fukuyama, 1995:353) argument: "Liberal democracy and capitalism remain
the essential, indeed the only framework for the political and economic
organization of modern societies." For the two to function properly, the institutions
of liberal democracy and capitalism "must coexist with certain premodern cultural
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habits that ensure their proper functioning" (Fukuyama, 1995:11). These cultural
habits entail law, contract, and economic rationality that are in turn "leavened with
reciprocity, moral obligation, duty toward community and trust" (Fukuyama,
1995:11).
~--- -- -According to Fukuyama (1995:38), the American, (and/or Western)
"preference for liberal democracy and free markets" is a matter of ideology rather
than cUlture; although there is a cultural attribute at the root of liberal democracy.
By culture Fukuyama (1995:38) refers to an "ethical or moral habit" that might have
begun as a "rational choice". For instance the preference for "democracy and free
markets" by Americans is a 'rational choice' that has become one of their cultural
roots for their "general upbringing" (Fukuyama, 1995:38). This is mostly
characterized by individualism.
4.3.1.2 Human Beings Desire Recognition
Fukuyama (1992, 1995, 1999) claims that there is a part of the human SOUl29 called
thymos30 that has been known to Western thought since time immemorial. Thymos
strives for recognition, just as reason strives for knowledge and the appetites strive
for the satisfaction of animal desires. Claiming to follow Hegel, Fukuyama argues
that this craving for recognition emanating from thymos is the "driving force of
history." Fukuyama (1992: 162) argues that Hegel did not invent the concept
underpinning the idea of recognition. It originated in the Western mind a very long
time ago and has been know by many different terms. He writes:
Over the millennia, there has been no consistent word used to refer to the
psychological phenomenon of the "desire for recognition": Plato spoke of thymos,
or "spiritedness", Machiavelli of man's desire for glory, Hobbes of his pride or
vainglory, Rousseau of his amour-propre, Alexander Hamilton of the love of fame
and James Madison of ambition, Hegel of recognition, and Nietzsche of man as the
"beast with red cheeks". All of these terms refer to that part of man which feels the
need to place value on things - himself in the first instance, but on the people,
29 Fukuyama draws on the Socratic-Platonic tripartite conception of the soul - reason, spiritedness
(emotio.n), and appetites (or desires) - that is expounded in Plato's Republic (Book IV). In the
R~~ub"c t~e three parts of the soul strive for various things: reason strives for knowledge, the
spirited stnves for honour and prestige, and the appetite (or desire) strives for satisfaction of the
desires or things of the body.
30 According ~o FUkuy~m~ (19.92:162-163), the Greek term thymos means "spiritedness." It is part
of the Socratic-Platonic tripartite conception of the soul.
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actions, or things around him as well. It is the part of the personality which is the
fundamental source of the emotions of pride, anger, and shame, and is not
reducible to desire, on the one hand, or reason on the other. The drive for
recognition is the most specifically political part of the human personality because it
is what drives men to want to assert themselves over other men and thereby into
Kafit's-torfditionbf"asocialsociability" (Fukuyama, 1992:162-163) ~
Singling out "Hegel-as-interpreted-by-Kojeve" whose method of interpreting history
he follows, Fukuyama (1992: 165) argues that Plato's thymos forms the
psychological basis of Hegel's idea of the human desire for recognition. It is
important to analyse the concept of thymos. In the first place, Fukuyama
distinguishes thymos from recognition. He writes:
Thymos and the "desire for recognition" differ somewhat insofar as the former
... -refers la a partofthe soul that invests objects with value, whereas the latter is an
activity of thymos that demands that another consciousness share the same
valuation. It is possible for one to feel thymotic pride in oneself without demanding
recognition. But esteem is not a "thing" like an apple or a Porsche: it is a state of
consciousness, and to have subjective certainty about one's own sense of worth, it
must be recognised by another consciousness. Thus thymos typically, but not
inevitably, drives men to seek recognition." (Fukuyama, 1992:165-166).
Furthermore, desire for recognition emerges from thymos as a "deeply paradoxical
phenomenon": it is the psychological basis for "justice and selflessness while at the
same time being closely related to selfishness" (Fukuyama, 1992:172). A further
distinction is that
The thymotic self demands recognition for its own sense of the worthiness of things
both of itself and of other people. The desire for recognition remains a form of self-
assertion, a projection of one's own values on the outside world, and gives rise to
feelings of anger when those values are not recognized by other people.
Thymos as an evaluation of one's self-worthiness leads one to demand
recognition. If this fails to happen, life is characterised by constant disagreements,
arguments and increasing anger that can overwhelm all possible relationships. In
The Great Disruption, Fukuyama (1999:228) argues that the quest for due status is
inbuilt. He writes:
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The desire for recognition - of one's own status and the status of one's gods,
country, ethnicity, nationality, ideas, and so forth - is the central driving force
behind political life. The feeling of pride occurs when one is recognized as having
the appropriate status, while anger results from inadequate recognition. These
~_._-- -
emotions are inherently social: when one feels anger at a lack of recognition, one
does not want a material object outside the body; rather, one wants evidence of a
mental state - recognition - on the part of another subjective consciousness
(Fukuyama, 1999:228).
It follows that a thymotic person displays the passion of anger, leading them to get
into a vicious circle of "fighting wars over the recognition of national or religious
identity ... engaging in retaliatory spirals of violence ... " (Fukuyama, 1999:228; Cf.
Fukuyama, 1992:181-182). The thymotic desire for recognition thus becomes a
--------_ .. _--
source of human conflict (Fukuyama, 1992:182). Inherent in the thymotic:temdency
is each individual's expectation to be more highly evaluated than others.
Fukuyama (1992:182) calls it mega/othymia. He describes it as "a highly
problematic passion for political life" in which recognition of one's superiority by
others leads to the demand for further recognition or universal recognition leading
to the desire for glory (Fukuyama, 1992:182-183). This can result in a tyrannical
intention, displayed in the ambition to achieve universal recognition through
conquest or oppression.
The opposite of mega/othymia is isothymia. Fukuyama (1992:190)
describes isothymia as an "all-pervasive ... desire to be recognized as the equal of
other people." These three concepts seem to form a triadic framework: thymos-
mega/othymia-isothymia. Fukuyama suggests that isothymia can only function in a
situation that places mutuality at the centre - thus mutual respect, or mutual
recognition. Such a situation demands a framework of governance that is
conducive to a good political order; for Fukuyama, as we have seen liberal
democracy is the best candidate.
However Fukuyama (1992:314-318) warns that although liberal democracy
can, in time, purge mega/othymia, unbridled mega/othymia or isothymia can
internally subvert liberal democracy. Whilst mega/othymia is "a necessary
precondition of life" to initiate recognition, as a "morally ambiguous phenomenon"
of good and bad composition, its excess leads to domination and inequality. These
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excesses can bring about an end to democracy, although it is important to
remember that megalothymia also plays a central role in capitalism. Fukuyama
(1992:314-315) also points out that excessive isothymia, leads to a "fanatical
desire for equal recognition" that seeks to eliminate any manifestation of unequal
recognition - undercutting the basis of modern-economic life, competition.
For Fukuyama, the idea of the desire for recognition originates from the
"Lordship and Bondage" section of Hegel's Phenomenology (Compare Chapter 3
of this thesis above). Unequal recognition occurs when the master desires
recognition from the slave. In the process the slave reacts by risking his life to fight
back for the master to recognize his (the slave's) values such as freedom and
thereby recognition.
Blunden (2003), criticizing Fukuyama's view of recognition, claims that the
idea of r~cognition in. Heg_E?I'~J2bltQ_§9P_h)/_i§__rl9!J?S?li~i~~I_irl_nl"l~tl.J~~ tie revisits
Hegel's early publications, such as System of Ethical Life (1802/3), Realpolitik, and
the Phenomenology of Spirit in order to show that Fukuyama's interpretation of
Hegel is flawed.
In an overview of Hegel's early publications Blunden (2003) concludes that
the struggle for recognition in Hegel begins as a market idea and relates to
property ownership. There is no "part of the soul" in Hegel's philosophy that
houses the "desire for recognition." Recognition initially emerges in the second
level in Hegel's Systems of Ethical Life - especially the philosophy of "Absolute
Ethical Life" with "property rights" - and also manifests itself in the discourse of
"the rule of law." It does not emerge from the "Lordship and Bondage" section of
Hegel's Phenomenology. In attempting to prove Fukuyama wrong, Blunden (2003)
cites a passage in the Systems of Ethical Life that refers to the theme of "Lordship
and Bondage." He argues that the idea of recognition does not arise from some
innate drive to dominate others. The passage he quotes is the following:
At this level a living individual confronts a living individual, but their power of life is
unequal. Thus one is might or power over the other. One is in indifference, while
the other is fixed in difference. So the former is related to the latter as cause;
indifferent itself, it is the latter's life and soul or spirit. The greater strength or
weakness is nothing but the fact that one of them is caught up in difference, fixed
and determined in some way in which the other is not, but is free. The indifference
of the one not free is his inner being, his formal aspect, not something that has
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become explicit and that annihilates his difference. Yet this indifference must be
there for him; it is his concealed inner life and on this account he intuits it as its
opposite, namely, as something external, and the identity is a relative one, not an
absolute one or a reconciliation of internal and external. This relation in which the
indifferent and free has power over the different is the relation of lordship and
bondage. This relation is immediately and absolutely established along with the
.. -- ----
inequality of the power of life. At this point there is no question of any right or any
necessary equality. Equality is nothing but an abstraction - it is the formal thought
of life, of the first level, and this thought is purely ideal and without reality. In reality,
on the other hand, it is the inequality of life which is established, and therefore the
relation of lordship and bondage (Blunden, 2003; Hegel, 1979, Cf. Hegel,
1977:113-119).
Blunden argues that the section that Fukuyama chose to be the source of the idea
of re~~gnitism, "'Lordship and Bondage' arises as a result of inequality which is a
necessary product of the action of the market." He continues,
The market first establishes the recognition of individuals through the universal
exchange of labour, giving people potential freedom, but then, through inequality of
wealth, introduces the division between the rich and the poor (Blunden, 2003).
Blunden (2003) maintains that "people's animal nature is ever-present but human
traits such as the desire for recognition, a sense of honour and justice, arise out of
specific social conditions and are manifested in and through ethical life." He takes
the "Lordship and Bondage" passage as Hegel's attempt to address fundamental
philosophical and ethical problems by describing "necessary and actual forms of
social life." This is because social life and government are manifestations of
human spirit in which Hegel participates (Blunden, 2003). So contrary to
Fukuyama's view of recognition, Blunden (2003) contends:
Recognition is above all property rights. The "struggle for recognition" associated
with "Lordship and Bondage" is a passing, negative phase, following the
breakdown of the natural order before the establishment of the rule of law in which
property is protected by law and constitutes "abstract right". It is sublated, and
remains as a moment of modern ethical life in the functions of policing, education
and military training, and the virtues of justice, honour and courage, Le., the on-
going need to stave off havoc.
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However, Blunden (2003) concedes that "insofar as havoc reigns, recognition is a
real, material need, for without recognition of one's basic rights, every threat is
potentially absolute." Hegel (1979) argues that people who feel that they are not
recognized may gain their recognition through war or colonialism. Defence of one's
--honour is the fear of-potential loss of-everythin§. Hence for Hegel, "the struggle for
recognition and honour are phenomena characterising the denial of rights in
modernity" (Blunden, 2003).
Blunden (2003) argues that "it is undeniable that in the modern human
being, the desire for recognition goes way beyond the need to have their property
rights defended by the rule of law." Furthermore, the idea of the desire for
recognition "has been cultivated by the conditions of modern life, [it is] not an
innate, primeval drive" as claimed by Fukuyama (Blunden, 2003). People are
__~IQ§ely_colJ_lJ~c;ted with nature throughI9~OLJ~' therel:>Y. cj~vel()ping property
ownership as a pressing need for the preservation of life. Ownership without
recognition of property rights renders one vulnerable to actual or potential loss of
everything accumulated. Consequently, there is a need for protecting these
property relations - hence the establishment of government and state for the rule
of law. Blunden (2003) argues that it is these property relations that Fukuyama
misinterpreted and mistook for egotism.
According to Blunden (2003) it is precisely after realising that "the struggle
for recognition is threatening the very fabric of society," that Fukuyama switches
over to trust, the other side of the Hegelian legacy, to moderate the adverse effects
of recognition. The way Fukuyama presents the struggle for recognition carries
with it the connotation that it has gone too far and is undermining trust. Blunden
(2003) identifies an "internal contradiction" built into the Constitution of the
Republic of the United States of America by the "Founding Fathers" - "rights were
only meant for the protection of property, but non-property owners are now
demanding recognition."
The crucial question that Blunden (2003) asks is: "What is the relationship
between Trust and Recognition?" Blunden takes us back to Hegel to search for
some answers. He believes that Fukuyama led us to misunderstand the
significance of the term recognition. As for trust, Blunden (2003) discusses Hegel's
critique of Rousseau's and Hobbes' conception of the state. Hegel dismisses
Hobbes' state as a complete stranger to society, "standing above it as the
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universal policeman." Rousseau's social contract is just as fictitious - "at best a
metaphor." This is because an individuals' fundamental need - his or her own will
- is not recognised in society and in the state. Such recognition can only be
attained via mediation, and "mediation is Trust." This creates a triangular
relationship- apartfromyotland me "there must be-awe"-(Blunden, 2003). This
triadic framework of relationships can only be realised through a system of
participation in voluntary organisations that mediate between citizen and state. In
that way, trust becomes the means by which recognition is achieved, and vice
versa - creating the basis on which "universal self-consciousness" or rationality is
founded (Blunden, 2003).
(b) Mutual Recognition in Fukuyama'5 Liberal State
Mutual recognition was an important step on the way to Hegel's teleological goal _
"a political community of Right characterized by the existence of the absolute Idea"
(which is a complete "individuated conception of the life of the volk community")
(Decker, 2001 :301-302). Decker (2001 :301) comments that the involvement of free
and equal individuals in a struggle for honour
is what makes recognition a desirable goal in Hegel's system and what underpins
the normativity of absolute ethical life qua political community as a preferable end-
state.
Reciprocal recognition takes place when there is mutuality among individuals.
Relations of recognition are the key to the development of a political community _
making it the core of Hegel's political philosophy.
For Sembou (2003:262) the concept "struggle for recognition" refers to the
striving of individuals to achieve recognition of their identity from other free
individuals "through self-assertion, self-negation, and redefinition of oneself in
relation to any other" - thus making it an inter-subjective state. In the same vein,
Honneth (1995:5) views the Hegelian idea of a struggle for recognition as "a
struggle among subjects for the mutual recognition of their identity." It is a process
that generates inner-societal pressure toward the pragmatic and political
"establishment of institutions that would guarantee freedom" (Honneth, 1995:5).
Like Blunden, Honneth (1995: 17) argues that it is in the Systems of Ethical Life
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that Hegel "modified the concept of the social struggle" which he appropriated from
Fichte's theory of recognition that signifies relations by "the dialectical movement
of the self."
The idea of a political community in which individuals recognize each
other's rights ~and praGlicall-y--e*perieRce- tolerance· of coexistence is the idea that
encapsulates the whole of Fukuyama's philosophy of history. This community must
be achieved at the end of history. The whole vision of a 'folk community' leads to a
number of problems that are often encountered in discussions on liberal
democracy, with Fukuyama being no exception. I will just discuss the basic three:
• The first problem emerges from Fukuyama's central claim that mutual
recognition was satisfied by the triumphant emergence of liberal democracy.
The Ji.@! i?_c.~nt~9C!i_~t~cJ_byth~systematic ~ailLJre of liberalism to satisfy the
human desire for mutual and reciprocal recognition. This is manifested in
social inequalities that continue to exist, where one group hates and
humiliates the other - like in the cases of the Spanish and French citizens
against the Moroccans, Algerians and other Francophone·citizens. It seems
there is nothing in liberal democracy that guarantees the reduction of such
longstanding social inequalities. Fukuyama. himself declares that liberal
democracy does not work where its cultural preconditions have not been
met - this will be discussed further in the following chapter. According to
The Columbia Encyclopaedia (2001 ),
In Great Britain and the United States the classic liberal program, including the
principles of representative government, the protection of civil liberties, and laissez-
faire economics, had been more or less effected by the mid-19th cent. The growth
of industrial society, however, soon produced great inequalities in wealth and
power, which led many persons, especially workers, to question the liberal creed. It
was in reaction to the failure of liberalism to provide a good life for everyone that
workers' movements and Marxism rose. Because liberalism is concerned with
liberating the individual, however, its doctrines changed with the change in historical
realities.
The co-existence of many value systems led to the advent of
multiculturalism. Consequently liberalism cannot advance any moral
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argument, because there is no common moral perspective about how things
should be. Economic liberalism as a result has nothing to do with ethics.
• The second problem is that neo-liberalism, instead of bettering life for the
poor and the economically dispossessed in developing countries, has
widenedthe-gap between the rich -and the poor by creating competition for
scarce resources which the ordinary person cannot afford. Since there is no
room for state intervention the market conditions of operation will in most
cases favour the rich. Fukuyama is correct to notice that classical
economics - which is the basis of neoliberalism - did not have room for
ethics. Many countries of the developing regions of the world that have
embraced liberal democracy have been experiencing economic hardships.
It is common knowledge that in the 19th century European socialism
emerged as a critique of the prevailing politico-economic system of the day
- causing people to perceive liberalism to have failed to live up to its
promise to achieve welfare services for all. As a result, the gap between the
rich and the poor also widened; socialists blamed this on the free-market
economy. It has also become common knowledge that in the developing
world similar events are taking place, with the state elite leading their
citizens into embracing liberal democracy. In most cases it is implemented
with the promise that if the national government deregulates its national
markets, investors in the form of transnational corporate groups will come to
invest. If it happens that the investors come, in most cases it benefits the
elites who negotiate with the transnational corporate groups. The
transnational companies that come to invest will in most cases not intend to
get business opportunities on easy terms - hence they favour liberal
economic policies. Fukuyama does give this problem any serious attention.
• The third problem is that liberal democracy has promoted a kind of war
between the individual and the community. The individual, in fighting for
recognition, has to rebel against the moral codes of the community. Like
any ideological framework, liberal democracy is rooted in certain cultural
habits such as respect for the rights of individuals, the rule of law, and free
market exchange. Its emergence brings with it excessive individualism, that
seeks demands acceptance by the community. But FUkuyama forgets that
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there are other communities where the individual is highly connected to his
community and can only be understood within that context.
Fukuyama's adoption of Nietzsche's idea of the "last man," leads us to ask: "Will
'the lasnnan'-bes-ati-sfied-with-univers-al andmuttJal recognition, since he fights to
overcome communal life and its slavish morality?" This question implies that there
is a side to the person that remains unfulfilled by what Fukuyama (1992:xxii-xxiii)
calls the "peace and prosperity of contemporary liberal democracy." "Could
Fukuyama perhaps accept a communitarian way out of this problem?" asks Fisk
(2003). In The Great Disruption Fukuyama indicates that the community will
triumph over excessive individualism through liberal democracy.
Cox (2003) concedes that Fukuyama makes a good point when he argues
that~Lib_eraLde_mQcracy b_ec9me~ a meClns for the worlc;i peace" that will bring us to
a point of universal recognition. However, Cox (2003) argues:
if a Liberal Democracy cannot govern itself through mutual trust, it cannot last. If
Liberal Democracy is 'The End of History', it must be accompanied by a moral code
for it to succeed. Otherwise, the state will have to provide one for society. Then it
ceases to be a Liberal Democracy.
The question of trust is a thorny one and very difficult to answer in terms of
practice. Parties to the deal of reciprocal recognition do not always negotiate with
good faith but with suspicion and the fear of being cheated. One party often ends
up under the control of the other - resulting in cultural and moral impositions. The
question of a moral code leads to the question: Whose moral code? Liberal
democracy is deeply indebted to the ideas and cultural habits of the European
Enlightenment which involved reducing cultural variations in an attempt to create a
common European political and economic culture. It has already been shown in
the previous chapters of this thesis that Fukuyama's claim could not have survived
without the cultural foundation provided by his philosophical antecedents in
seventeenth and nineteenth century' European ideas. This is because the
European Enlightenment period laid the foundation for the liberal democratic
conceptualization of political needs characterized by the principles of consensus,
freedom, equality, and toleration. Fukuyama's idea of recognition in a liberal
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society involves the issue of the distribution of recognition - hence the question: Is
recognition equitably distributable?
(c) Recognition and Distribution
In Trust Fukuyama (1995:358) argues that rational desire was fulfilled in human
history when "human beings sought to satisfy their material needs through the
accumulation of wealth." However we should understand that because economic
life is pursued not simply for the sake of accumulating wealth, "but also for the
sake of recognition," thereby forging an inescapable interdependence of capitalism
and liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 1995:359). If the goal of liberal democracy is to
fulfil the desire for recognition, the question is, how does liberalism equally
dLsJrib_ytEt r_eQQgQili9!J_-:- J:e~_LJlting iQ mutu_~1 qr rElciproc91re<;.0_9rlJtion?
From another angle, but still dealing with the idea of recognition, Fraser
(2002:22) sees the world of progressive politics as split into two camps, the
proponents of redistribution on one side, and the proponents of recognition on the
other. The former camp draws from egalitarian, labour and socialist traditions,
while the latter draws from the "new visions of a 'difference-friendly' society"
(Fraser, 2002:22). At the same time Fraser (2002) tries to link recognition, which
comes from the context of Hegelian community ethics, to distributive justice which
comes from the context of Kantian deontological morality. The latter has to do with
judgments concerning justice as fairness that "seek to eliminate unjustified
disparities between the life-chances of social actors", while the former deals with
"the value of various practices, traits and identities" - creating the question of
identity versus status (Fraser, 2002). Attempting to integrate recognition and
distribution is difficult: given the divide by which political philosophy is generally
Characterized, distribution is confined to the morality side of the divide while
recognition is on the other side. Fraser (2002) points out that in terms of "the
standard identity model" it is group-specific cultural identity that demands
recognition. She (Fraser, 2002:24) rejects the identity model of recognition
because of its reification of culture as an "authentic, self-affirming and self-
generated collective identity" that exerts moral pressure on an individual "to
confirm to group culture."
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In contrast to the proponents of the identity model, Fraser (2002)
approaches recognition as an issue of "social status." She argues that "what
requires recognition is not group-specific identity but rather the status of group
members as full partners in social interaction" - whereby misrecognized members
of the community- -are---accorded-full- member-ship of society and recognised as
"capable of participating on a par with other members" (Fraser, 2002:24). What
Fraser tries to do is integrate recognition and equitable distribution. She writes:
To view recognition as a matter of status is to examine institutionalized patterns of
cultural value for their effects on the relative standing of social actors. If and when
such patterns constitute actors as peers, capable of participating on a par with one
another in social life, then we can speak of reciprocal recognition and status
equality. When, in contrast, institutionalized patterns of cultural value constitute
_someactors as infertQr, excluged, whQlly()ther or si l11Ply invi~ible, hence ~s less
than full partners in social interaction, then we should speak of misrecognition and
status subordination (Fraser, 2002:24).
What Fraser (2002) is advocating here is that the theory of justice should extend
"beyond the distribution of rights and goods to examine institutionalized patterns of
cultural value" and proceed to conceive of recognition as "a matter of status
equality, defined in turn as participatory parity" - giving a deontological explanation
of recognition. In other words, the distribution of recognition should be a reciprocal
act based on an individual obligation to maintain others' dignity, according due
respect to their humanity. In this way Fraser tries to integrate the egalitarian
politics of redistribution and the politics of recognition in order to overcome
philosophical schizophrenia or what she calls "unending dichotomies." To
contextualise this in terms of Fukuyama's thesis, recognition should be a matter of
justice for all, and not the promotion of cronyism, which some see as implied in his
concepts of social capital and trust. It has been shown in the previous chapter that
trust networks happen within groups of people who have common ties.
Honneth (2002:43) argues that there is a "guiding principle of a normative
theory of the political order" based on the imperative that "any form of social or
economic inequality that cannot be justified on rational grounds" should be
removed. Eradication of social or economic inequality implies distributive justice.
Unlike Fraser who distinguishes between recognition (Hegelian ethics) and
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distribution (Kantian deontological morality) Honneth (2002:44) makes a distinction
between the concept of recognition (Hegelian ethics) and the concept of respect
(Kantian morality) which he however views as complementary. The former refers
to one's need to be understood in his singularity as a particular subject (Lash &
Featherstone, 2002:4). The latter has to do with dignity. One wants to be treated
like any other subject; that is as an autonomous individual and as having certain
universal rights.
Fukuyama claims that this consciousness of one's dignity and the desire to
be respected are fulfilled by liberal democracy. But Fukuyama does not say how
the distribution of recognition is going to take place. He seems to presuppose that
the arrival of liberal democracy will automatically ushering in of equality in all
aspects of life.
4.3.2 Sen: "Democracy as a Universal Value" Satisfies the Desire for Well-
being
It is not clear whether Sen's view of democracy agrees with that of Fukuyama.
Fukuyama talks of "liberal democracy" while Sen talks about "democracy" and
never refers directly to 'liberal democracy.' According to Heywood (2000) liberal
democracy is a form or system of government while democracy is a political value.
Sen does not give any reason why he chooses not to refer to liberal democracy.
However, in essence his idea of democracy seems to agree with that of
Fukuyama. Hence his assertion that democracy's "gradual and ultimate triumphant
emergence as a working system of governance" has made itself relevant and
applicable to any nation, whether in Africa, Asia, Europe, or America (Sen,
1999a:4). Jorgenson (2000) concludes that the substantial freedom, propounded
by Sen, "is an integrated part of a liberal democracy in the sense that substantial
freedom can be seen as the opportunities and the fulfilment of expectations of the
citizens, i.e. the political culture of a liberal democracy."
Sen concedes that as a universal political commitment, democracy "is quite
new, and it is quintessentially a product of the twentieth century" (Sen, 1999a:4).
Like Fukuyama, Sen (1999a:4) becomes teleological when he claims that "we
have at last reached the point of recognizing that the coverage of universality, like
the quality of mercy, is not strained." Furthermore, Sen (1999a:5) does not
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overlook or deny the existence of "challenges to democracy's claim to universality."
Sen (1999a:5) disassociates himself from nineteenth century theorists of
democracy who find it "quite natural to discuss whether one country or another
was 'fit for democracy.'" He also dismisses the question of determining which
country should be democratic, arguing-that-"a-country does-not have-tobe deemed
fit for democracy, rather it has to become fit through democracy" (Sen, 1999a:4). In
a "Round table" discussion hosted by Asiaweek (1999) Sen is quoted as arguing
that the rise and establishment of democracy as a "'normal' form of government to
which any nation is entitled" should be granted without establishing afresh whether
the nation is "ready for democracy."
Sen (1999b) points out that there is an implicit tendency in America and
Europe to assume that the primacy of political freedom and democracy is a
fundamentaL.and.ancient feature of W.§!§lern culture -91l~ not to b~ found
anywhere else in the world. This is magnified in the Western arrogance of trying to
determine whether or not a country deserves the title 'fit or ready for being
democratic.' Furthermore, he criticises those who 'promote the spread of
democracy' in non-Western countries for often seeing themselves "as bringing
Occidental values to Asia and Africa" (Sen, 1999b:232). As a result the non-
Western world is invited to be part of the "Western democracy club" and "to admire
and endorse traditional Western values" (Sen, 1999b:233). Fukuyama (1992)
claims the universality of Western traditional values through liberal democracy -
especially the virtue of tolerance, but Sen (1999b:244-248) disputes this by
indicating that the virtue of tolerance existed in Asian cultures before the arrival of
Christianity. Instead Sen argues for valuing the primacy of freedom.
4.3.2.1 The Primacy of Freedom
Sen (1987) argues that freedom is the fundamental, dominant and ultimate value
for judging the satisfaction of human need - not, as Fukuyama would have it, the
human desire for well-being. He argues that freedom is primary, and that well-
being is built on the basis of freedom (Sen, 1989). For Sen (1992) satisfaction is
inseparable from freedom because it underpins the realisation of the elements of
well-being - in terms of its functions and capabilities.
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In Development as Freedom Sen (1999b) asserts that freedom plays three
basic roles in human life, namely, a constitutive role, a constructive role, and an
instrumental role. Sen (1999b:6-7, 17) holds that freedom plays a constitutive role
in the political and civil engagements in all human life activities. Furthermore, Sen
(1999b: 17) says that freedom ·"involves both-the proeesses that- allow freedom of
actions and decisions, and the actual opportunities that people have, given their
personal and social circumstance." Freedom fundamentally underpins our sense of
security in political and economic participation, and civil rights. A major argument
"in favour of political freedom ... lies in the opportunity it gives citizens to discuss
and debate - and to participate in the selection of - values in the choice of
priorities" (Sen, 1999b:30). To Jorgensen (2000) the distinction between
opportunity and participation is worth mentioning because "participation requires
kOQwledgecmd basic educational skills." That is to say, to deny any person or
group in society the opportunity of schooling directly contradicts participatory
freedom (Jorgensen, 2000; Cf. Sen, 1999b:32).
Concerning its constructive role, freedom helps people to conceptualise and
comprehend their economic needs (i.e. their content and their force) through open
discussion, debate, criticism and dissent. This exchange enhances "the process of
generating informed and reflected choices" (Sen, 1999b:148, 153). According to
Sen (1999b) this process is crucial to the formulation of values and priorities.
Underpinning the constructive role of freedom is the idea of tolerance that carries
with it the possibility of dialogue and the exchange of ideas with an intention to
assess political and economic problems.
In its instrumental role, Sen (1999b:38-53) asserts that freedom includes
distinct, interconnected, and complementary components such as economic
facilities, political freedoms, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and
protective security. Sen (1999b:38-53) discusses how these components work
when they are applied to the general capability of a person:
• Political freedoms refer to the opportunities that people have to choose who
should govern them on the basis of some principles that will allow them "to
scrutinize and criticize the authorities" as an expression of their political
freedoms and entitlements that are associated with the broad meaning of
democracy.
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• The economic facilities component refers to common economic goods
available for people to use for consumption, production or exchange.
• Social opporlunities are the arrangements put in place by a society to
provide services in education, health, etc.
• Transparen-cy--gaarantees include the- presumption that society --should
operate on the basis of trust, so that people can expect openness - that is
"the freedom to deal with one another under guarantees of disclosure and
lucidity" (Sen, 1999b:39-40)
What this means is that inasmuch as freedom plays an instrumental role, it blocks
the human inclination to "corruption, financial irresponsibility and underhand
dealings" (Sen, 1999b:40).
__ _____However,atJh_e"HQundta_ble"dtsc!.JsSigO .OD clOagE309i:lJ9Lc0C3nge in Asia,
recorded in Asiaweek (1999), Sen's position did not go unchallenged. The former
Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro warned in response to Sen, against
too radical "a swing toward freedom" (Asiaweek, 1999). The ex-Prime Minister is
quoted as saying, "Overemphasis on democracy has the danger of causing
disorder ... and overemphasis on market economy may destroy a nation's culture
while stressing efficiency" (Asiaweek, 1999). Sen shared Yasuhiro's concern
regarding "over profit-oriented free enterprise with no sense of social responsibility"
(Asiaweek, 1999). The ex-Prime Minister agreed that "greater freedom and
openness is the direction Asia is headed, even in countries where strong
government has worked" (Asiaweek, 1999). He added that "once development is
accomplished, democracy should replace authoritarianism" (Asiaweek, 1999). The
ex-Prime Minister illustrated his argument by pointing to the economic and political
history of South Korea and Taiwan "where middle-class citizens played main roles
in leading the shift" (Asiaweek, 1999).
For Sen democracy as a universal value helps all nations to fulfil their
potential by conceptualising political and economic needs that hinder their well-
being by not being met. Sen's view of democracy is instrumental, as Asiaweek
(1999) puts it: "political and civil rights give people the opportunity to draw attention
forcefully to general needs and demand public action" for them to achieve well-
being.
170
4.3.2.2 The Human Need for Well-being
Sen rejects the idea of equating well-being with desire-fulfilment as does
Fukuyama. Fukuyama equates well-being with the satisfaction of the desire for
recognition. In contrast to Fukuyama's position,-Sen concentrates on the
satisfaction of the human need for well-being rather than on the human desire for
recognition. This does not mean that Sen has nothing to say about recognition and
Fukuyama nothing to say about well-being. The difference is that Fukuyama thinks
that if recognition and affirmation of one's rights and freedom are fulfilled, then a
person's total well-being is achieved. On the other side, Sen holds that complete
well-being is achieved only when one has the freedom to choose what one values
and the freedom to pursue what one values.
..._._._._.,. Wi/J.C3f9lJE3 that $en conceives of well-being in terms of the fulfilment of
economic needs and the realization of political freedoms. In the next section we
will examine Sen's theory of basic needs and compare it in passing with the desire
theory (which is a frequent feature in most discussions on the concept of well-
being). Some scholars are in favour of a third theory, based on the idea of interest.
We will not discuss it separately here as it seems to be part of the desire theory.
(a) The Concept of Well-being
Sen conceives well-being as being and doing. One's well-being "is seen in terms of
the quality (or 'well-ness') of a person's being" (which is viewed as worth pursuing)
(Sen, 1992:38). To achieve well-being demands a context of freedom. It is a
measure of the actual and potential quality of existence that encompasses both the
achievements of an individual and "opportunities in the context of his or her
personal advantage" (choices that he or she enjoys) (Sen, 1987:58-59).
According to Griffin (1986:40), the application of the concept of well-being in
moral theory implies the notion of need31 more than desire theory.32 The notion of
31 The notion of basic need falls in the category of objective theories (or accounts) of well-being _ a
view that basic needs are "needs for the all-purpose means to whatever ends different individuals
may choose ... " and it connects with "ends that we do not choose" (Griffin, 1986:40-55; Cf. Sumner
1999:53-60). '
32 According to Crisp (2001) desire theory mainly consists of three versions, namely, present desire
theory, comprehensive desire theory, and informed desire theory. The present desire version refers
to the idea that one "is .made ?etter off to the extent that his current desires are fulfilled" (Crisp,
2001). The comprehensIVe desire theory carries the idea that what matters most to a person's well-
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basic needs focuses on "the vital interests, the basic needs, and the central human
concerns that create obligations" (Griffin, 1986:40). It is on the basis of the
obligatory aspect of the notion of basic needs that Griffin (1986:42) defines well-
being or "at least that conception of it to be used as the interpersonal measure for
moral judgment, as the level- to which basic needs- are met." The notion of basic
needs characterises the conditions of human existence and context.
Griffin (1986:41) argues that "needs are not a sub-class of desires" but
rather to some extent, vice versa. His lexical distinction of the two notions shows
that the term "need" is not an intentional verb - it is not attached to subjects of
experience (Griffin, 1986:41; ef. Sumner, 1999:53). The term "desire" is intentional
and is attached to subjects of experience (Griffin, 1986:41; cf. Sumner, 1999:53).
However, Griffin (1986:41-42) distinguishes between two categories of
_n~~_d~: on Joe _.oD? hand there are instrumental needs - needs that .,!,e have
because of what we choose; on the other hand there are basic needs - needs we
have by virtue of our existence. These are the needs corresponding to Sen's basic
needs that lead to well-being. Our conditions of human existence dictate basic
needs such as food, shelter and clothing for us to survive. He further distinguishes
the two by claiming that instrumental needs do not have moral weight, while basic
needs by virtue of their being fundamental, are normative. The normative weight of
a basic need strongly links it to some obligation - one's suffering makes a claim on
others. Basic needs tend to be interdependent. This also marks a big difference
between basic needs and Fukuyama's desire for recognition. Desire for recognition
mostly relates to one's personal context - hence emphasizing this desire will foster
individualism more strongly than emphasizing basic needs.
Sumner (1999:123) argues that unlike the notion of basic needs in "which
the sources of our well-being are dictated by unalterable aspects of our nature, the
desire theory offers us the more flattering picture of ourselves as shapers of our
own destinies, determiners of our own good." This makes the desire theory in tune
with the spirit of liberal democracy's "virtues of self-direction and self-
determination" that centre on liberal individualism (Sumner, 1999:123). It follows
being is the overall level of desire-satisfaction in a person's life as a whole - summatively "the more
the desire-fulfilment in life the better" (Crisp, 2001). The informed desire refers to the notion that the
be~t life is that one would desire if one was "fully informed about all the (non-evaluative) facts"
(CriSP, 2001). Fukuyama's desire for recognition fIts in the comprehensive desire theory because
once there is mutual recognition in society, the central human expectation - satisfaction - is
achieved.
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that many political liberals advocate the desire theory. However, Sumner
(1999: 132) indicates that the properties of desire - intentionality and prospectivity
_ open a logical gap between desire-satisfaction and well-being, rendering desire-
satisfaction neither logically sufficient nor logically necessary for well-being.
Because desire is future-directe-d (it-focuses on-"anticipation of benefits"-), it can be
frustrated (Sumner, 1999:124, 132). The desire for recognition in Fukuyama would
be frustrated if liberal democracy were to be superseded by another ideology or if
liberal democracy fails to meet its promises. Sen (1987:46) argues against the
sufficiency of desire-fulfilment as a criterion for judging a person's well-being.
While well-being is ultimately a matter of valuation, happiness and desire-fulfilment
may indeed be of value to well-being but according to Sen (1985: 188-189;
1987:46), "they cannot ... adequately reflect the value of well-being." This is
because the_y ar~Lmenlal s1atescmd they "ignore other aspects of a person's well-
being" (Sen, 1985: 188-189).
The rejection of desire theory as a criterion for judging well-being allows the
notion of basic needs to remain as a possible approach to well-being, for it can fill
in the gap and explain why such things like food, shelter and clothing are cardinal
ingredients of our well-being. Sen invokes the theory of basic needs in his
conception of well-being. However he holds that the notion of basic needs can only
be adequate in a democratic situation where an individual has the political freedom
to exercise his economic rights that enable him to identify and conceptualise his
material needs. In addition to the rejection of desire-satisfaction as a criterion in
judging a person's well-being, Sen (1985:187-192; 1987:40-60) discards the idea
of equating well-being with utility, or of equating well-being with the possession of
commodities. He argues that to think of well-being simply in terms of the
commodities that a person possesses is misleading, since it ignores the capability
that an individual has to use those commodities to his own advantage (Nussbaum
& Sen, 1993). Sen thus advocates a middle-of-the-road position that mediates
between the two camps of the Right and Left. All that he does is to argue that need
has a priority over desire. This is because one can arguably live without the
satisfaction of desires, but life is not possible without fulfilling basic needs such as
those for shelter, food, and clothing.
In Sen's (1985: 186-187; 1987:40-41) conception of well-being, that there is
"an essential and irreducible duality" in the way we perceive a person in his/her
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existence - well-being and agency. He argues that "the conception of 'persons' in
moral analysis cannot be so reduced as to attach no intrinsic importance to this
agency role, seeing them ultimately only in terms of their well-being" (Sen,
1985:186). In terms of agency, it is recognising and respecting a person's own life,
"ability to form goals, commitments,and values" (Sen, 1985:186; 1987:41). In
terms of well-being we recognise a person's ability to achieve well-being and
"opportunities in the context of his or her personal advantage" (Sen, 1987:58-59).
Thus a person's well-being is inseparably connected with his agency.
Well-being leads to a distinct and necessary concept of freedom (Sen,
1985). According to Sen (1985:203), this particular type of freedom centres on a
person's "capability to have various functioning vectors and to enjoy the
corresponding well-being achievements." It must be distinguished from the general
CQDc::ept of freedom that relates to the agency aspect of a person. Sen (1985:203-
204; et. 1992:56-57) distinguishes the two in the following manner:
A person's "agency freedom" refers to what the person is free to do and achieve in
pursuit of whatever goals or values he or she regards as important. A person's
agency cannot be understood without taking note of his or her aims, objectives,
allegiances, obligations, and - in a broad sense - the person's conception of the
good. Whereas well-being freedom is freedom to achieve something in particular,
viz, well-being, the idea of agency freedom is more general, since it is not tied to
anyone type of aim. Agency freedom is freedom to achieve whatever the person as
a responsible agent decides he or she should achieve."
The "open conditionality" which is central to the idea of agency freedom
distinguishes it from well-being freedom (Sen, 1985). Sen cautions that the open
conditionality of agency freedom does not imply a Hobbesian state of nature where
individuals are free to fulfil their own desires rather it implies the necessity of a
disciplined, responsible and rational agent. Agency freedom stands for a general
type of freedom that allows one person to achieve any objective, even beyond the
pursuit of well-being, such as the independence of one's country or poverty
alleviation (Sen, 1992:40n, 61-62). Due to its all-inclusive nature, agency freedom
also encompasses inter alia well-being freedom (Sen, 1985; 1992).
Apart from the inseparable connection between agency and well-being, Sen
(1987; 1992) places the notion of functioning at the centre of his account of well-
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being. He defines functioning as anything that an individual can be or do or
achieve - making a functioning the basic feature of well-being (Sen, 1987:59).
Closely linked to functionings is the notion of capability. According to Sen
(1992:40), a capability is "a set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the person's
freedom to lead one type-of life'-or another [of]a--person's freedom to choose from
possible livings." In other words, Sen is saying a capability is a freedom or
opportunity to achieve a functioning - e.g. the ability to choose to eat well or the
ability to choose any kind of work that earns one a salary. It may therefore be
pointed out that functionings and capabilities determine a person's level of well-
being.
When Sen (1999b) introduces the concept of well-being in the development
context by noting that the quality of a person's existence encompasses "being" and
dQing (func;ti()r}ing§) from an availabl~ set of choices (capabilities) - meaning that
people are entitled to a practical implementation and an expansion of their actual
freedom. This demands the eradication of all forms of unfreedom, poverty, social
and political deprivations, and all forms of intolerance and repressions (Sen, 1999a
& 1999b:15-17). The replacement of these socio-politico-economic pathologies
enhances the actual and potential quality of existence that includes both the
achievements of an individual and the rational choices available to him or her.
Sen (1985; 1992) maintains that based on the virtues of democracy such as
tolerance, civility, and respect, individuals in pursuit of their well-being, as rational
and responsible agents, will be able to recognise the freedoms of others. They will
be able, under the rule of law, to tolerate the diversity of people and see them as
equals who deserve the freedom and opportunity to pursue their well-being.
Knowing the natural tendency of human beings to always seek what serves their
interest, and thereby to interfere with their fellow citizens' freedom in the process of
pursuing well-being - Sen nevertheless believes in some form of limited
intervention by a constitutional nation state. Unless there is some form of
institutional intervention there will be social disorder. There is need for the
government to make sure that there are no violations to others' rights. Thus, well-
being is achievable in a democratic political environment that gives one political
and civil freedom to pursue one's well-being. Pursuit of well-being implies a
distributive mechanism of opportunities - in this case it is the market. Is the market
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as a distributive mechanism and process able to provide an opportunity for all to
pursue their well-being?
(b) The Pursuit of Well-being
Sen (1985; 1992) holds that well-being has intrinsic importance in human life, and
hence is worthy of being pursued. The pursuit of well-being implies competitive
interaction among individuals for limited resources. This leads to the need for a
mechanism for distribution. According to Sen (1992) the issue then becomes the
mechanism and fairness of distribution. Underlying Sen's distributive principle is
his philosophical approach - capabilities equality approach which we shall discuss
below. In the following section the focus will be on the pursuit of well-being and its
gJ§trib_lJ_!Lon_~~s 'WeU_?~ V\f~II-~~i'!9 ~n9 reco9_nition.ln this s~ction we ~riefly discuss
the market as a distribution mechanism, together with the notion of equality and
inequality. Prior to these, I will examine Sen's capability equality approach
(i) Capability Equality Approach
According to Sen (1993:32) the capability approach "is concerned primarily with
the identification of value-objects, and sees the evaluative space in terms of
functionings and capabilities to function." Sen (1982) describes the capability
approach as focusing "on meeting the need of self-respect rather than ... the
pleasure from having self-respect." Rawls (quoted in Sen, 1982) calls this need
"the social basis of self-respect." Furthermore, Sen (1982:164, 167), explains:
What the capability approach does is to make that basis explicit and then it goes
on to acknowledge the enormous variability that exists in the commodity
requirements of capability fulfilment. In this sense, the capability approach can be
seen as one possible extension of the Rawlsian perspective.... [It] shares with
John Rawls the rejection of the utilitarian obsession with one type of mental
reaction, but differs from Rawls' concentration on primary goods by focusing on
capabilities of human beings rather than characteristics of goods they possess
The focus on human capabilities to achieve specific functionings makes Sen's
approach a step further from Rawls' social basis of self-respect.
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Sen's capability approach combines functionings and freedom. As already
explained above, functionings are beings and doings; such as being fed, or being
educated, or participating in building a house - making functionings constitutive of
a person's whole being. Freedom, in the capability approach is concerned with
-"real-opportunity-that we have to accomplish what we value" (Sen, 1992:31). In
terms of a person's advantage (which is referred to by Sen as well-being freedom),
according to Sen (1993:30), the capability approach is "concerned with evaluating
it in terms of his actual ability to achieve various valuable functionings as a part of
living." Thus an individual's achieved functionings in his/her daily living are those
exact functionings he or she has the opportunity to successfully pursue and
realize. So it may be concluded that Sen's capability approach works as an
evaluative framework for an individual's ability to achieve certain functionings as
per freedolll of choice and access to opportunities available. In this case it helps
to evaluate the distribution of well-being as well as its relation to recognition.
Sen's capability approach should also be understood as a proposition to
evaluate social arrangements using the extent to which freedom is given to people
for them to achieve certain functionings and to evaluate equality of access to
opportunities. For Sen, if equal access to opportunities in social arrangements is to
be required in any space, it should be required in the space of capabilities. Thus
people should be given freedom to choose what they want to be and they want to
do in order for them to achieve well-being.
Although Sen argues against desire-fulfilment theories, particularly
utilitarianism accusing them of, as Hamilton (2003:92) puts it, "guilty of both
'physical-condition neglect' and 'valuation neglect,'" his (Sen's) capability approach
also sends waves of assuming some form of trans-positional objectivity that, if not
curbed, transforms into 'objective illusion' (Hamilton, 2003:99) - which he accuses
other theorists of having committed. In my opinion is that Sen's capability approach
is helpful in engaging both proponents of the empirical and metaphysical aspects
of the social discussion on improving "the human condition" to enhance life
satisfaction.
177
(H) Well-being and Distribution
Sen was deeply influenced by and sympathetic to Rawls' position of equal
distribution of primary goods (Sen, 1992:9; Cf. DeMartino, 2000:107). However
Sen (1992:41 n) ends up being more inclined to Marx's needs-based distributive
principle, a position that focuses on the basic value of freedom, namely that a
person in a free society has the freedom to do one thing today and another,
tomorrow. Sen (1992) argues that Rawls' account of justice as fairness does not
satisfactorily address the existence of interpersonal differences.
33
Rather he over-
emphasizes equality, leaving us with the problem of conceiving equality as 'even-
handedness' in the distributions of the common good, based on the notion of the
veil of ignorance.
_______~enjJ~§l2:J7 -:_t?l~_rg~~~_that if an ~!~i~1 arg~m~rlt on_so~ial m_atters is
ever to be advanced, there must be a consideration of some form of basic equality
- a demand inescapable "in presenting a political or ethical theory of social
arrangements." For as Erikson (1994:49) puts it, "it is difficult to see how any
theory of justness could be morally convincing if men are not regarded as equals in
some fundamental space." Sen (1992:21-23; 1999b:74) chooses "substantive
freedoms" (the capabilities) as his own fundamental space "to choose a life one
has reason to value." The choice of freedom ('individual freedom to choose' and
'freedom to transact') as the primary basis of well-being (including agency), reflects
Sen's (1992) recognition of human diversity as fundamental. Given this, the crucial
issues for the ethical analysis of equality according to him are: "Why equality?" and
"Equality of what?" For Sen, the latter question implies the former, because if one
satisfactorily answers "Equality of what?" then it will be possible to answer the
question "Why should we be in favour of equality?" The answer to the former
question is equality of substantial freedom. In that way, Sen, inter alia sets out to
address interpersonal differences, or to borrow Minow's term "the dilemma of
difference,,34 and the problem of even-handedness that Rawls propagates and that
33 Rawls' (1999:65-66) Difference Principle is an egalitarian concept that holds that "unless there is
a distribution that makes both better off ... an equal distribution is preferred." As a maximum
criterion and principle of justice it is a procedure that focuses on producing "the greatest benefit for
the least advantaged, with advantage being judged by the holding of 'primary goods" (Sen.
1992:75) - of which the chief ones are "rights, liberties, and opportunities. and income and wealth"
(Rawls, 1999:54,65-73).
34 Martha Minow (cited in Koggel, 2000) uses the term "dilemma of difference" to describe the
dilemma created in a liberal framework in relation to equality where there are two policy options:
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Fukuyama tends to overlook in his claim that there is mutual and equal recognition
for all human beings under the homogeneous liberal state. Rawls (1999:83-84)
tends to think that if people were to start all over again on an equal basis in which
inequality is only accepted if it is to "the greatest benefit of the least advantaged
members of society," there will beno--iHes~ons-ible social- or economic inequality.
He (Rawls' Tanner Lectures quoted in Sen, 1992:75) argues thus:
Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First, they must be
attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity; and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged member of society.
So for Rawls the "fair equality of opportunity" must be available to all people
equally such that-no member of society should lack the primary goods. Fukuyama
does not risk trying to solve this problem; he seems to hope to that some miracle
will take place as soon as there is a universal and homogeneous liberal state. It
may be possible that he chooses to keep quiet on the issue because he has
nothing new to tell us.
Sen (1992:71) argues that well-being is important in dealing with such
issues as "social security, poverty alleviation, removal of gross economic inequality
and in general, in the pursuit of social justice." The pursuit of well-being implies
distribution - which in turn in a liberal society implies the free market mechanism.
In principle, a perfectly competitive market is put in place as an economic
institution that serves the purpose of distribution. According to Clark (1991 :6),
following the 'Pareto optimal' theorem is the principle of a competitive market: to
"ensure an efficient economy in which no person can be made better without
making someone else worse off' (thus at zero opportunity cost). It follows that the
market fulfils its task by "coordinating vast numbers of transactions with minimal
political supervision" and allowing individuals to exercise their freedom to transact
"the formal equality option of equal or same treatment and the substantive equality option of
different or 'special' treatment." Minow (cited in Koggel, 2000) contends that in any case the
framework causes a dilemma because choosing either option "risks creating or perpetuating further
disadvantages for members of oppressed groups." In other words Minow is arguing that on the one
hand, treating people differently sometimes emphasizes their differences and hinders them from
achievements, and on the other hand treating people equally leads "to the insensitivity of their
difference and likely to hinder them on that basis" (Koggel, 2000) hence the dilemma of difference.
I~ t~e ~as~ of this the~is, ~h~ dilemma of difference may refer to the notion that while equal
distribution IS a noble thing, It IS also good to understand inequality in terms of human diversity on
the basis of capability and environmental differences.
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in order to achieve the maximum feasible level of well-being (Clark, 1991 :6-7). This
conception of the market as the central arena for the individual pursuit of well-
being and as a mechanism for distribution has been criticized for its failures,
especially in the realm of social efficiency. A market is said to have failed in a
situation where the market-mechanism isunsuccessfulinalloeating resources
efficiently. There are a number of market failures such as technical efficiency,
productive efficiency, and allocative efficiency (generally referred to as the Pareto
optimality - discussed above), of important to pay attention to is social efficiency.
According to Hale et al (2000:83):
Social efficiency refers to a situation where the benefits to those that gain from the
reallocation of resources are greater than the losses incurred by those who are
made worse off, such that the gainers could compensate the losers and still be
-. -- -----b(;tteroff--
If the gainers do not compensate the losers then there is inequality. According to
O'Neill (2002:81) markets do not have a rule against inequality, "[r]ather, markets
encode inequalities as competitive differences that optimize social efficiency." The
idea here is that the market has become socially inefficient because of human
greed. This must not be understood as meaning that social efficiency is bought at
the price of inequality.
Despite this, Sen argues (1999b: 110), that "the virtues of the market
mechanism are now standardly assumed to be so pervasive that qualifications
seem unimportant." Pointing to any defects of the market is regarded in most
intellectual circles as not moving with the time or being contrary to 'the global
culture.' However Sen (1999b: 11 0) believes it is worthwhile to critically scrutinise
"the standard preconceptions and political-economic attitudes" in favour of the
market, which he argues have never been stronger. He begins by acknowledging
the merits of the market. It is indispensable for human well-being, especially
because of the centrality of freedom in the operation of the market. Hicks (2002)
points out that in Sen "the market system is often touted for the instrumental
freedoms it provides for people - that is, the market helps people to meet basic
needs like having adequate nutrition and shelter." This is a reason why society
cannot deny the relevance of the market; Sen (1999: 112-116) shows that there is
a need for freedom of transactions be that for selling, for buying or for seeking
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employment. The question remains: Is the market sufficient to enable people to
achieve well-being equally?
Hicks (2002) points out that there are widespread concerns about the
increasing role played by the market as an economic and political institution, "but
at the- same time- the virtues--of-the market-are-wieely -touted and- hard to deny." As
long as liberal democracy remains the ideological framework for our polity and
gain, there seems to be no other alternative in which we can "enjoy the benefits of
a market system without allowing it to dominate our lives" (Hicks, 2002). I am of
the opinion that the market should not be taken as a divinely given or sanctioned
mechanism that cannot be transformed or changed. It should be recognized as
something that has the potential to lead to forms of 'unfreedom.' So it is our duty to
organise it in such a way that it functions according to rules that makes it morally
ac-couolgble, Ih~ qU(3~tiQns_ tt]aJgne mayask from !his m9_d~Lare: Is an equal
distribution of primary goods possible, and how do we address the problem of
difference?
Sen (1999b:119) acknowledges the problem of inequality in the area of
income and in the area of "the distribution of substantive freedom and capabilities."
He also acknowledges that even-handed equality in the distribution of primary
goods is impossible, simply due to the diversity of human existence and physical
contexts that influence the potential of each individual's achievement (Sen,
1992:85-87). These differences include individual differences in physical and
mental capability, differences in the physical climates in which people live, and
institutional structures that govern different societies. Sen (1992) argues that these
differences affect the ability of each individual, in the words of OeMartino
(2000:207) "to transform primary goods into the actual achievements that they
have reason to value." In an attempt to address the problems of difference and
even-handedness, Sen (cited in DeMartino, 2000: 108) takes as his point of
departure that the '''focal variable' that should be equalised in an ideal society is
not primary goods per se, but human capabilities."
DeMartino (2000:107-108) points out that Sen's ideal society acknowledges
the difference principle; so that the notion of equality does not involve that all
people must achieve the same level of well-being. However, because the
necessary means, namely the freedom to live one's life must be provided by
society; Sen emphasizes the duty of society. It is not enough that opportunities or
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advantages be available to individuals; they must be distributed even-handedly.
According to DeMartino (2000: 107), Sen's principle of capability equality does not
presume the existence of a single "ideal set of institutional arrangements" such as
advocated by neo-liberalism, communism, or other ideologies. Furthermore,
DeMartino (2000: 108) -maintains that the capability approach inspires us "to
interrogate vigilantly the actual performance of the actually existing economic
systems" that emerge and to press for improvement as a way of determining
whether they are able to meet the standard requirements of capabilities equality. In
that way it accommodates both some form of basic equality and the possibility of
difference in the achievement of well-being
(iii) Well-being and Recognition
Earlier I indicated that Sen acknowledges the basic diversity of human existence.
He asserts that "equality in one space frequently leads to inequality in other
spaces" (Sen, 1992). This diversity includes class, gender and other groups that
are created in our societies. Looking closely at gender as one aspect of diversity,
Sen (1992) argues that "there are systematic disparities in the freedoms that men
and women enjoy" in the area of income distribution, resource-use and even the
freedom to transform "the used resources into the capability to function."
Sen (1999b) argues that the current consensus favours a participatory
democracy that promotes the primacy of freedom in the daily life of every member
of society. It is generally held that democratic social arrangements extend freedom
to all their members. For Sen (1999b) this expansion of freedom is held as "both
the primary end and as the principal means of development." Due to many
unfreedoms (to borrow Sen's term) the world we live in is also a world of
"deprivation, destitution and oppression" that is fuelled by new problems such as
the
persistence of poverty and unfulfilled elementary needs, occurrence of famines and
widespread hunger, violation of elementary political freedoms as well as of basic
liberties, extensive neglect of the interests and agency of women, and worsening
threats to our environment and to the sustainability of our economic and social lives
(Sen, 1999b).
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To solve these problems, the recognition of various freedoms is crucial. Taking top
priority is the freedom of the individual to pursue his or her well-being. As has
already been indicated, Sen's concept of freedom consists of two related, but
separable aspects - "agency" and "well-being." Well-being can only be achieved if
there is sufficient freedom to deploy agency. Accordil'"lgto Sen (1999b) the
possibility of our freedom of agency "is inescapably qualified and constrained by
the social, political and economic opportunities that are available to us." Individual
freedom should be viewed as a "social commitment." It is the role of the political
and economic institutional frameworks that are in place to go beyond the basic
recognition of human freedom by making this freedom realizable.35 The aim is for
social arrangements to remove all unfreedoms hindering the distribution of
freedom to access the common good, as part of one's pursuit of well-being.
The process of removing all unfreedoms, is wholly assigned to development
which is viewed as expanding freedom to reach each individual member of Sen's
(1999b) ideal society. The removal of unfreedoms will lead to the recognition of all
people as equals and with rights to access opportunities to exercise "their agency
by making choices to realize their ends; whatever they are" (Steele, 2001).
Robeyns (cited in Steele, 2001) argues that in the process of removing the
unfreedoms, "certain cultural and social patterns, like gender roles and gender
hierarchies, which now constrain individuals in their [agency] freedom" must be
transformed so that they do not block the recognition of individuals as equals. The
realisation of development as freedom includes "expanding real opportunities of
women to make choices" regarding the achievement of their well-being (Sen,
1999a).
Above, we reviewed the three basic features of the capability approach
namely, the concept of advantage (which is referred to by Sen as well-being
freedom), the conversion of primary goods into well-being, and agency freedom
(Steele, 2001). Certainly if these conditions are fulfilled, in Sen's ideal society, it
could be referred to as recognition of a person or member of society. It may also
be said that recognition is possible when each and every individual is given the
35 Here .Sen pleads for t~e necessity of "simultaneous recognition." Simultaneous recognition refers
to the Idea that there IS a complementary relationship between "individual agency and social
~rrangements" in that individual freedom takes the centre stage and that there must be social
Influences on the realization of individual freedom (Sen, 1999b).
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opportunity to conceptualise his or her needs and has the freedom to fulfil his or
her capability to function (to do or to be).
Steele (2001) indicates that "Sen's conceptual approach is explicitly
pluralistic." Consequently it gives "intrinsic value to agency and well-being
freedom" in that each person, regardless of gender or ideological conceptions has
substantive freedoms and opportunities to choose "a life one has reason to value"
(Sen, 1999b:?4). The pluralistic nature of Sen's capability equality approach has
implications for gender equity. It raises an issue that appeared in the third chapter
of this thesis - that of women working outside home, for instance working in
industry. Fukuyama sees this as one of the causes of "the great disruption" of
social order in the West. Sen (1999b: 115) rather focuses on societies in which
women are deprived of the freedom to work outside home. He (Sen, 1999b:115)
argues that a continuous and systematic denial of women's freedom to work is "a
serious violation of women's liberty and gender equity." It follows that "the absence
of this freedom militates against the economic empowerment of women and adds
momentum to accumulation for further violations of women's rights (Sen,
1999b:115). This is totally opposed to the thrust of Fukuyama's argument.
According to Steele (2001), the intrinsic value of agency freedom "speaks to
the autonomy and personal liberty of people." In Sen's view, democracy as a
universal value can be adopted by every nation without subjecting the nation
concerned to scrutiny as to whether it is ready or fit for democracy. He emphasizes
freedom as the substratum of human existence. Substantial freedom implies
recognition of individuals as having equal freedom and rights.
4.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Fukuyama shows that the liberal societies of Hobbes and Locke only satisfied
material well-being, without looking further into the human desire for recognition,
as highlighted by Hegel. At the end of history, Hobbesian-Lockean-like
communism left people unsatisfied and it collapsed - hence Fukuyama opted for
liberal democracy, arguing that it satisfies the desire for recognition. The upshot of
the above discussion is to accept Fukuyama's claim that there will only be
harmony in global interaction when there is a homogeneous and universal liberal
state in place. For Fukuyama, liberalism as an ideology, and democracy as a
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political value are instrumental and constitutive in the creation and justification of a
liberal state. This is because the two are indispensable to the state's facilitation of
the recognition of every individual's freedom and its affirmation of every individual's
rights. The study has also shown that the idea of the end of history, characterized
by the emergence of liberal demoeracy as -the uFliversal and homogeneous state
that oversees the transition into a new world order, has its own problems. Although
people will be attracted to the freedom and affirmation of rights that liberal
democracy offers, there are outstanding issues such as the problem of social,
political, and economic inequalities. And another problem is that liberal democracy
work only with those cultures that agree with its cultural pre-conditions.
Sen holds that democracy as a universal value instrumentally brings
freedom for people to pursue their need for well-being. Although Sen and
Fukuyama start from the same ideological framework, democracy, Sen argues that
democracy, as a universal value, is no longer something that is new to the world,
rather it is taken for granted that each sovereign nation will follow it as an
ideological framework. Sen prefers to talk about the twin pillars of democracy,
freedom and equality, with an emphasis on freedom. Freedom becomes the
fundamental basis for the achievement of well-being. It plays three basic roles in
human life, namely: a constitutive role, a constructive role, and an instrumental
role. The instrumental role features prominently in that it helps the individual or a
community to conceptualise its needs. Therefore one of Sen's main arguments for
democratic freedom is that it is instrumental to the satisfaction of needs.
Sen prefers to make well-being rather than recognition the central concept
of his political and economic thought. I am of the opinion that if Sen's requirements
are met, this de facto involves the sort of recognition Fukuyama is at such pains to
safeguard. That is if one is granted one's freedoms to pursue all things one has
reason to value, and one's rights are affirmed, then one's existence is eo ipso
recognized. Sen conceives well-being as being and doing. In my own view, that
includes material well-being and recognition, to categorize it in Fukuyama's terms.
In developing his notion of well-being Sen resorts to his basic needs theory rather
than a desire theory such as the one followed by Fukuyama. Sen rejects
Fukuyama's idea of equating well-being with desire-fulfilment. Implicitly, it is as if
Sen is re-interpreting Marx by invoking well-being as the freedom to fulfil basic
needs.. Central to Sen's notion of well-being are two important ideas, namely,
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functioning and capability. The idea of agency also appears to be inseparable from
the idea of well-being.
It has emerged that the notion of well-being implies the idea of distribution.
Sen argues that if distribution is to be addressed as an ethical matter then there
must be some·-form ·of·e-quality;-and he- chooses freedom as his space of equality.
Freedom will enable individuals to pursue well-being and it is through a market
mechanism that this freedom will become realized in economic life, and through
choice of leadership during elections that one's rights and freedom are recognized.
My observation is that the two theorists' reasoning starts from different
points and proceeds in different directions, but in the middle they share a common
ground - the freedom and rights of the individual in a liberal society. On the one
hand, Fukuyama moves from the empirical (people have fulfilled the desire for
material well-being through other political, social, and economic alternatives) to the
metaphysical (desire-satisfaction in a universal and homogeneous liberal state).
On the other hand, Sen moves from the metaphysical (freedom for basic need-
satisfaction in a liberal society) to the empirical (development as an expansion and
practical fulfilment of freedom). All in all, each of them wants every individual to
experience freedom and every individual to have his or her rights affirmed so that





FukLJyamc:i_~_cjY.~IJC~~ a I.Llcid,. cggent, and learned a~Q~!!1~rlt irl_s.l}~e?rt of his view
about the end of history _. by which he means the worldwide triumph of liberal
democracy over other contending ideologies, last but not least of which was
communism. This chapter sets out to critically evaluate Fukuyama's arguments on
a number of issues that arise from his end of history project. As already indicated
in the introduction and in many parts of this piece of study that I seek to critically
examine Fukuyama's notion of liberal democracy who declares its emergence as
the ultimate end to the human evolutionary search for a political system of
governance that will satisfy human desire for recognition. Certainly liberal
democracy has achieved much, making it worth emulating in cultural contexts
similar to those in which it arose, and has worked well. But nevertheless many
aspects of it need to be criticized.
5.2 CRITIQUE: FRANCIS FUKUYAMA VS AMARTYA SEN
5.2.1 Liberal Individualism
The idea of individualism runs through all of Fukuyama's antecedents discussed in
the first, second, third and fourth chapters. It takes different forms as the humanity
wrestles with the issues that concern it in its continually changing contexts. In the
first chapter individuals in a state of nature reach consensus to form a government.
In Hobbes, the individual is a consensual participant in the formation of the
absolute monarchy; in Locke it is also the individual who consensually agrees with
other individuals to form a constitutional monarchy with a representative
government; and in Rousseau it is again the individual who participates in the
formation of a popular sovereignty (or representative government). From Kant
onwards, the individual's rights, dignity and independence are accorded respect. In
Adam Smith and the other classical political economists, the individual's self-
interest is emphasized. In all these theorists, the individual participates in order to
seek security, self-preservation or material well-being.
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Fukuyama's claim is that previous systems of governance did not satisfy the
individual's desire for recognition. Hobbes' absolute monarchy only accorded the
individual with the satisfaction of the desire for material well-being when individuals
in the state of nature managed to secure peace and exercise the fundamental right
of self-preservation.-·· Loeke's·coFlstitutioFlal -monarchy and .representative
government only created the continuous pursuit of the accumulation of wealth.
Rousseau accorded the individual with a representative government (or the
popular sovereignty), which had the potential of not being sensitive to the needs of
the individual - leaving a conflict between the desire for individual freedom and the
demand for submission from the collective authority. There was no balance struck
between the two. In the human endeavour, to come up with a system that will meet
both the empirical and metaphysical needs of the individual, various systems of
governance emerged.
According to Vincent (1995: 129) the idea of the individual keeps on featuring
so prominently, beginning with Hobbes, because of the common view that "the
individual is prior to society" - hence "society is understood to be built out of such
atomic individuals." But according to Fukuyama, the individual features so
consistently and prominently in the philosophies of his antecedents because his or
her desire for recognition is never fully satisfied. Fukuyama (1992:42) claims that
as the worldwide revolution of liberalism progresses, at the end of the millennium
the twin crises of authoritarianism and socialist central planning have left only one
competitor standing in the ring as an ideology of potentially universal validity: liberal
democracy, the doctrine of individual freedom and popular sovereignty.
This makes individualism the basis of and goal for liberal democracy. It is liberal
democracy that satisfies the individual's desire for respect of dignity. Fukuyama
(1992:42) defines liberalism as "the rule of law that recognizes certain individual
rights or freedoms from the government." For a broader and comparative
understanding of the term, Heywood (200:60) defines liberalism as:
a political ideology whose central theme is a commitment to the individual and to
the construction of a society in which individuals satisfy their interests or achieve
fulfilment.
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And for Waldron (1998:598) as well,
liberal political philosophy ... explores the foundations of the principles most
commonly associated with liberal politics: freedom; toleration; individual rights;
constitutional democracy and the rule of law.
What all these definitions share is a high level of commitment to the individual;
according to Heywood (2000:60) this is because of the belief that "human beings
are first and foremost individuals endowed with reason." The supremacy of the
individual in Fukuyama's end of history project has its good side and its bad side.
The good side is that the emergence of liberal democracy has brought recognition
and realization of the aspirations of individuals. Each individual aspires to make
sure that his or her political freedom and rights are protected by the government of
the day, and that he or she has the freedom to do and to be what he or she has
reason to value.
Fukuyama (1999b:48) views individualism as on the one hand the "bedrock
virtue of modern societies," and on the other something that
begins to shade over from the proud self-sufficiency of free people into a kind of
closed selfishness, where maximizing personal freedom without regard for
responsibilities to others becomes an end in itself.
If it does not put the individual centre stage, liberal democracy fails to meet its
goal. However, if it does, the resulting individualism becomes dangerous, even to
the point of undoing liberal democracy's positive achievements.
Fukuyama points out that even though Americans were able to celebrate
their individualism, community diversity, and spontaneous sociability
[t]he balance between individualism and community has shifted dramatically in the
United States over the last fifty years. The moral communities that made up
American civil society at midcentury, from family to neighbourhoods to churches and
workplaces, have been under assault, and a number of indicators suggest that the
degree of general sociability has declined. The most noticeable deterioration in
community life is the breakdown of the family, with the steady rise of the rates of
divorce and single-parent families since the late 1960s. This trend has had clear-cut
189
economic consequences: a sharp rise in poverty associated with single motherhood
(Fukuyama, 19.95: 308, 309).
This shift also has serious political consequences, notably social disorder or
disrupliao,_which is inimicq! Jo th~_ flqurishing of J.iberal dem()cracy.__ ln The Great
Disruption Fukuyama (1999:281) warns that the triumph of liberal democracy and
the free market economy does not necessarily entail the corresponding moral and
social order. This is because there can be no political order without moral
consensus. The consequences of the lack of moral consensus are serious,
because in any moral deal that may be achieved a compromise between the
different ideas and practices of the various parties will have to be reached so as to
accommodate everybody. Fukuyama further warns that
[t]he tendency of contemporary liberal democracies to fall prey to excessive
individualism is perhaps their greatest long-term vulnerability, and particularly visible
in the most individualistic of all democracies, the United States (Fukuyama,
1999:10).
To be successful, liberal democracy needs social order. But excessive
individualism has the capacity to miniaturize the community and loosen family
bonds. When this happens, because of a lack of coercive control, the future of
liberal democracy will be in danger.
Despite Fukuyama's warnings concerning individualism, it is exactly an
individualistic bias that some critics accuse him of: Blunden (2003) describes
Fukuyama's book, The End of History as "a thoroughly despicable, triumphalist
eulogy to liberal individualism," and especially objects to Fukuyama's use of
Nietzsche's expression: "the Last Man.,,36 Blunden's view is echoed by Fisk (2003),
who argues that Fukuyama's entire "end of history" approach is flawed by
assuming individualism, and because, despite Fukuyama's equation of recognition
and isothymia, the fact is that "satisfaction can only come through recognition of
individual superiority." Fisk (2003) claims that
Fukuyama cannot challenge this assumption since his historical dialectic of
recognition traces recognition back to the individual male warrior's urge to defeat
36
The last man to Fukuyama refers to a citizen of a liberal state under capitalist democracy where
equality is in principle fully realized.
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and subdue anyone posing as an equal. Even outside its warlike context, this urge
will reappear in the form of an urge to be recognized by free persons as superior.
Mutual recognition, which leads to democracy, becomes a compromise that doesn't
eradicate the primal urge for superiority.
Individualism pervades Western philosophy and it remains a distinguishing
characteristic of Western civilization (Huntington, 1997:71-72). According to
Huntington (1997:71), "a sense of individualism and a tradition of individual rights
and liberties" emerged in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Since the
seventeenth century, individualism prevailed in the form of "the right of individual
choice" and the claim of equal rights for all individuals (Huntington, 1997:71-72).
It is difficult to strike a balance in the relationship between the individual and
the community. Excessive control over individuals results in oppression, the
violation of rights and the loss of opportunities to express one's individuality. In the
article, "Why It Can Happen Again: the Fundamental Cause of the Holocaust is the
Anti-Individualist Morality of Self-Sacrifice," Tranciski (2003), analyzing Nazism,
simultaneously defines the ethics of individualism. He shows how the Nazi German
state destroyed the individual in the name of the community (or state). Adolf Hitler
(quoted in Tranciki 2003) explicates the moral foundations of Nazism that
governed the decision to rob an individual of his rights:
It is ... necessary that the individual should finally come to realize that his own ego
is of no importance.... This state of mind, which subordinates the interests of the
ego to the conservation of the community, is really the first premise for every truly
human culture. .. The basic attitude from which such activity arises, we call-to
distinguish it from egoism and selfishness-idealism. By this we understand only
the individual's capacity to make sacrifices for the community, for his fellow men.
Tranciki (2003) states that historians tend to dismiss Hitler's words as empty talk.
However, Hitler's statements became fact in the concentration camps. According
to concentration camp survivor Bruno Bettelheim (cited in Tranciki, 2003) the
central goal of the concentration camp was "to break the prisoners as individuals,
and to change them into a docile mass." For Tranciki (2003) central to the
philosophy of National Socialism "was the relentless sacrifice of the individual: the
sacrifice of his mind, his independence, and ultimately his person." Concurring with
Fukuyama's claim, Tranciki (2003) argues that a liberal country is "based on
191
precisely the opposite principle" to that of Nazism. The Founding Fathers of
America "upheld the individual's right to 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness'"
in order to protect him or her against the "tyranny of the majority" (Tranciki, 2003).
The individual's right to life, freedom, and the pursuit of happiness is at the
centre of the ethics of individualism - "the view that the individual is not
subordinate to the collective, that he has a moral right to his own interests, and
that all rational people benefit under such a system" (Tranciki 2003). Furthermore,
liberal individualism's biocentric conception of ethics is that "the good consists of
actions that sustain or enhance one's life": any actions that destroy or undermine
one's life are invariably regarded as evil (Anonymous, 2003). According to the
ethics of individualism the purpose of an individual's life is to pursue the fulfilment
of his desires (to achieve his own happiness) - which is his own rational self-
interest (Anonymous, 2003) - an idea that echoes Adam Smith's idea of self-
interest. This is achievable "through a constant, conscious process of self-
evaluation (introspection) and a consistent adherence to reason in pursuing
values" (Anonymous, 2003) - with the fundamental value to be pursued being
democracy, which gives an individual the opportunity to pursue recognition, in
Fukuyama's sense, or well-being, as Sen puts it.
Central to the ethics of individualism is the idea of independence that is
based on the primary virtue of "respecting individuality" - first and foremost, one's
own individuality, and secondly the individuality of those one interacts with. (The
Kantian resonances in all this are unmistakable). Reflection on this version of the
ethics of individualism suggests that this independence, if not brought under the
rule of law, could turn into a 'state of nature.' This is because individuals in,
extreme cases of independence, "do not follow social groups, social authorities, or
social conventions, [rather] they follow only their own minds and proudly exist as
sovereign, autonomous, rational entities" (Anonymous 2003), as if condemned, a
la Sartre, to freedom. In extreme cases of individualism individuals tend to interact
only with those whom they think are a "source of value, or a potential source of
value" (Anonymous, 2003). This idea promotes the practice of segregation and
separatism. If such individuals group together and form an extremist 'hate group,'
they can end up causing social disruption because they will not acknowledge the
rule of law. In its extreme state this type of individualism only exists in a state of
nature. But with the evolution of human reason to maturity, individuals came to
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seek respect and recognition. Hence there was appreciation of interdependency,
and concomitantly a greater concern for the common good, so that the value of
individual autonomy no longer had to lead to excessive individualism. If liberal
society is to enjoy freedom and equality, there must be a balance between
in9ivig!:Jalism and community, based on the acknowledgement of interdependency.
The approach known as moral ecology, inspired by the environmental
sciences, can help us become more aware of interdependency in human
interaction, especially between the individual and the community. In his article,
''The Theory of Moral Ecology," Hertzke (1998) describes moral ecology as "a
philosophical, empirical and practical construct" that frequently applies
environmental thought - particularly insights from Garrett Hardin's "Tragedy of the
Commons"37 - to the moral and cultural realm in an attempt to present, or explain,
the dynamics of human relations as it relates to the distribution of the commons
and the relationships between individuals. Hertzke (1998) sees the "tragedy of the
commons" as a powerful metaphor for theory construction and empirical research.
Hardin's metaphor continues to haunt liberal thinking because "the practice of
individual freedom" which all of us desire can, "under certain circumstances,
undermine the very basis of life itself, or certainly of the good life" (Hertzke, 1998).
Hertzke (1998) argues that there is mounting evidence suggesting that the
"tragedy of the commons" can operate in the moral realm of society. This notion
helps us to understand how "the delicate interdependent relationships .,. and
civility that constitute a healthy society" function. Hertzke (1998) indicates that
some individuals "can be viewed as practising their liberal freedom in ways that
contaminate [the] moral ecosystem, undermining its ability to sustain healthy lives."
Hertzke (1998) concludes, therefore, that the concept of moral ecology is of great
37 The expression "tragedy of the commons" comes from Garrett Hardin's (1968) article, ''The
Tragedy of Commons." The term, "commons" refers to "any resource which is shared by a group of
people", such as "the air we breathe and the water we drink" or the delicate ecosystems that
sustain life (Harding, 1997; Hardin, 1968). The idea of the commons is an ancient cultural and
economic organizing principle that asserts that natural resources are rightfully and pragmatically
best owned by the people - thus each individual owns an equal share of the value of land air
water, minerals, etc (Harding, 1997). However by acting rationally in their use of the com~on~
"individuals tr~gic~~ly destroy it b~cause of untrammeled individual freedom itself' (Harding, 1997).
The tragedy lies m the ~olemnlty of the remorseless working of things" whereby the futility of
escape c~n be made eVIdent by the behaviour of individuals as they pursue their individual
economic mterests, in which "left to their own devices, people would abuse, pollute, or overpopulate
the earth" (Hardin, 1998).
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value in our striving "to balance individual freedom with the broader health of
society."
Greenberg & Greene (1999) for their part define moral ecology as the
patterns of culturally-informed understandings and practices that entail moral
economy38. It includesconeepts such as eql:Jity, justice and entitlement, according
to which people organise their economic activities and the use of local resources
that "underpin the human appropriation of resources and structure of relationship"
between members of human communities. Thus it is a fabric of customs,
philosophical ideas, and empirical theories that lay the foundation for civilising
social relations among humans as they conceptualise their economic needs and
how goods should be distributed among them.
According to Hertzke (1999) some thinkers from the communitarian camp
express concern, arguing that the "cultural crisis resulting from an aggressive
capitalist ethos" will seep into communities and family life and as a result degrade
their "sustaining norms." Radical individualism threatens the ties of trust, civility,
and cooperation that hold human communities together. This concern dovetails
with Fukuyama's (1995; 1999) claim that "social capital," so vital to well-functioning
societies, is mysteriously declining. Hertzke points out that the philosophical and
policy implications of moral ecology, in turn, highlight a poignant Tocquevillian
dilemma: "How can liberal societies, which leave individuals largely free in the
moral arena, shield themselves from cumulative moral depredation, let alone
economic inequality?"
A follow-up question would be: Is it not time to create or formulate a new
moral ecology that will see us laying down fundamental politico-economic values
that are not a threat but an inspiration to the interdependency between the
individual and the community? Moral ecology argues that liberal democracy does
not guarantee this collective moral perception. So it is worthwhile incorporating a
moral element that sees a heightened awareness of interdependency functioning
as a way to curb excessive individualism. This brings to mind again Sartre's saying
that we are all condemned to freedom, which in effect depicts the individual as
vulnerable to unrestrained freedom.
38 Moral economy is an "interpretive framework for social justice and equity issues within the socio-
economic system," particularly in the Indian context. Greenberg and Greene (1999) trace the term
to Amartya Sen (1981) and others who did groundbreaking research on "how the distribution of
India's economic resources reflected an implicit social hierarchy and a legitimisation of economic
inequality."
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Hertzke (1999) notes that "both environmental analysts and cultural critics
identify unrestrained individual freedom as a major source of disruption."
Fukuyama shares this view but his model of understanding and dealing with the
problem of excessive individualism does not seem to be of much help. He tries to
solve the problem firstly through the idea· of social capital (which;-as we saw
above, can promotes cronyism), and secondly by hoping for the triumph of the
community over excessive individualism. As long as freedom, one of the twin
pillars of liberal democracy (the other being equality), continues to be promoted in
defence of the individual at the expense of the community, the problem will
continue.
As for Sen, there is both independence and interdependence in a society
where democracy is embraced as a universal value. The mere fact that Sen talks
about democracy as a universal value, and about the primacy of freedom in
pursuing the need for well-being, implies the idea of individualism. Sen (1992:41)
argues that "a good society ... is ... a society of freedom" where an individual is
free to achieve well-being. For Sen, individualism is defined within a social setting
where one has the freedom to participate in debates on issues that affect one's
daily life, to influence political decision-making in one's society, and to
conceptualize one's needs. His capability equality approach is individualistic in
nature and intent. Thus he talks of a capability as representing "a person's [an
individual's] freedom to achieve well-being" (Sen, 1992:43). Sen does not talk
about excessive individualism (perhaps partly because this is not yet a major
problem in developing countries).
Sen acknowledges the diversity of human existence, but emphasizes the
need for some form or space for equality - equality in the freedom to pursue well-
being.
5.2.2 Global Trends Regarding Gender
From a feminist point of view Fukuyama can be faulted for overlooking the global
trend in the direction of gender equality. Throughout the book The End of History
and the Last Man (as in its title), one charge goes, Fukuyama consistently focuses
on men at the expense of women. He is thus accused of basing his understanding
of personhood on manhood. For instance when he discusses "equality" in The End
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of History, the concept is discussed with reference to "men," not persons or human
beings - thus he writes:
The Roman Empire ultimately collapsed because it established the universal
... equality of all men, but .withQut recogniziIlg their. rights and in.ner human dignity
(Fukuyama, 1992:61).
When he talks about the coming of freedom, Fukuyama's reference is
similarly masculine:
Human freedom emerges only when man is able to transcend his natural, animal
existence, and to create a new self for himself. The emblematic starting point for this
process of self-creation is the struggle to the death for pure prestige (Fukuyama,
1992:61; 152).
In The Great Disruption Fukuyama stops just short of saying women were the
cause of the "Great Disruption;" given the way in which he discusses them at
length in connection with the invention and distribution of the contraceptive pill, the
baby boom, and female participation in industry. These are but a few example of a
general trend in Fukuyama. However, I think Fukuyama's frequent reference to the
male gender can be read in many different ways - it could be, for instance, partly
because he discusses humanity during the modern era, when family life was
based on patrilineality (see Tiger's "Fukuyama's Follies: So What if Women Ruled
the World?" in Ehrenreich, Pollitt et al (1999)). Maybe Fukuyama is just trying to
argue within the philosophical and ideological traditions of his antecedents. It could
be also that he takes the word, 'man' to refer to both genders - male and female.
But the major problem is that Fukuyama does not propose any primeval urge for
superiority among women, which he emphasizes among men as the cause for
struggle for recognition. This might be interpreted as meaning that issues of
recognition do not matter to women.
To exacerbate the matter Fukuyama (in his article, "Women and the
Evolution of World Politics," 1998) seems overly reliant on the stereotype of men
being violent, men liking to start war, and men fighting for prestige (as in The End
of History). Ehrenreich, Pollitt et al (1999) argue that if women were in power, they
would act in the same manner men currently do, because making war is not a one-
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man thing, rather, it is a collective effort. There is a track record of women involved
in violence as members of the military and as members of revolutionary
movements or terrorist organizations (Ehrenreich, Pollitt et aI, 1999) - and also,
more generally, of women making decisions leading to violent consequences.
-Although-the-accusation-ofa sexist bias may ring true, other passages
suggest that Fukuyama conceives of personhood without gender prejudice. (For
instance in his discussion on "The Universal and Homogeneous State," Fukuyama
(1992:201-203) refers to "all people," "citizens," "all human beings").
Since time immemorial, inequality between the two genders has been a fact
of life. Fukuyama's philosophical antecedents lived in a time when men were in
control and women were not regarded as equals. However, the end of history is
supposed to mean the coming of liberal democracy - a final form of government
that will bring reciprocal and equal recognition and affirmation to all individuals. If
men and women are not recognized as equals, the whole end of history project will
be a failure.
Sen's (1999b:115-116) idea of freedom and his capability equality approach
are gender-friendly, as well befits a conception acknowledging the diversity of
human existence. While Fukuyama sees the participation of women in industry as
one of the causes of "the great disruption" of social order in the West, Sen
(1999b: 115) bemoans the fact that women in India and other developing countries
are deprived of the freedom of working outside home. Sen (1999b: 115) argues that
a continuous and systematic denial of the freedom of women to work is "a serious
violation of women's liberty and gender equity." It follows that "the absence of this
freedom militates against the economic empowerment of women" and allows
momentum for the further violation of women's rights to accumulate (Sen,
1999b:115). We see that when it comes to gender issues, there is a major
difference of emphasis between Fukuyama and Sen.
5.2.3 Cultural Diversity and Homogenization
By the 1990's, Fukuyama (1999: 10-91) argues, there was a return to the cultural
preconditions of liberal democracy such as trust, the authority of moral values -
especially the central liberal virtue of tolerance - and a vibrant civil society.
Accompanying these historical factors are two supratemporal sources of social
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order, viz.: "human nature and the spontaneous process of self-organization," that
will help revive social order and sustain liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 1999:139).
The aim of this section is to look into the cultural preconditions of liberal
democracy, which Fukuyama uses as a touchstone for a country's fitness to attain
to democracy and be homogenized into the club of liberal democracies. I will also
look at cultural diversity and how it relates to homogenization.
(a) The Cultural Preconditions of Liberal Democracy
Fukuyama's antecedents serve as sources of ideas regarding which cultural
preconditions must be met for liberal democracy to succeed. Culture pervades
human life. According to Fukuyama (1999:10-12), the cultural preconditions for
liberal democracy are individualism, pluralism, tolerance (which he sees as the
cardinal virtue), moral consensus, and the rule of law (which include a democratic
constitution, and the free functioning of civil society). All these cultural
preconditions characterize Western civilization, giving better prospects for the
success of liberal democracy.
As we have already seen in the third chapter of this thesis, Huntington
(1996:28-29) argues that liberal democracy can only succeed in those countries
that have a Christian heritage, especially those in the West. This is debatable
because there are other places which are democracies without being Christian.
After September 11, Fukuyama (2001) echoes Huntington's assertions, arguing
that
Modernity has a cultural basis. Liberal democracy and free markets do not work
everywhere. They work best in societies with certain values whose origins may not
be entirely rational. It is not an accident that modern liberal democracy emerged first
in the Christian west, since the universalism of democratic rights can be seen as a
secular form of Christian universalism. The central question raised by Huntington is
whether institutions of modernity will work only in the west, or whether there is
something broader in their appeal that will allow them to make headway elsewhere.
I believe there is. The proof lies in the progress that democracy and free markets
have made in regions such as east Asia, Latin America, orthodox Europe, south
Asia and even Africa. Proof lies also in the millions of developing world immigrants
who vote with their feet every year to live in western societies. The flow of people
moving in the opposite direction, and the number who want to blow up what they
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can of the west, is by contrast negligible.... But there does seem to be something
about Islam, or at least the fundamentalist versions of Islam that have been
dominant in recent years, that makes Muslim societies particular1y resistant to
modernity. Of all contemporary cultural systems, the Islamic world has the fewest
democracies (Turkey alone qualifies), and contains no countries that have made the
fransition-to developed-nation status in-the- manner-ofSouth Korea or-Singapore.--·
The above quotation contradicts what Fukuyama has been preaching all along -
that liberal democracy is the only remaining universal framework of human
government that humanity has reason to embrace. Now he seems to be arguing
that liberal democracy and market economy "do not work everywhere." The
quotation also shows that all forms of social life and/or organization are highly
influenced by the free market and liberal democracy, the fundamental driving
components of modernity today. According to Fukuyama, in the case of Islam
there is no collaboration between modernity and tradition, because modernity does
away with tradition by putting it under constant critical scrutiny. I think Fukuyama is
wrong, because the fact that there are so many versions of Islam in the world
today (fundamentalists, conservatives, liberals, etc). tells us that modernity is
having an influence. Muslims are taking an inward and critical look into
themselves. The reflexivity of modern life involves a continuous examination and
rapid reform of social and cultural practices, in the light of a constant stream of
information about the actual effects of these practices. This changes these
practices, fragments the social order, and individuates communal life. If
Fukuyama's desire that all the cultures of the world become compatible with
modernity is fulfilled, then the wish of many cultural groups to hand down their
traditions intact will have to be disregarded. It may be true that Islam cannot accept
modernity without a critical scrutiny of its intentions, but signs of compatibility
between Islam and modernity abound. (Think of elections in a whole variety of
Islamic nations, such as Turkey, Iran, and Indonesia).
So in some parts of Asia, Islam, in a bid to protect its tradition, does not
welcome liberal democracy, because it is based on Western culture. Should
Fukuyama not just admit that he wants all cultures to submit to American culture in
the name of liberal democracy? What Huntington interprets as a clash of
civilizations, for Fukuyama is the incompatibility of liberal democracy and Islam (AI-
Braizat, 2002:269) because of their cultural differences. Fukuyama (1992:45)
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points out that "Islam constitutes a systematic and coherent ideology, just like
liberalism and communism, with its own code of morality and doctrine of political
and social justice." Thus, Islam is seen as a threat to liberal democracy because it
cannot accommodate modernity (AI-Braizat, 2002:272).
______ -AI-Braizat (200~:2-72}--accuses Fukuyama of-cultural essentialism and
oversimplification by "equating universalism of democratic right to Christian
universalism." He (AI-Braizat, 2002:272) argues that the cultural precondition for
democracy cannot be a religion or the culture of a particular country, in this case
the United States of America. He writes:
For all democratic states today are more or less secular. Moreover, the introduction
of Christianity to Africa did not bring about Liberal democracies. Further, if one
equates the universalism of democratic rights to Christian universalism, why did
Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and Latin America not develop liberal
democracies and capitalist free-market economy [sic] simultaneously with Western
Europe? Instead they developed systems of an opposite nature: political
authoritarianism and economic communism as opposed to democracy and free
markets. Fukuyama's cultural yardstick of "Christian universalism" does not account
for Japan's (Confucian) democracy and free market. Catholic Christian societies are
different from the protestant Christian societies. They have different patterns of
development and have experienced similar circumstances to some Islamic,
Buddhist, Orthodox Christian, and Confucian societies. The fortunes of democracy
in many of these societies explicitly indicate that there is more to the story than
religion and cultural tradition (AI-Braizat, 2002:272).
Fukuyama can thus be accused of falling prey to cultural essentialism and
disregarding the diversity of human existence.
The liberal society that Fukuyama envisages is a society that he claims will
be homogeneous both politically and culturally. It thus links up with the traditional
thrust of the Enlightenment - the dissolution of cultural variations through reason.
If Heywood (2000:598) is correct to argue that "liberalism rejects both the view that
cultures, communities and states are ends in themselves and the view that social
and political organizations should aim to reform or perfect human nature," then
Fukuyama's liberal democracy will find it hard to penetrate communities like the
Islamic ones that value their cultural identity.
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Sen is not caught up in the problem of the incompatibility with modernity
that has characterized and endangered Fukuyama's engagement with the Muslim
world. He (Sen, 1999a:3) rejects the approach of the 19th century theorists of
democracy who "found it quite natural to discuss whether one country or another
was 'fit for democracy.'" Sen (1999a:3) arguestnat "[a] country does not have to
be deemed fit for democracy, rather, it has to become fit through democracy,"
whether it is culturally compatible with liberal democracy or not. Although he
argues strongly in favour of democracy, Sen does not tell us which ideological
tradition he follows, telling us which political values he prefers instead: democracy,
freedom, and equality. He (Sen, 1999a:5) sees "democracy as a universal value"
because it has become "a dominant belief in the contemporary world." But he does
not choose liberalism or any other ideology as his starting point. He takes it for
granted that democracy is conducive to freedom.
(b) Cultural Diversity
There is an over-emphasis on universalism in Fukuyama's declaration of the
triumph of liberal democracy. He tries to see liberal democracy as something that
is naturally emerging and that can be accepted as something given and fixed.
According to him, any other ideological system of polity and gain that may emerge
will be overcome by liberal democracy. This compels Fukuyama to revisit Kant's
idea of a universal history, Hegel-as-interpreted-by-Kojeve's notion of the end of
history and Marx's idea of history as driven by class conflict. In so doing,
Fukuyama sets human history in motion under the thrust of the European
Enlightenment in order to create a homogeneous liberal state with a single culture.
It is well known that liberal democracy is a Western cultural product that always
displays Western values. If taken as such it aims at reaching an ideological
homogenisation that will see the creation of a liberal state whereby the satisfaction
of human desire is systematized and universalised. Fukuyama paints a picture of
the liberal project - through liberal democracy - that aims at establishing one
specific kind of political and economic system across all human communities,
regardless of whatever differences in culture or values they may exhibit. This
project displays its ethical shortcomings especially in the question of economic
equality. In it we find the commitment to the ontological presuppositions of moral
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objectivism based on assumptions of rationality and the scarcity of resources
which are taken to be universal propositions (DeMartino, 2000).
Sen, on the other hand, makes much of diversities in human existence and
values. Ignoring these diversities and trying to make human existence the same
everywhere is extremely dangerol:Js.-Being GQAscious of this, Senalso argues that
any social ethics must allow a dimension of freedom for people to co-exist, to
pursue well-being in their own way. Sen's conception of diversity does not imply
anarchy. On the contrary, he expects the individual citizens of his ideal society to
act responsibly and not to violate each other's rights. This is unlikely to simply
follow from the free acts of individual citizens; Sen thus has strong views regarding
the necessity of state intervention.
5.2.4 Parallel Histories within a History
Like Marx, Fukuyama appropriates Hegel's dialectical method, but unlike Marx, he
takes it to a metaphysical level in the way he adopts Hegel's ideas of the struggle
for recognition. Hence he writes:
Life in a liberal democracy is potentially the road to great material abundance, but it
also shows us the way to the completely non-material end of recognition of our
freedom. The liberal democratic state values us at our own sense of self-worth.
Thus both the desiring and thymotic parts of our souls find satisfaction.
In an attempt to illustrate the universality of the twin human desires for material
accumulation and recognition, Fukuyama transforms this empirical-metaphysical
conception of history into two parallel histories. The first history, economic history,
is driven by scientific endeavour, whereby nations acquire military technologies as
a means to defend their independence and sovereignty. This leads nations into a
race of continuous accumulation of wealth leading to the necessity of creating
markets for their products, so that in the end everything is channelled into the
economic framework of capitalism. Fukuyama argues that the success of
capitalism will attract those nations currently still outside the free market economy.
This will make them abandon the other alternatives they have been embracing, so
that they join the free market economy. Finally, capitalism will be the last economic
ideology at the end of economic history. The second history, parallel to economic
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history, is driven by the human desire for recognition. Humankind will shift its
passion from material accumulation to the satisfaction of the thymotic urge and the
desire for recognition. Desire for recognition becomes the force driving human
history in the direction of world democratization, and hence the universalization of
human satisfaetion. One can accuse Fukuyama nf dividing. human history into two
parallel rails rather than viewing it as a single, integrated human history that sees
humanity simultaneously pursuing both material well-being and recognition, which
would allow the synergy between liberal democracy and capitalism to be seen in a
holistic way. Fukuyama's declaration of the triumph of liberalism rests on far
reaching suppositions, most crucially that of a progressive, coherent, and
directional "Universal History," an idea which he appropriates from Immanuel Kant.
The combination of liberalism and a progressive Universal History tells of a goal to
be achieved at the end of history, when liberal democracy ushers in a new world
order of political peace and global economic prosperity.
In Trust, Fukuyama (1995:xiii) turns to what he thinks will make the world
economy successful after history, when the universal liberal state has become a
reality. He (Fukuyama, 1995:xiii) turns to economics because he believes that
"economics is almost inevitable," as "virtually all political questions today revolve
around economic ones." If the end of history is to take place, which Fukuyama
believes is irreversible, because history is directional and goal-oriented, then the
global economy under global capitalism must be consensually accepted for it to
bring about economic prosperity in the universal liberal society after history.
Fukuyama tries to identify what hindrances there are to achieving such prosperity
and concludes that the major one is a lack of social trust. (He sees social trust as a
by-product of social capital). Thus people wanting to do business successfully
must be able to socialize with, and trust, those falling outside their family or
religious circle. Fukuyama (1995) claims that societies with strong family bonds of
trust like China, have low social trust and low social capital, which hinders them
from building successful businesses beyond the confines of the family. On the
other hand societies with weak family bonds, such as the United States, Japan and
most Protestant countries, have high social trust and high social capital, and were
thus able to establish big and successful businesses - often. transnational
companies.
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Fukuyama (1995:356) claims that it is social capital that keeps "capitalism
and democracy so closely related." To maintain "a healthy capitalist economy,"
there must "be sufficient social capital in the underlying society to permit
businesses, corporations, networks, and the like to be self-organizing" (Fukuyama,
·1995:356)..
As Fukuyama warns us on the possible hindrances to the success of the
development of global capitalism, so he also tries to warn us of the hindrances to
the development of a global political order after history. His argument in The Great
Disruption is that the future of liberal democracy is threatened by increasing
conflict between individualism and community morals (See 5.2.1 above).
As he concludes The Great Disruption, Fukuyama returns to the arguments
in The End of History. He (Fukuyama, 1999:280-282) claims that "since
contemporary liberal democracies today enshrine this principle of universal
recognition," they are the best vehicles for facilitating productive sociability and
promoting moral consensus under the guidelines of "universal obligations for
tolerance and mutual respect." We can therefore look forward to "a long-term
progressive evolution of human political institutions in the direction of liberal
democracy" (Fukuyama, 1999:281).
Sen (1999b:147), like Fukuyama, is also confronted with the problem of the
dichotomy of political freedom (political history) and economic needs (economic
history), which he puts in question form: "What should come first - removing
poverty and misery, or guaranteeing political liberty and civil rights, for which poor
people have little use anyway?" There is a general tendency for people to
"undermine the relevance of political freedoms because the economic needs are
so urgent" or vice versa (Sen, 1999b:147). Sen (1999b:147) rejects such an
approach to solving problems because he believes that there are "extensive
interconnections between political freedoms and the understanding and fulfilment
of economic needs." He does not separate the confluence of economics and
politics. For him it is wrong to think in terms of a parallel movement of two
histories. The complete human condition of existence needs both democratic
politics so that people have the freedom to function and choose the opportunities
they want, and market economics for satisfying people's material needs. Thus both
politics and economics play a very important role in the individual's pursuit of well-
being.
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Sen (1999b) points out that for many years, theorists thought that
development revolves around the hub of industrialization and juridical institutions
(to protect property and arbitrate in civil disputes). This proved too narrow as a
framework, because it completely neglected freedom. But now, argues Sen,
development-has a broaderaim,that--of-inereasing-theopportunity for all
individuals to achieve those things that they have reason to value. For Sen, the
new, broader goal of development is the substantial freedom that is brought about
when countries embrace democracy. Industrialization alone does not assure well-
being - health, longevity, proper education, the capability to participate in political
processes that affect people's lives. The democratization of political communities
is a necessary precondition for development, because it enables citizens to
express their dissent and to contribute to the political process in their country on an
ongoing basis. For Sen, to fail to democratize is to support the status quo, which
means to support the continuation of "unfreedoms."
5.2.5 Desire-satisfaction Versus Need-satisfaction
According to various social contract theories (see Chapter 1) members of the state
of nature agreed to form a government to arbitrate their disputes. This was a move
for securing a chance for self-preservation. For Fukuyama material well-being was
all that was at the stake in this move. In the state of nature, members of society
were not concerned with recognition. According to Fukuyama, it is only in Hegel's
Phenomenology where humankind is claimed to have reached maturity by moving
away from the desire for material well-being to the desire for recognition. This
matured human desire, having remained unsatisfied for a long time, is satisfied in
Hegel with the coming of the homogeneous state, which Kojewe interprets as
liberalism. With the fall of Communism, Fukuyama sees liberal democracy as
coming to the rescue of humankind, satisfying its desire for respect and dignity by
way of the recognition and affirmation of individual rights. While Fukuyama focuses
on the need for material well-being and the desire for recognition, Sen focuses on
the general lack most people experience of everything that is constitutive to well-
being and fundamental to freedom. For Sen need-satisfaction refers to dealing with
the basic fulfilment of the need for well-being. It must be borne in mind that a
desire gets fulfilled or satisfied "just in case its object comes to exist" (Sumner,
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1996:149). If the object satisfying the desire for recognition does not exist, then
Fukuyama's claim that liberal democracy ultimately fulfils this desire becomes
empty.
Fukuyama's tone in the end of history project suggests that the universality
and objectivity of liberal democracy have become a fact. Fukuyama tends to
equate desire fulfilment with well-being - which is rather subjective. In his
capability approach to need-satisfaction, Sen makes well-being independent of our
actual or possible desires.
It is my opinion that before one talks about desires, one should talk about
the basic needs of people. I think Sen is being realistic in making us, to borrow
Hicks' (2000) words, "think society not economy" by placing economic life within
the "wider context of personal and societal well-being," whereby an ideal society
works to "convert as efficiently as possible, economic wealth into human
capabilities." This kind of thinking changes the whole conceptualisation and
purpose of economic development. In the past it used to be concerned with the
massive production of commodities, or the over-accumulation of wealth, but Sen
shows that it can be used to expand people's freedoms or capabilities to function
and achieve well-being in their diverse communities. Hicks (2000) correctly argues
that it is relevant (following Sen's line of thought) to ask "Are people well
nourished? Are they able to obtain a good education? Can they appear in public
without shame?" This would be in contrast to Fukuyama's focus, which seems to
suggest that people, at some point in life, stop needing food, shelter, and water,
and then switch to the search for recognition. The over-emphasis on the
satisfaction of the desire for recognition dominates Fukuyama's ideology, and
while it pays attention to both the individual and the community, the former is
privileged over the latter.
5.3 CONCLUSION
Liberal individualism is the central focus of liberalism, and today, of liberal
democracy - suggesting that every individual is fully satisfied. However, it is
unlikely that every individual can be satisfied, since the primeval urge for
superiority and self-interest (gain) continues to push the individual to satisfy his
ego at others' expense. I maintain that liberal democracy has not yet overcome
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this problem; in fact the problem has increased as individuals become less
satisfied either as a result of scarce resources and the increase of the population,
or of ever increasing aspirations. Think of the influence of advertising, for instance.
The recognition of the individual as a person should be understood in terms
of gender equity. Fukuyama erred in this -respect-andcaused· a furore among
feminists. His book The End of History seems to suggest that the primeval urge
that pushes men to struggle for recognition does not affect women. One may be
compelled to think that women have nothing to do with democracy because they
do not need freedom to achieve well-being, but of course they too yearn for their
individual freedom to pursue all that they value most. Cultural diversity must also
be recognized, so that there is no imposition of the cultural preconditions of one
group over another in the name of fulfilling the objective conditions for the success
of liberal democracy. If liberal democracy cannot work with all cultures, then it
cannot be a universal and homogeneous form of government unless it happens
under colonialism or some form of domination - which would make it cease being
liberal democracy. We saw for instance that it clashes with Islam, because Islam
cannot accept the cultural preconditions of liberal democracy.
Fukuyama acknowledges both the need for material well-being and the
desire for recognition. Because the former has largely been met in the West, his
emphasis is on the latter - to such an extent that the need for material well-being,
which is still largely unsatisfied in the developing world, ends up being sorely
neglected. While Fukuyama trumpets liberal democracy as satisfying the desire for
recognition, he also shows that excessive individualism in liberal democracies
inhibits reciprocal recognition.
Fukuyama gives this panoramic and utopian view of liberal democracy
against the backdrop of the fall of socialism. One is compelled to ask: Is Fukuyama
not overhasty in writing, to borrow Siegel's (1993) words, "the premature obituary
of socialism" before it is completely dead? Is it true that socialism has collapsed for
good? Can it not be that, in the succession of shapes, socialism has moved into
another shape, which Fukuyama and the rest of us do not see or understand at the
moment? Socialism is perhaps just temporarily defeated, not dead. This implies
that it has the potential of coming back, just as liberalism has made a comeback in
the triumph of liberal democracy.
207
If liberal democracy is incompatible with Islam and other cultures, that
suggests that it is something for a particular community, not for the whole world. It
seems to have cultural preconditions that are specifically western, not African or
Asian. If so, the obvious reaction to Fukuyama's offer of liberal democracy will be
rejection. -The danger-is that to-beat the-incompatibility problem liberal democrats
will go around various countries in Africa, Asia or other parts of the world,
campaigning for a 'regime change;' crusading to dethrone those governments that
do not agree with liberal democracy. Whether this is done through military mighty,
through the financial clout of the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank, or
by the threat of withdrawing aid is immaterial. Fukuyama does not leave room for
the possible failure of liberal democracy, for he is convinced that it is a success,
yet he has not demonstrated convincingly that it is the best of all possible systems
of governance.
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6.1 RECAPITULATION: THE MAIN IDEAS OF THE STUDY
In this section I discuss the main findings obtained from the study undertaken in
the previous chapters.
The first chapter looks at how Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant use the
theory of social contract to explain the genesis and justification of the state.
Featuring prominently in all their versions of social contract are ideas of free,
equal, and independent individuals, the process of consensus, the primacy of self-
preservation and the necessity of the state. Hobbes' point of departure is the
hypothetical state of nature where we encounter free and equal individuals without
a government to arbitrate their disputes, for it is natural in the state of nature to
fight for anything needed to satisfy one's desires - for instance, the desire for
glory. The drastic modernity of Hobbesian inflexible individualism, underlying his
social contract, presents the idea of the basic and inalienable right of self-
preservation. This brings in the reason to have a juridical authority - Hobbes's
absolute monarchy, which replaces inherited monarchy. Though Hobbes was not a
liberal, shaking off inherited monarchy was a bold move, which laid the basis for a
philosophically reasoned and progressive theory of politics. Thus, according to
Fukuyama, it was a first step of political thought in the direction of liberalism and
democracy. Because it was also only a first step, it does not offer a good
foundation on which to build democracy.
While Hobbes' version of the state of nature is negative - the war of all
against all - Locke's is presented in positive terms - people living together without
having a common political authority over them, but under the guidance of natural
law - reason, as applied to morals. Locke's social contract also differs from that of
Hobbes, in being against absolute sovereignty, and in being mainly democratic in
nature; for he argues for limited political authority over the individual - hence the
function of the constitutional monarchy and the representative government is
basically to respect and protect the natural rights of the individual. When citizens
consensually institute the body politic, they bring all that they possess into the
body politic for safety and security, but the state does not have territorial
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jurisdiction over the owners and their possessions. The idea of consent in the
formation of the state is what legitimizes the state's political authority and power -
citizens consent so as to have their freedom and rights safeguarded. This - the
value of consensus and representative government - takes Locke a step further
towards liberalism than Hobbes: However; l::ockealso falls short of being a liberal
democrat because his theory lacks the aspect of political parties, and especially,
opposition parties.
Rousseau rejects Hobbes' hypothetical state of nature. Instead, he pursues
a defiant idea of collectivism that progresses unto the realization of the social
contract. For Rousseau the social contract is supposed to solve the problem of
inequality between individual citizens by instituting a sovereign assembly. The
general will works as the source of the law (conditions of civil association) and
sovereignty (body politic), as well as the basis of political right. In spite of the
criticism that his general will erodes particular (or individual) interest, Rousseau,
like Locke, propagates a radical and innovative idea of a representative democracy
that gives freedom and equality to the entire citizen body and safeguards the basic
dignity of humankind. Rousseau is not a liberal, because for him individual
interests are not a priority; the sovereign assembly takes precedence and there is
no mechanism of checks and balances to limit the coercive authority of the popular
sovereignty.
The theory of laissez-faire calls for non-interference, thereby laying the
foundation for a free market economy. This doctrine was reaffirmed in the thought
of Adam Smith, Ricardo, Mill and Bentham. Because of their emphasis on the
value of freedom above everything, they deserve the epithet of "libertarians." With
the fall of communism in the late 20th century, the maxims of laissez-faire are
revived, and the idea of laissez-faire regains its dominance in Europe, America,
and some other parts of the world.
The second chapter discusses the teleological view of history underlying the
philosophical theories of history propagated by Kant, Hegel, and Marx - each of
these thinkers assumes that history is moving towards an end point or the
fulfilment of a purpose. Kant's universal cosmopolitanism introduces the idea of a
universal history that is based on the possibility of a constant advancement of
human freedom, rationality, morality and political development. Kant's teleo-
cosmos suggests the end of history at some point in time as human history
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progress~s. At the end of history, humanity will have matured rationally, and
through good reasoning will unite under an original contract to form a civil society
that will produce a just civic constitution that assumes a universal nature - hence
the idea of the League of Nations.
Fundamental to Hegel's philosophy of history is the law of contradiction that
propels the dialectical movement of history towards its end. This dialectical
process of history is characterized by the human desire for recognition. The
struggle for recognition ends with mutual recognition between conflicting
individuals as well as the realization, and absolute knowledge, of freedom. Marx
adopts Hegel's law of contradiction in order to frame his theory of history -
historical materialism. His claim is that all human history is a history of class
struggle. Marx sees the end of history as the overcoming of the bourgeoisie by the
proletariat. This leads to the superseding of capitalism by socialism and the
ultimate triumph of a classless society in communism. In this chapter it was
concluded that at the centre of the three philosophies is the belief that history has
an end point, and that at its end point it will have attained universality. This is an
idea that Fukuyama appropriates to envisage the universality of liberal democracy.
The third chapter surveys the many forms of government that, true to the
method of Hegelian dialectic and the law of contradiction, have competed with
each other over the centuries, the one sometimes superceding the other. These
are Hobbes' absolute monarchism, Locke's constitutional monarchy and
representative government, Rousseau's sovereign representative assembly,
Hitler's Nazism and Mussolini's fascism. Last but not least we had the ideology of
socialism as a prelude to communism. Fukuyama argues that systems of
government that have fewer contradictions tend to supersede systems that have
more contradictions. After the fall of fascism and Nazism, only two ideological
contenders were left, namely socialism-to-be-followed-by-communism and liberal
democracy. When communism finally also collapsed, liberal democracy was the
only remaining option. Drawing on Kant's idea of universal history, Hegel's notion
of a universal and homogeneous state and Marx's materialist interpretation of
history, Fukuyama envisages a global order that will be ushered in by the universal
and homogeneous liberal state which is the ultimate goal of liberal democracy. So
it is the duty of the liberal state to ensure equal and mutual recognition and
affirmation of its citizens' freedom.
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In his argument, Fukuyama distinguishes between two parallel histories in
an attempt to illustrate the universality of the human desires for material
accumulation and recognition. The first, economic history, is in our time driven by
scientific endeavour, which impacts enormously on how well nations fare in the
arms--race-;--and are--thus--asle to-Elefend their-independence and sovereignty. -As
some of these competing nations perfect their technology, in the process they
produce more than they need, and thus can sell the surplus to others. This leads to
the creation of markets for their products and also the creation of labour markets
for those who want to seek new technological knowledge or expertise in order to
sell their labour to the highest bidder. Everything is consequently channelled into
the economic framework of capitalism and the free market economy. The second
history is driven by the human desire for recognition. What is at stake here is not
the passion for material accumulation, but the thymotic urge, the desire for
recognition. The desire for recognition becomes the driving force of human history
in the direction of world democratization, which brings with it the universalization of
human satisfaction.
Fukuyama claims that social capital is what links capitalism to liberal
democracy. A well functioning capitalist economy depends on the presence of
sufficient social capital in society to allow businesses, corporations, networks, and
the like to be self-organizing. As he warns us on the possible obstacles to the
successful development of global capitalism, he also warns us of the obstacles to
the development of a global political order after history. In The Great Disruption
Fukuyama argues that the future of liberal democracy is threatened by an
increasing conflict between individualism and community morals. This will result in
social disruption, posing a severe threat to liberal democracy, which needs a
stable social order to succeed.
Fukuyama's claim of the end of history was challenged after the September
11 attack, when public thinking shifted from Fukuyama's claim to Huntington's
counter-claim that what is at stake is not a conflict of ideologies but a clash of
civilizations.
The fourth chapter stages a debate between Fukuyama and Sen in which
the question of life satisfaction and its achievability is addressed. Fukuyama claims
that human beings desire recognition, and can best satisfy this desire through
liberal democracy. Sen for his part, claims that people need well-being, and can
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only achieve it through democracy, which he views as a universal value. The
discussion shows that although Fukuyama and Sen may share similar political
values they differ ideologically and in historical vision.
The fifth chapter deals with the critical evaluation of liberal democracy.
Several issues--present-major -problems for- -liberal democracy. These issues are
liberal individualism as the central focus of liberalism and liberal democracy; the
global trend against gender bias; the political and cultural homogenization of the
world; the problem of parallel histories versus a single inclusive history; desire-
satisfaction versus need-satisfaction, and the cultural preconditions of liberal
democracy. Fukuyama concedes that culture pervades all forms of government
and maintains that liberal democracy will only work if implemented within its
cultural preconditions. It is this last issue that destroys all hope that liberal
democracy will work in places other than America and Europe. Liberal democracy
will not be adopted where these cultural preconditions are not appreciated or have
not been cultivated. Liberal democracy cannot be imposed successfully under
such conditions, either.
6.2 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
The End of History
According to Fukuyama's idiosyncratic use of the notion of 'end of history,' history
is goal-oriented, directional, and progressive. Its goal is for humankind to realize
absolute knowledge of their freedom. He argues that humankind has tried many
other forms of government, in the hope of having individual freedoms recognized
and protected against the whims of government, but none of them delivered the
goods they had promised.
The "end of history" view also depicts a situation in which humankind has
reached an end point in their endeavour to find a satisfactory political and
economic framework for organizing society. At the end of history liberal democracy
remains as the only ideology that enables humankind to have a government that
recognizes their freedom and affirms their rights. FUkuyama is persuasive in
presenting his argument. He has carefully chosen his examples to illustrate the
ideological conflicts that took place between the time of Hobbes' absolute
213
monarchism and the time of communism. Everything seems to fit beautifully into
his Hegelian-Marxian dialectic method. However, what works (or seems to work) in
theory need not do so in practice, as becomes evident when one looks for
empirical counterexamples.
If humankind has -indeed-fol:Jfl(;j -tAe--uJtimate system of governance, this
would stop them from further experimenting. But the human mind is still as
inquisitive as ever, so this is unlikely to occur. If despite these objections, one still
believes in an end to history, one can view this in a very different way than
Fukuyama does. For socialists the end of history could for example mean that we
are in an era where the workers of the world are facing hard times under liberal
governments. Such anti-globalization socialists, united in their protest at the World
Trade Organization conference in Seattle, could draw courage from such an
alternative view of the end of history.
I maintain that until such demonstrations like the Seattle one and many
others to come have stopped, and all people have accepted without coercion
liberal democracy as the ultimate form of governance, we will not have reached the
end of history envisaged by Fukuyama.
Individualism
My view is that the whole of Fukuyama's "end of history" work referred to in this
thesis puts the individual above the community. As a result it appears that liberal
democracy leads to miniaturization of community and the emergence of excessive
individualization - a situation that worries FUkuyama himself. Even if Fukuyama
does attempt to address these drawbacks, they will still feature, because liberal
democracy is built on cultural preconditions that develop from a tradition that has
been fighting for, to borrow Cohen's (1999:233) words, "an ideal that emphasizes
personal happiness over all other concerns," undermining the individual's "capacity
for exhibiting civic virtue or social solidarity, both of which require commitment and
self-restraint. "
Fukuyama champions the cause of the recognition of the freedom of the
individual and the affirmation of the individual's rights. By so doing FUkuyama is
showing the worthiness of every individual in society. The problem with
Fukuyama's notion of recognition is that it continues to give absolute priority to the
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rights of the individual, as already found in Hobbes and Locke, and to care less
about the duty of the individual to communal life. Fukuyama is highly aware that
individualism is strong enough to destroy social order - hence his warning that
many liberal democracies have fallen prey to it. The conclusion Fukuyama should
have -drawn is that -the very individualism he-warns·against is an· intrinsic part, or
perhaps essential by-product, of the very ideal he espouses, liberal democracy.
One shudders at the thought of a globalization of the individualism foUnd in what
Fukuyama (1995:303) himself has described as "the black underclass of America,"
where individuals are unwilling to make any provision for each other's inclinations,
resulting in the depletion of social capital and the disintegration of society. One
also wonders why Fukuyama wishes the world to inherit a tradition where there is
no balance between the individual and the community.
Individualism conceives of the individual as an absolute or fixed unit,
instead of a being only gaining substance in a social context. This absoluteness or
completeness of the individual is described in terms of freedom, rights, and
independence. Instead of individualism, I would accept individuality. Individuality
refers to the uniqueness of a person without turning the person into an absolute
entity without social inclinations. The idea of individuality gives room to one's
uniqueness while at the same time recognizing one's social being. Thus one is a
free and independent being who cherishes the same rights as others do, but with a
strong social consciousness that makes one aware of one's responsibility to
communal life. This means that one takes responsibility for ensuring that
communal life gives due respect to the individual's dignity.
Fukuyama shows the importance of recognizing every individual by
affording him or her freedom, rights, and independence. He wishes a society of
isothymia - equal recognition. However he runs into the problems of megalothymia
- the desire for superiority of the individual, that tends to subvert existing social
institutions such as families and a communal moral authority by miniaturizing the
community, and thus causing community disenfranchisement. He thinks that the
dangers of excessive individualism can be averted by invoking social capital. The
major problem with Fukuyama's idea of social capital is that it produces market-
oriented relationships and thus does not address the threat to communal relations
in other spheres than business and the market.
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A sense of duty to communal life encourages a sense of interdependency,
while an overemphasis on rights encourages the individualistic atomization of
society. In my view, the individual's rights should be promoted sufficiently to
protect his or her right to life and dignity and all that comes with it. In addition the
individual-should beencooragedequallystrongly--to acknowledge and fulfil his or
her duties to society, as a way of maintaining a closely knit community. This will
fulfil the desire for freedom and equality as a human being recognized by other
members of the community.
Freedom and Equality
Regarding freedom and equality Fukuyama picks up where his predecessors left
off. For them freedom was needed just to be able to pursue material well-being -
self-preservation. For Fukuyama we need to be free in order to be able to
recognize each other's freedom. Fukuyama argues convincingly that liberal
democracy has brought freedom to the people. He goes a step further when he
claims that it is the best of all possible political forms of governance and that it has
brought freedom to humankind - freedom of the individual to pursue both material
and thymotic desires.
In my opinion, some of the values of liberal democracy, such as freedom
and equality (foundational or formal equality, and equality of opportunity or
outcome), embody ideals worthy of universal acceptance. These twin values stress
that humankind is capable of reflection, able to make rational choices, is creative,
can engage in communal solidarity, has rights, and can lead a virtuous life. As
such they have inescapable political and economic implications, because the
social world in which an individual lives demands political and economic
institutions. On the one hand these institutions encourage and protect one's
freedom to be creative, one's right to participate in the process of political decision
making, and to cultivate rational choices; on the other hand, these institutions exert
pressure to discourage the human greed and self-centredness that can lead to the
violation of other people's rights.
Fukuyama is wrong to claim that liberal democracy, having succeeded in
bringing freedom to all people in the West, has definitely vanquished all its
contenders, past and future, so that no other form of government will ever be able
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to supersede it. This contradicts the whole idea of the directionality of history under
the regulatory mechanism of scientific endeavour, because scientific endeavour
evolves ever onwards, without ever reaching a teleological goal. Human thinking
and inquiry into the human context does not just end because liberal democracy
-has brought -freedom toaay.--H- -is pQssible-t~at- some socialist or other form of
government is in the making that will be as good or better than liberal democracy,
that is, have less internal contradictions than liberal democracy.
Desire for Recognition
Fukuyama attempts to do justice to human history by looking back at the various
inclinations of humankind. Out of the whole collection of human needs he chooses
to focus on only certain desires or appetites. His focus is biased towards the West
that has already achieved material well-being. But what about those communities
where the basic need for material well-being is still unfulfilled? Everybody knows
that in many parts of the developing world, people still need shelter, clothing, and
food. We cannot talk of a desire for recognition as something separate from one's
basic needs. To me Fukuyama is wrong to think that the whole world shares the
same desire - the yearning to have the desire for recognition satisfied. Thus one
cannot universalize desire and its fulfilment. It is true that television advertisements
and the internet reach many parts of the world, and many people seem to admire
Western consumerism and the desires it is geared at. The problem here is that
there are many entrenched interests that welcome and foster a drive towards
consumerism - even of political "products" - while even the most basic needs
have not been met. If an individual is offered the freedom to pursue his or her
needs, or to participate significantly in the political process - for instance
participation in the general elections of his or her country - then that to me is
recognition. The central thing that should be sought by every member of the
community is the freedom to do the things he or she values most, and to be the
kind of person he or she has reason to value.
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Universal History
According to Fukuyama, the spread of liberal democracy and the realization of
every individual's freedom in many parts of the world unlocks a pattern of a
-universal nrstory -in the-making, -as-- people-anticipate an end-- point of history.
Fukuyama alerts the world that there are a set of principles at work underlying
human history that can be uncovered by a philosophy of history drawing on Kant,
Hegel, and Marx. These underlying principles relate to the individual's place in the
dialectical movement of a goal oriented history that has to culminate in the
recognition of every individual's freedom.
Though Fukuyama's attempt to show how everything fits in a Hegelian-
Marxian dialectical philosophy of history is impressive, it is still possible that there
could be another understanding of the universality of history not yet discovered,
rather than thinking that it only unfolds when the world consensually receives
liberal democracy and every individual is able to have full knowledge of his
freedom and rights. Of course this would be a good thing if it were possible to
achieve. Fukuyama's implication, however, is that individuals are only able to
realize their freedoms and rights in the event of a homogeneous liberal state. It is
not possible for liberal democracy to be a universal ideological framework and
system of governance for all human communities of the world - firstly, because of
the fact of cultural diversity; secondly, because of liberal democracy's ingrained
tendency to flatten cultural diversity by imposing Western cultural values and
practices upon other cultures. The tendency of its practitioners to overlook cultural
variety impedes its reception as the sole and valid framework for governance and
distribution, and frequently leads to its outright rejection.
The synthesis of Kant's idea of a universal history, Hegel's homogeneous
state, and Marx's internationalization of the labour market, makes Fukuyama's
view of history, freedom and recognition a rich one.
What upsets Fukuyama's apple cart is his belief that there are parts of the
world that are still in history, while others are beyond history because for them it
has ended with the arrival of liberal democracy. This introduces a fundamental
unclarity into Fukuyama's "end of history" project. World history becomes
something like the eclipse of the sun, that does not cover the whole world.
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Trust
Trust occupies a central place in Fukuyama's discussion of social capital, because
he tries to prove that trust within family circles does not help in the development of
the type of big business on which-Iarge-economies--depend~-Fukuyama is correct to
argue that trust builds up social capital, which in turn contributes to economic
growth. However, Fukuyama makes a mistake similar to the one Hegel made in
giving an overview of world history, when Hegel claims that Africa does not have
history. This happens when Fukuyama divides the world into countries with high
trust and countries with low trust, implying that countries with low trust are never
compatible with large-scale business. However countries that are high trust are
also extremely individualistic,· so that their citizens can be expected to mistrust
other individuals, the family and the institutions of the state - none of which is in
the least conducive to interpersonal interaction nor, by the same token, to
business. Fukuyama himself shows that in America there are situations where
people are so over-individualized that they cannot do anything together.
I think that economic development depends far more on people's freedom
to do what they themselves think can help the community achieve economic
growth. Certainly trust is a crucial component for economic development and
prosperity, but it should assume more of a social character and be less market
oriented than it is Fukuyama. For if social capital is to be built on market terms,
there is always a catch - that of social disruption because a moral dimension is
absent.
The other problem is that Fukuyama thinks that trust is only crucial in
democratic societies. This is not true at all. Trust also plays a central role in non-
democratic societies, such as Gaddafi's Libya, or Hitler's Germany. So we should
not think of trust only in terms of economic benefits, but also in. terms of its moral
significance for communal development.
Sovereignty
Fukuyama's notion of the "end of history" should be seen against the backdrop of
the 'new world order.' As already shown in the first chapter, the human striving for
a new world order that guarantees peace and stability has historical roots that go
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back very far. Up until the Cold War, there was a 'multi-polar world order' - like in
the Hobbesian state of nature - characterized by colonial wars, wars of greed,
wars of ambition and gain, and all the other forms of instability that led to World
War I and World War 11. This multi-polar world order proved to be dangerous, and
offered- insufficient guarantees of peace and stability to afford well-being. After the
first and second World Wars there was a renewed attempt to create a "new world
order" to secure peace and stability. But of course out of this process a 'new bi-
polar world order' emerged with the two superpowers - the United States and the
Soviet Union - at each other's throat, in what is commonly known as the Cold War.
At the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, a "new uni-polar world order"
emerged with the United States as the only remaining superpower. It is to this uni-
polar world order that Fukuyama attaches the label of the end of history,
suggesting that there is an international consensus in favour of liberal democracy.
Fukuyama takes the social contract idea of consensus and uses it, as he
expects people worldwide to agree with the claims of liberal democracy and
consensually receive it as the sole, universal and valid form of government. He
tries to show us that liberal democracy works with substantive consensus on
fundamental issues that benefit every individual. Hence, some day there will be
consensual reception of liberal democracy by all of humanity and consequently a
liberal state will be established. The major problem with this is that there is a
tendency for liberal societies to undervalue other societies and overlook their
uniqueness. This is the reason why liberal democracy is unlikely to succeed in the
Islamic world - barring the use of military means, their desire to maintain their
traditions is invincible. Such a consensus is unlikely to arise because the
insistence by nation-states on their sovereignty does not allow any shift from the
nation-state to a homogeneous and universal liberal state, characterized by a
market economy and liberal democracy, as espoused by Fukuyama. This is
because these nation-states fear disenfranchisement and assimilation.
Cultural Preconditions
Although accused by his critics of being a cultural essentialist, I think Fukuyama is
right to show that liberal democracy has a cultural foundation. Thus liberal
democracy can only work under cultural preconditions emanating from a long
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Western tradition. All proponents of liberal democracy must bear in mind that
liberal democracy may fail in societies lacking these Western cultural
preconditions. Every ideological framework has a cultural basis. That basis must
be maintained for it to succeed. Despite Fukuyama's claim that liberal democracy
is the· sole-valid--system of governance with-l:Jniversal pretensions-, there will never
be sufficient consensus to receive it as a universal system, because not all people
subscribe to its cultural preconditions. The other thing is that at the moment the
world cannot have a common culture unless one is made up, as a way to come up
with cultural habits that are compatible with liberal democracy. I maintain that
liberal democracy will always get a mixed reception because there will never be
sufficient consensus regarding its desirability.
6.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Due to its internal contradictions, such as the tension between excessive
individualism and community, liberal democracy has unintended negative
consequences. I thus conclude that liberal democracy is not yet the final ideology
leading to human satisfaction at a global level for this generation and generations
to come. This will remain the case as long as scientific development continues, as
long as rational thought does not come to an end and as long as Fukuyama's
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